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I. INTRODUCTION
THE FOLLOWING "Recent Developments in Aviation Law"
article was originally presented as a paper and speech at the
1995 SMU Air Law Symposium. The article attempts to present
a reasonably comprehensive report of aviation case law decisions
from all United States jurisdictions that were published between
November 1, 1993, the submission deadline for the 1993 report,
and December 1994. Unpublished reported decisions are in-
cluded, as'well, to the extent they could be located using con-
ventional resources. To all who participated in cases resulting in
published decisions that are not included, the author extends
his humble apology.
Although a summary of aviation case law decisions decided
over slightly more than one year's time presents only a snapshot
view of the state of the law, it is possible to identify certain
trends. For example, the preemption of state law tort claims by
federal law under the Aviation Deregulation Act of 1978, which
was expanded significantly in the case law decisions of recent
years, underwent a marked retrenchment in 1994, with fewer
successful cases of preemption published. The Warsaw Conven-
tion, on the other hand, seems to have largely retained its his-
toric vitality, although the case law authority continues to be
split over several important issues, and the Convention itself
continues to be frequently attacked by the aviation plaintiffs'
bar.
In addition to aviation case law decisions, this year's article
includes a selection of important cases decided outside of the
aviation context that may have significant effects in future avia-
tion cases. The author believes this is the first time such cases
have been included in the continuing series of "Recent Develop-
ments" reports and hopes that the practice will be continued.
This year's article also summarizes relevant statutory enact-
ments, including, most prominently, the General Aviation Revi-
talization Act of 1994.
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Because the summarized cases are of recent vintage, in con-
sidering their impact it is important to recognize that some may
have been modified by subsequent court or legislative action. In
addition, while the summarized cases are grouped under dis-
crete subject headings corresponding to their dominant area of
concern, many of the cases deal with multiple issues that are
covered elsewhere in the article.
As with any project of this magnitude, many hands played a
role in its creation. The author's heartfelt appreciation goes to
the following Kenney, Burd & Markowitz attorneys, without
whose assistance this article would not have come to exist: Tom
K. Hammitt, the editor of the article; James D. Caven; Adam S.
Gruen; Stephen E. Kyle; George M. Moore; David R. Pearl; Wil-
liam F. Gutierrez; Philip D. Witte; and legal assistant Gordon




In Durrett v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,1 applying the long-arm stat-
ute of the forum state, Michigan, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found personal juris-
diction lacking and dismissed the case. This personal injury ac-
tion, which arose from the crash of a Cessna aircraft equipped
with Wipaire floats, involved a challenge to the district court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction in a case where subject matter
jurisdiction was based on diversity.
When federal subject matter jurisdiction is based solely on di-
versity of citizenship, the district court looks to the law of the
forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists
over a defendant. As neither Cessna nor Wipaire are incorpo-
rated or have their principal places of business in Michigan, the
state long-arm statute provided the sole possible basis for juris-
diction. Under that statute, plaintiffs were required to prove
that the defendants carried on "continuous and systematic busi-
ness" in Michigan.' The district court examined the plaintiffs'
pleadings and affidavits in their most favorable light and found:
(1) Cessna's corporate headquarters and manufacturing facility
were in Kansas; (2) Cessna did not operate any service centers,
I No. 93-CV-72837-DT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3240 (E.D. Mich.Jan. 18, 1994).
2 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.711 (West Supp. 1994).
3 Id. § 600.711(3).
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dealerships, or subsidiaries in Michigan; (3) Cessna advertises in
national publications; (4) Wipaire was a Minnesota corporation
with its principal place of business in Minnesota; (5) Wipaire did
not have an office in Michigan; (6) Wipaire did not maintain a
bank account in Michigan; and (7) Wipaire did not have any
representatives, agents, or dealers in Michigan. The court ruled
that personal jurisdiction under the Michigan long-arm statute
did not exist based on these facts. 4
The court then considered whether Cessna's subsidiary rela-
tionship with Textron, Inc., which was present in Michigan, af-
fected its analysis. In reliance on Third National Bank in Nashville
v. Wedge Group,5 however, the court ruled that Textron's pres-
ence did not create personal jurisdiction over its subsidiaries.
The court, therefore, dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
B. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrIES Acr (FSIA)
In Gould v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp.,6 a wrongful death ac-
tion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA) ,7 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the United States subsidi-
ary of a French state-owned corporation was not entitled to a
bench trial, even though it was named as a defendant together
with its parent. The action arose from an Idaho crash of a heli-
copter that was designed and manufactured by the foreign state-
owned corporation and marketed in the United States by a
wholly-owned domestic subsidiary. Also named as defendants
were three individual United States citizens.
Previous to trial, the district court had denied the motion of
the French parent and its United States subsidiary to strike
plaintiff's jury trial demand on the ground that 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1330(a) prohibits jury trials of actions against foreign sover-
eigns. These parties then admitted liability, and the court
proceeded to try damages in a bench trial with respect to the
foreign defendant and, in a simultaneous jury trial, against its
domestic subsidiary.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the domestic subsidi-
ary's argument that it was entitled to a bench trial along with its
parent. The court of appeals held that the plain language and
4 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3240 at *4.
5 882 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
6 40 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1994).
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
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legislative history of the FSIA indicated that section 1330(a) only
applies to "foreign states." 8 The Ninth Circuit also noted the
cases in which parallel jury/nonjury procedures had been em-
ployed in similar FSIA actions in other judicial circuits.9 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that section 1330(a) did not grant the
right to a bench trial to the domestic subsidiary.'"
The Ninth Circuit case of Sugimoto v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de
C.V 11 was an appeal that involved the second of two jurisdic-
tional challenges raised by defendant Exportadora de Sal, S.A.
de C.V. in a wrongful death action arising from the crash of an
air taxi engaged by Exportadora to transport certain business
visitors from its facility in Guerrero Negro, Mexico, to San Di-
ego, California. Exportadora appealed an adverse judgment fol-
lowing a bench trial.
Exportadora, a salt manufacturer that is fifty-one percent
owned by the Government of Mexico and forty-nine percent
owned by Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan, claimed that the
FSIA precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction
over plaintiff's action. In affirming the district court's rejection
of the immunity defense, the Ninth Circuit invoked the "corn-
mercial activity" exception of the FSIA.12 Under this exception,
a foreign state is subject to jurisdiction in the United States
court if the action involves conduct that occurred in the course
of commercial activity carried on in the United States.' 3 Citing
the tortious conduct of the pilot, which occurred in U.S. air
space, and Exportadora's conduct in arranging transportation
for prospective business partners, the court of appeals held that
the "commercial activity" exception applied.14
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Exportadora's argument that
it could not be held liable for the pilot's negligence on the the-
ory that he was employed by an independent contractor. While
acknowledging the general rule precluding liability under such
circumstances, the court noted that the rule was so riddled with
exceptions that " 'it is applied only when there is no good rea-
son for departing from it.' 115 According to the court, "good
8 40 F.3d at 1034.
9 Id. at 1035.
10 Id. at 1036.
11 1'9 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 .(1994).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
13 Id.
14 19 F.3d at 1311.
15 Id. at 1312 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1977)).
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reason" existed in this case due to Exportadora's control of ac-
cess to its facility.16
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The Fifth Circuit case of Jorreblanca de Aguilar v. Boeing Co',1 7
an appeal regarding conflicts between federal and state proce-
dural law, resulted from plaintiffs' fourth attempt to pursue a
wrongful death action in a United States court arising from a
Mexicana Airlines crash in Mexico. In the first two attempts,
plaintiffs had filed Texas and Illinois state court actions that de-
fendants successfully removed to federal court and had dis-
missed on federal forum non conveniens grounds. The third
attempt was filed in Washington state court and was dismissed
on state forum non conveniens grounds. Seeking to capitalize
upon a subsequent Texas Supreme Court decision that Texas
common law would no longer countenance the forum non con-
veniens doctrine in wrongful death actions,"8 plaintiffs again
filed suit in Texas state court. After the action was removed, the
district court denied plaintiffs' motion to remand and again dis-
missed the action on federal forum non conveniens grounds.
In upholding the district court's denial of the remand mo-
tion, the Fifth Circuit discounted affidavits executed by plain-
tiffs' counsel stating that the amount in controversy was less
than the $50,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction. 9 Citing re-
buttal testimony offered by defendants, including the amounts
plaintiffs had sought in their previous actions, the court found
that the amount in controversy was in excess of the jurisdictional
minimum.20 The court dismissed plaintiffs' counsel's affidavits
as an "artful post-removal pleading in order to avoid the conse-
quences of federal forum non conveniens law."21
The court of appeals then turned to plaintiffs' contention that
Texas law should apply and held that federal forum non con-
veniens law should apply in diversity actions. Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal after concluding, without
16 Id.
17 11 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993).
is Dow Chemical v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024
(1990); but seeTEX. Civ. PRtc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon 1993 & Supp.
1995).
19 11 F.2d at 57.
20 Id. at 58.
21 Id.
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substantive discussion, that the district court had not abused its
discretion in dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds.2 2
In 1993 the Texas legislature codified the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.25 Affecting actions filed on or after September 1,
1993, the statute responds to the Texas Supreme Court's aboli-
tion of the common law forum non conveniens doctrine in Dow
Chemical Co. v. Alfaro.24 The statute establishes different tests ap-
plicable to claimants depending on whether they are or are not
legal residents of the United States, and it creates several signifi-
cant exceptions to the doctrine for particular types of lawsuits.
The statute also specifically exempts injury or death actions aris-
ing from air transportation, provided the factual basis for the
action has sufficient contacts with Texas. With respect to claim-
ants who are not legal United States residents, the statute simply
provides that the court may stay or dismiss an action on forum
non conveniens grounds provided the court finds it "in the inter-
est of justice" to do so.2 5
Application of the doctrine to legal United States residents is
limited to instances where the court determines that an out-of-
state forum is more appropriate, based on several specified fac-
tors. The application of the doctrine is further restricted to
cases where each defendant enters a written stipulation that it
will submit to personal jurisdiction in the transferee forum and
waives any statute of limitation defense that would be available
in the transferee, but not the transferor, forum. The statute also
exempts actions that are: (1) brought by legal residents of
Texas; (2) allege that "acts" or "omissions" occurring in Texas
were at least contributory causes of the claimant's injury; (3)
brought under specified federal statutes; or (4) involve asbestos
or other toxic tort exposures. 2 With respect to air transporta-
tion, the statute exempts injury and death actions that are
"caused by a means of air transportation designed, manufac-
tured, sold, maintained, inspected or repaired in this state or
occurred while traveling in or on a means of air transportation
during a trip originating from or destined for a location in this
state ....27
22 Id. at 59.
23 TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051.
24 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1990).
25 TEX. Crv. PR.c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(a).
26 Id. § 71.051(f)(1)-(3), (5).
27 Id. § 71.051(f)(4).
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III. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY AND DEFENSES
A. PREEMPTION
1. Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978
a. Preemption of Personal Injury Claims
In the diversity action of Doricent v. American Airlines, Inc.,2 8 the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts de-
nied a defense motion for summary judgment based on federal
preemption of plaintiff's emotional distress and assault and bat-
tery claims, under section 1305(a) (1) of the Federal Aviation
Act?9 as interpreted in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.30 The
court, however, granted summary judgment for defendant on
plaintiff's state law civil rights claims, ruling that those laws
would not be applied as none of the alleged tortious conduct
occurred in Massachusetts.
The following facts were stipulated as true for purposes of
summary judgment:
Plaintiff was a standby passenger on a flight from Haiti to New
York and was the last to board the plane. While attempting to
place his bags in the overhead compartment, a flight attendant
yelled at him to sit down. As soon as plaintiff sat, the flight at-
tendant yelled at him to put his bags in the overhead compart-
ment. Plaintiff told the flight attendant not to yell at him, and
the flight attendant responded by stating, "Get the black guy off
the plane. He is staying in Haiti." Another airline employee yel-
led that plaintiff was a Communist.
Haitian military guards who were standing at the stairs leading
to the airplane then yelled, "Let us kill these Communist bas-
tards. They are making all this trouble for the country when
they come here." They then began beating plaintiff. The air-
line captain intervened, verified that plaintiff was a United
States citizen, and ordered the guards to desist.
Section 1305(a) (1) of the Federal Aviation Act bars any "state
or political subdivision" from enacting or enforcing laws "relat-
ing to rates, routes or services" of any air carrier. In Morales the
Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of "relating to" is
extremely broad and extends to state statutes or actions that
have some connection with or reference to "airline rates, routes
No. CIV-A. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670 (D. Mass. Oct. 19, 1993).
29 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
so 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
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or services."3 1 Thus, any statute or action would be preempted if
it had the "forbidden significant effect" on airline rates, routes
or services, even if not specifically directed at them.32 The Mas-
sachusetts District Court, however, interpreting the purpose be-
hind section 1305 as economic, held that preemption would
hinge on the finding of economic impact on airline rates caused
by the state action."3
American also argued that plaintiff's claims should be pre-
empted as relating to airline "services." The court rejected this
argument, ruling that
[r]acial discrimination, the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and assault and battery have nothing whatsoever to do
with any legitimate or quasi-legitimate industry-wide practice of
affording airline services. Imposing liability for such conduct
under Massachusetts law is not shown in any way to "significantly
impact" an airline's ability to administer services, or set rates and
routes.3
4
American also argued that the Massachusetts civil rights stat-
utes on which plaintiff based certain claims were inapplicable, in
that all of the alleged tortious conduct occurred in Haiti. The
court granted summary judgment as to these claims, reasoning
that, because an appropriate injunction under the statutes could
only be enforced within Massachusetts, the statutes could not be
applied to conduct occurring in Haiti.3 5 Plaintiff was allowed to
proceed with his claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and assault and battery.
In Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,36 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held genuine issues of material
fact precluded summary judgment. In this personal injury ac-
tion arising from a fall by an elderly passenger, the lower court
rejected defendant air carrier's argument that claims arising
from alleged negligence in supervising passengers in its termi-
nal baggage areas were preempted by federal law as "relating to"
rates, routes or services. The lower court, however, granted
summary judgment for defendant, ruling that, under applicable
New York law, air carriers do not owe the heightened, common-
31 Id. at 2031.
32 Id at 2037-38.
33 1993 WL 437670 at *4-*5.
34 Id. at *5.
35 Id. at *7-*8.
-% 849 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, vacated, remanded, 52 F.3d 463 (2d
Cir. 1995).
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carrier duty of care to passengers and are only subject to the
ordinary negligence standard of care.
The accident occurred when plaintiff, while waiting to re-
trieve her bags from a baggage carousel, was struck by baggage
that was dislodged by another passenger in retrieving his lug-
gage. Plaintiff fell, breaking her hip. Applying ordinary negli-
gence rules, the court ruled that the air carrier lacked any duty
to protect plaintiff from the type of harm she encountered be-
cause the dangers associated with waiting near crowded baggage
carousels are open and obvious.3 7 The court also found that
preventive measures the air carrier could take would either be
ineffective or unduly burdensome.m With respect to the pre-
emption argument, the court ruled that federal preemption was
not meant to apply to ordinary premises liability claims.39
In another Second Circuit case, Sedigh v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 40
the action arose from plaintiff's alleged wrongful ejection from
defendant's international flight. The court ruled that plaintiff's
state law claims were not preempted, but the court granted sum-
mary judgment for defendant under a statutory privilege author-
izing air carriers to refuse transportation to persons when
necessary in the interests of flight safety.4
Plaintiff was ticketed on a Delta Airlines flight from the
United States to Turkey. During a layover at Frankfurt Interna-
tional Airport in Germany, plaintiff commented, in favorable
terms, "so this is the country where so many Jews were killed."
Plaintiff allegedly made various other comments about "killing
all the Jews," along with other defamatory comments about
members of the Jewish faith and activated the lavatory smoke
detector during the layover.
Nine armed United States federal marshals were on board the
aircraft. Together with the captain, the marshals determined
that plaintiff posed a security risk and removed him from the
flight. Plaintiff was handed over to the German authorities, who
arrested him for altering his passport. Plaintiff alleged that the
German authorities kept him hand cuffed for three days, beat
him, and forced him to pay a fine for crimes he did not commit.
37 Id. at 183-84.
s8 Id. at 185.
39 Id. at 182.
40 850 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
41 49 U.S.C. app. § 1511 (1988).
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Ultimately, plaintiff was returned to the United States on a Delta
flight.
Plaintiff filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York (the trial
court of that state), charging Delta with breach of contract, false
imprisonment, slander, assault, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Plaintiff's wife filed a related claim for loss
of comfort. Plaintiffs sought damages in excess of $4 million.
The case was removed to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, and defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment.
The summary judgment motion raised two grounds: (1) fed-
eral preemption; and (2) the privilege to eject passengers who
pose a threat to air safety. After carefully analyzing the ADA and
Morales,42 the court found no preemption because "the proper
focus should be on whether or not the specific common law ac-
tion addresses matters about which the airlines wish or are likely
to compete."4 3 The court, however, awarded summary judg-
ment under the discretionary removal power granted by section
1511.
In Kay v. USAir, Inc.,44 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that ADA preemption did
not apply to plaintiff's action for personal injuries sustained
while disembarking from an aircraft. Plaintiff fell allegedly re-
questing but not receiving assistance in disembarking.
Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas for
Philadelphia County, from which defendant removed, claiming
removal jurisdiction under the ADA, and moved for summary
judgment on the basis that plaintiff's state law claims were pre-
empted. The federal district court overruled defendant's pre-
emption argument, noting that "to hold that Section 1305 (a) (1)
of the ADA preempts state tort claims for negligence would be
to leave plaintiff entirely without remedy."41 In the court's view,
it was "inconceivable that Congress would have intended Section
1305(a) (1) of the ADA to act as a grant of total immunity to the
airlines for any and all service-related negligence."46 The court
cited with approval the dicta in Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc.4 7
in which the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that "Con-
42 112 S. Ct. at 2031.
43 850 F. Supp. at 200.
- No. 93-4856, 1994 WL 406548 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1994).
45 1994 WL 406548 at *2.
6 Id.
47 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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gress has expressed no intent to preempt traditional state law
claims for negligence... [p]reemption under Section 1305 was
not intended to be an insurance policy for air carriers against
their own negligence."48
In Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,49 during a flight from the Car-
ibbean to Miami, a passenger opened an overhead compart-
ment directly above plaintiff, dislodging a case of rum, which
fell on plaintiff, lacerating her left arm and wrist. The district
court held that plaintiff's action was preempted and plaintiff ap-
pealed. Although the Fifth Circuit favored the argument that
ADA preemption does not generally apply to state common law
personal injury claims, it held itself bound by its previous deci-
sion in Baugh v. Trans World Airlines,50 in which it had affirmed a
dismissal of a personal injury claim arising from a passenger's
foot being stepped on by a flight attendant.
In Chouest v. American Airlines, Inc.,51 plaintiffs, a husband and
wife, brought personal injury actions in Louisiana state court
arising from injuries the husband suffered while participating in
ground transportation provided as part of defendant's vacation
package. Defendant removed the action to federal court on the
basis of diversity and federal question jurisdiction, and plaintiffs
sought remand, which the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana granted.
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, plaintiffs conceded that
their claims were worth less than $50,000 each, and the district
court noted that their broadly pleaded allegations were not in-
consistent with plaintiffs' admission.
With respect to the federal question jurisdiction, the district
court considered, and ultimately rejected, defendant's argu-
ment for preemption of plaintiffs' state law causes under the
ADA. The district court distinguished Morales52 and the Fifth
Circuit precedent in Baugh3 in ruling that "ground transporta-
tion services, or an air carrier's procurement of ground trans-
portation services for its customers" are not air carrier "services,"
even if they are included in a vacation package provided by the
air carrier. 4
48 1994 WL 406548 at *3 (quoting Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 323-21).
49 4 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1993), reh'g granted, 12 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 1994).
50 915 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
51 839 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. La. 1993).
52 112 S. Ct. at 2031.
53 915 F.2d at 693.
54 839 F. Supp. at 416.
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In Fenn v. American Airlines, Inc.,55 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied the unop-
posed motion to dismiss of defendant American Airlines, Inc.
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b) (6), hold-
ing that plaintiff's state law tort claims were not preempted.
While on an American flight, plaintiff, a registered nurse, no-
ticed another passenger having trouble breathing. With the pas-
senger's and a flight attendant's permission, plaintiff
administered medical care until the airplane landed an hour
later. The passenger then accused plaintiff of stealing her ring.
Plaintiff was then detained by American employees. Subse-
quently, she filed an action in Mississippi state court for slander
and false imprisonment, which American removed and moved
to dismiss.
The court denied the motion, holding that preemption under
the Federal Aviation Act does not apply to all claims relating to
airline "safety."51 6 The court explained that "[t]he intent of this
distinction is to secure by federal preemption the benefits of
economic deregulation of the airline industry, while maintain-
ing the traditional role of state law in adjudicating bodily injury
claims."57 An airline's failure to keep a passenger safe from
harm, the court ruled, should not be preempted.5 The court
then remanded the case to state court.
In Bayne v. Adventure Tours USA, Inc., 9 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas held that plain-
tiffs' claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act for
breach of warranty, slander, emotional distress, and false impris-
onment were not preempted and remanded the case to state
court.
While on a charter flight, plaintiffs allegedly made repeated,
unheeded complaints to airline employees about another pas-
senger's disruptive behavior. Upon landing, plaintiffs were
taken into police custody, detained, and subjected to a luggage
search. Plaintiffs sued in Texas state court. Defendants re-
moved the action on the basis of federal preemption and then
moved to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for remand on
the basis of lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
55 839 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
56 Id. at 1223.
57 Id. at 1222-23.
58 Id. at 1223.
59 841 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
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In rejecting defendant's preemption argument, the district
court quoted the Fifth Circuit's recent ruling in Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc.6 0 that only" 'elements of the air carrier service bar-
gain' such as 'ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food
and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transporta-
tion itself' qualify as 'services' warranting broad protection from
state regulation under section 1305."61
In O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,6" the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied defendant's
FRCP 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, holding that plaintiff's per-
sonal injury claims were not preempted.
Plaintiff suffered a severe and permanent hearing loss when
his flight allegedly descended too rapidly. Delta urged that the
negligence claim was preempted as relating to airline "services."
The court disagreed, finding that "services" does not extend to
all matters concerning passenger safety. Noting that section
1305 does not mention "safety," the court ruled that state law
negligence personal injury actions are not preempted because
they concern safety aspects unrelated to "rates, routes or
seivices."
6 3
Seligman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.6 concerned alleged discrim-
ination against passengers with disabilities who potentially posed
a danger to flight safety or to other passengers.
Plaintiffs, a married couple, both suffered from Tourette's
Syndrome, a genetic disability associated with various symptoms
including involuntary movements and vocalizations such as pro-
fanity. They were scheduled to fly on defendant's airline from
Detroit to San Francisco on the return portion of a round-trip
ticket. At the Detroit Airport, plaintiffs allegedly advised the
ticket agent of their disability, provided information concerning
Tourette's Syndrome, and requested early boarding in order to
discuss their disability with the flight crew. The captain of the
aircraft allegedly advised the plaintiffs that they could not fly on
the aircraft because they might become disruptive. However,
plaintiffs were allowed to board the flight. Plaintiffs alleged that
during the flight they were treated badly by at least one flight
60 4 F.8d 350 (5th Cir. 1993).
61 841 F. Supp. at 208.
62 838 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
63 Id. at 1267.
64 No. C-93-3801 SAW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1994) (text available in AVIATION
LrrIG. REP., Feb. 22, 1994, at 19706).
1995]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
attendant. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California alleging
two federal claims and nine state law claims. Defendant moved
for dismissal averring that the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The court examined the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986
(ACAA) 65 (an amendment to the Fcdcai Avluwi, 1 Act) LU itaer-
mine whether the air carrier had unlawfully discriminated
against plaintiffs because of their handicap. 66 The ACAA specifi-
cally prohibits denying transportation to handicapped individu-
als whose handicap may result in involuntary behavior that may
"offend, annoy or inconvenience", crew members or other pas-
sengers.67 The Federal Aviation Act, however, provides that
"subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Transportation, any carrier may refuse transporta-
tion of a passenger or property when, in the opinion of the car-
rier, such transportation would or might be inimical to safety of
flight."68 The complaint stated that "the captain ordered the
plaintiffs off the aircraft, claiming that plaintiffs were a hazard to
other passengers." The court found that the complaint did not
allege that the captain was motivated by safety concerns but
merely set forth grounds barring plaintiffs from the flight. The
court also noted that even if it were assumed that the captain
was acting out of concern for flight safety, his discretion was lim-
ited by the anti-discrimination provisions of the ACAA. Defend-
ants also sought to rely on the Rehabilitation Act of 197369 as
supporting dismissal of plaintiffs' action, which the Court also
rejected.
In addition, defendant argued that plaintiffs' state law claims
were preempted under the ADA. The court, after examining
the case law, concluded that "plaintiffs' state law claims for im-
proper treatment by airline employees during boarding and
flights were related to airline services, and are therefore pre-
empted by section 1305."70 Accordingly, the Court dismissed
plaintiffs' state law claims.
65 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (1988), repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-272, 7(b), 108 Stat. 379. The subject matter formerly covered in this section
is now covered generally in 49 U.S.C.S. § 41705 (Law. Co-op. 1995).
66 AVIATION LITIG. REP., Feb. 22, 1994, at 19707-08.
67 49 U.S.C.S. app. § 13764.
68 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1988).
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
70 AviATION LITIG. REP., Feb. 22, 1994, at 19711.
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Finally, defendant sought to rely on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to dismiss plaintiffs' tenth and eleventh causes of ac-
tion for equitable relief. The court concluded ihat plaintiffs'
claims for equitable relief rested on state law and, therefore,
were preempted. However, to the extent that plaintiffs' claims
for equitable relief rested on federal law, the claims were subject
to agency resolution under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In Martin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,71 the Florida appellate court
held that federal preemption was an affirmative defense that
must be raised in the defendant's answer to provide a basis for a
motion to dismiss. In addition to ruling against defendant on
this procedural ground, the court ruled that federal law did not
preempt appellant's negligence action.72
Appellant was struck on the head by a briefcase that fell out of
the overhead compartment when a flight attendant opened the
compartment. The action was filed in 1987 but was stayed until
1989 when a stipulation and order modifying Eastern's auto-
matic bankruptcy stay was filed. Eastern raised the federal pre-
emption issue for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed in
1992, Well after the statute of limitations had run, which the trial
court granted.
The appellate court reversed the dismissal, ruling that the fed-
eral preemption defense was waived when defendant failed to
raise it in its answer. 73 The court also held that reversal'was
proper on the merits, ruling that actions based on flight attend-
ant negligence do not relate to airline services under Morales.74
In support, the court referred to two post-Morales cases indicat-
ing that the purpose of preemption was confined to ensuring
against state actions that would frustrate the purposes of the
Federal Aviation Act, which are related to allowing market
forces to promote innovation, efficiency, and quality in air trans-
portation.75 Quoting the two post-Morales cases, the court held
that "'preemption was not intended to be an insurance policy
for air carriers against their own negligence.' "76
71 630 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
72 Id. at 1207.
7 Id.
4 Id. at 1208-09.
75 See Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993);
Heler v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 92 CIV-A-1937, 1993 WL 330093 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
*25, 1993).
76 630 So. 2d at 1209 (citations omitted).
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The New York Appellate Division case of Harrell v. Champlain
Enterprises, Inc." arose from the death of a Champlain Enter-
prises airline mechanic traveling on an employee pass on board
a company aircraft. In its answer to the complaint, defendant
asserted that an express release provision contained in the em-
ployee's traveling pass precluded the action. To prevent the ap-
plication of New York law, under which the release would not
have absolved defendant for its own negligence, defendant ar-
gued that the ADA preempted New York law. Rejecting this ar-
gument, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to strike the
"release" defense. The appellate division affirmed, noting that
the majority of federal courts addressing the issue had deter-
mined that most common law injury claims fall outside the pre-
emptive scope of the Federal Aviation Act.78
On consideration of the defendant air carrier's motion for
leave to amend its answer to include the affirmative defense of
federal preemption,79 the New York trial court in Hirsch v. Ameri-
can Airlines8" sua sponte determined that plaintiff's claims were
preempted and dismissed the action, and the appellate court'
affirmed.
While in the process of boarding defendant's flight from Los
Angeles to New York, plaintiff's child became disruptive and un-
ruly and was ordered to disembark. Plaintiff followed with her
other child. Plaintiff then filed state law claims alleging dam-
ages arising from the incident.
In ruling that plaintiff's claims were preempted, the court re-
lied on the section 1305(a) (1) preemption of state law claims
that "significantly affect" air carrier "rates, routes or services.""
The court also relied on section 1511 of the Act, which allows a
carrier to " 'refuse transportation of a passenger or property
when, in the opinion of the carrier, such transportation would
or might be inimical to safety of flight.' "82
The court noted that courts within the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits had previously addressed the operation of these two sec-
tions and adopted their findings that Congress intended that
77 613 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
78 Id. at 1004.
79 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
80 608 N.Y.S.2d 606 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 608 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1511(a)).
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regulation of boarding procedures, including boarding denials,
be left to the FAA."
In Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,"4 plaintiffs, husband and
wife, successfully challenged the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to defendant air carrier in a case arising from per-
sonal injuries and loss of society they suffered as a result of an
in-flight luggage fall from an overhead bin. The court of ap-
peals for the First District of Texas, ruling that it was not bound
to follow the decisions of the Fifth Circuit or other lower federal
courts, but, instead, would "interpret federal law indepen-
dently," accepted plaintiffs' argument that the ADA preemption
was intended by Congress to affect economic issues only, not
actions for personal injuries that passengers might incur while
receiving air carrier services.8 5 Important to the court's opinion
was the fact that a finding of preemption would leave plaintiffs
without legal remedy, in the absence of a clear congressional
expression of such intent.86 The court based its analysis on its
examination of the House, Senate, and Conference Reports,
which lacked any express reference to personal injury lawsuits.87
b. Preemption of Air Carrier Business Practice Claims
In the Sixth Circuit case of Burke v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,88
applying the doctrine of "complete preemption," the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan re-
manded this action, which alleged violations of the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices Acts 9  Defendants moved for
reconsideration on three grounds. In ordering remand, the
court ruled that the following two-part test must be satisfied to
support removal of an action under the doctrine of "complete
preemption": (1) a plaintiff's claims were preempted under the
Federal Aviation Act; and (2) the Act or its legislative history
evidenced congressional intent to make such causes of action
removable. 90
8s Id. (citing O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Von Anhalt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 735 F. Supp.
1030 (S.D. Fla. 1990)).
84 882 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1994, writ granted).
85 Id. at 502.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 504.
88 819 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
89 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
90 819 F. Supp. at 1367.
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Defendants' first argument for reconsideration was based on
preemption of the deceptive advertising claim under Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.91 The court disagreed, ruling that
plaintiffs' action related to "non-rate" aspects of airline advertis-
ing, in that they claimed the airline falsely advertised that it pro-
vided safe, reliable transportation, and employed competent,
well-trained people.9" The court further ruled that, even if de-
fendants could satisfy the first prong of the "complete preemp-
tion" test, they had failed to show congressional intent to
authorize removal of actions subject to the Federal Aviation
Act.
93
Defendants' second reconsideration argument alleged judi-
cial error for not considering plaintiff's negligence claim
against the involved pilot as separate from his claim against the
airline. Again, the court found no indication of legislative in-
tent to warrant removal of the state court action. 94
Defendants' final argument was that the court erred by failing
to apply the law of the transferor forum, which supposedly au-
thorized removal, in conformity with the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox.95 The court distinguished
Mattox as not applying the two-step analysis mandated by the
Supreme Court.96
Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc.97 was remanded to the Illinois
Supreme Court by the United States Supreme Court for recon-
sideration in light of its decision in Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.98 This class action suit against American Airlines, Inc.
seeks damages and an injunction based on American's alleged
retroactive modification of its frequent flyer program. Upon in-
terlocutory review, the appellate court held that the action for
injunction comprised an attempt to regulate airline services
and, thus, was preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs, however,
were allowed to proceed with their damages claims.
American petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
writ of certiorari. The Court vacated the judgment and re-
91 112 S. Ct. at 2031.
92 819 F. Supp. at 1368.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1369.
95 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990).
9 819 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
97 626 N.E.2d 205 (1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994).
98 112 S. Ct. at 2031.
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manded the case for further consideration in light of Morales."
The Illinois court found that plaintiff's claims for breach of con-
tract and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Decep-
tive Business Practices Act"' were only tenuously connected to
airline rates, routes and services and were not preempted by sec-
tion 1305(a) (1).101 The Illinois court majority reasoned that fre-
quent flyer programs are peripheral to rather than essential to
airline operations, and, therefore, that actions based on such
services are not preempted. 10 2 A dissenting justice views Ameri-
can's management of its frequent flyer program as indistinguish-
able from the alleged deceptive advertisement practices
involved in Morales.10 3 The United States Supreme Court, for
the second time, has granted certiorari.
In Pearson v. Lake Forest Country Day School,10 4 the Illinois appel-
late court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's action against de-
fendant air carrier and one of its employees on the basis that
state law actions based on air carrier policies and practices in
denying boarding to passengers traveling on employee passes
are preempted under the ADA.
Plaintiff, who was defendant's employee, sent her thirteen
year old daughter on a school-chaperoned trip to Spain using an
employee travel pass that allowed family members to travel on a
stand-by basis. Plaintiff's daughter was denied boarding on her
intended return flight from Madrid. She returned a day late
after being accommodated overnight by a couple traveling
stand-by, who also had been excluded from the flight. Plaintiff
claimed that the flight from which her daughter had been ex-
cluded arrived in the United States with three empty seats.
In affirming the dismissal, the appellate court ruled that pre-
emption would apply both to the denied boarding claim and to
plaintiff's related defamation claim against an employee de-
fendant, which was based on a letter he had written to the
daughter's schoolteacher explaining the boarding denial and
questioning plaintiff's judgment in having her daughter travel
stand-by during a peak European travel period.1 0 5 The basis for
the ruling was that the actions against both defendants rested
90 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992).
100 ILL REV. STAT. ch. 121 , paras. 261-272 (1992).
101 626 N.E.2d at 208.
102 Id. at 208-09.
103 Id. at 211 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
1 4 633 N.E.2d 1315 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994).
105 Id. at 1320.
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upon state tort laws that, if enforced, would "significantly affect"
air carrier services.10
6
The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court's dismis-
sal based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the employee de-
fendant, finding that the employee defendant, who claimed to
be specially appearing, had participated in the proceedings be-
yond simply contesting jurisdiction and, therefore, had gener-
ally appeared.1 0
7
In the consolidated appeal of Johnson v. American Airlines,
Inc.,108 the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Cook County
Circuit Court's decision that plaintiffs' class action against Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc., and United Airlines, Inc., was preempted.
Plaintiffs bought reduced fare airline tickets that carried a
twenty-five percent cancellation penalty. When plaintiffs can-
celed the tickets, the airlines kept twenty-five percent of the total
ticket price, including twenty-five percent of the federal tax.
Plaintiffs alleged that the airlines had breached the ticket con-
tracts by retaining the federal tax portion.
Applying the rationale of Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,"°9 the Illinois Appellate Court held that:
[T] he State law claims here clearly relate to the rates charged by
airlines for reduced fare tickets. Furthermore, to allow plaintiffs
to bring these State law claims would create exactly the type of
rate inconsistency among States which Congress intended to pro-
hibit by enacting the federal preemption language of section
1305(a) (1).
The court further ruled that, if plaintiffs wished to pursue
their claims, they would be required to file a claim with the De-
partment of Transportation, which has been specifically desig-
nated by Congress to administer and enforce consumer
protection law.111
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1318-19.
108 633 N.E.2d 978 (Il. App. Ct. 1994).
-0 112 S. Ct. at 2031.
110 633 N.E.2d at 980.
11, Id. at 980 (citations omitted).
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c. Preemption of Air Carrier Employment Practice Claims
The Fourth Circuit case of Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Association
112
was an appeal that arose from a class action by 2400 former East-
ern Airlines pilots against the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA).
The pilots alleged that ALPA induced them to strike against
Eastern by promising that, if Eastern declared bankruptcy and
was liquidated, ALPA would implement its Merger Fragmenta-
tion Policy. Under that policy, former Eastern pilots would re-
ceive assistance in obtaining positions with the airlines acquiring
Eastern's assets, with some retention of seniority for their years
at Eastern. The pilots, alleging that ALPA failed to carry
through on this process, filed a lawsuit alleging six causes of ac-
tion: (1) the union had violated its federally mandated duty to
provide fair representation; .(2) ALPA breached its contractual
duty to implement the Fragmentation Policy; (3) ALPA induced
the pilots to rely on its promises to implement the Fragmenta-
tion Policy; (4) ALPA tortiously interfered with the pilots' efforts
to secure employment with the other airlines; (5) ALPA officials
breached their fiduciary duties to the union under the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA);" 3 and
(6) ALPA unlawfully established a "custodianship" over the East-
ern Master Executive Council, a subordinate union body that
had coordinated union-related activities of ALPA-represented
pilots employed by Eastern, in violation of 29 U.S.C. section 462.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for ALPA on the pilots' first four causes
of action. The court held that the state law claims of breach of
contract and tortious interference with prospective employment
relationships were preempted by ALPA's federal law duty to pro-
vide fair representation and that ALPA had not breached this
duty because its actions were not "arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith."" 4 With regard to the fifth cause of action, the appel-
late court affirmed summary judgment for ALPA, ruling that the
pilots could not assert a derivative claim against ALPA manage-
ment absent a showing of harm suffered by the union itself.1 5
The appellate court also affirmed summary judgment on the
sixth cause of action, ruling that ALPA's custodianship had com-
112 15 F.3d 50 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 56 (1994).
I3 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
114 15 F.3d at 51.
115 Id.
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plied with both the union's constitution and federal law." 6
Deeming it unnecessary, the Fourth Circuit did not reach the
merits of ALPA's cross-appeal from the trial court's ruling that
the pilots' fair representation claims arising from certain years
were barred by a six-month statute of limitation.11 7
In the Ninth Circuit case of Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Ahue, 11 the
issue, on appeal from summary judgment in favor of the air car-
rier, was whether a Hawaiian statute,119 which required the car-
rier to pay for FAA-mandated physicals for its captains and first
officers, was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 2 0
Pursuant to an agreement between Aloha and ALPA, Aloha
pilots could choose two Health Maintenance Organizations for
medical care. Aloha paid the entire cost of each health care
plan. The plans differed in how they treated FAA-mandated
medical exams. One plan paid the cost of one annual FAA
exam and the other plan paid for an FAA-mandated medical
examination only if the examination was required by a
physician.
Aloha brought the underlying declaratory relief action after
the Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations issued
an opinion that the Hawaii statute required Aloha to pay for the
FAA-mandated physicals. In unsuccessfully opposing Aloha's
preemption argument under ERISA, the state argued that sec-
tion 388-6(6) of the Hawaiian statute applied because the FAA
examination did not provide the pilot with a "medical benefit,"
as defined by ERISA. Alternatively, the state argued that the
statute was a criminal statute, and, therefore, was exempt from
ERISA preemption. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that
the purpose of the FAA-mandated medical examination was not
only to protect the public but also to evaluate various aspects of
the pilot's health, which provided the pilot with a medical bene-
fit within the meaning of ERISA.' 21
116 Id.
11 Id. at 52.
118 12 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1993).
119 HAw. REv. STAT. § 388-6(6) (1994).
120 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1974).
121 12 F.3d at 1503-04.
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2. Warsaw Convention12 2
a. Scope of Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction
In Alvarez v. Servicios Aereos de Honduras, S.A.,' 23 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled
that the Warsaw Convention exclusively controlled plaintiff's
rights and remedies in this action and, therefore, that removal
jurisdiction existed.
The action arose from an accident occurring in Managua,
Nicaragua, on July 18, 1993, involving a Servicios Aeros de Hon-
duras (SAHSA) Boeing 737. The flight originated in Miami,
Florida, and was to terminate in San Jose, Costa Rica, with inter-
mediate stops in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and Managua, Nicara-
gua. During the scheduled intermediate stop in Managua, the
airplane slid sideways down the runway. The passengers exited
through the emergency exits after the airplane stopped. There
were no fatalities;
On August 21, 1993, plaintiffs filed a personal injury suit
against defendant SAHSA in Texas state court. On September
28, 1993, SAHSA filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. sec-
tions 1337 and 1441, claiming the court had original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331 because thirty of the fifty-one
plaintiffs had claims governed by the Warsaw Convention. De-
fendant further alleged that the court had supplemental juris-
diction over the remaining plaintiffs whose claims were not
subject to the Warsaw Convention.
Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the Warsaw Conven-
tion does not create an exclusive cause of action, but merely
limits the damages remedy available. Plaintiffs further argued
that even if the court had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim-
ants who were subject to the Warsaw Convention, it did not have
jurisdiction over the remaining claimants. The court found that
cases arising out of international air transportation are governed
by the Warsaw Convention and are within federal court original
jurisdiction. The court was bound by the Fifth Circuit holding
that the Warsaw Convention creates an exclusive cause of action
preempting state law claims for personal injury. Accordingly, the
court held that state law claims of those plaintiffs covered by the
122 Convention of the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 note.
123 No. H-93-3060, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) I 17,888 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1994).
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Warsaw Convention were preempted and, therefore, that re-
moval was proper. 124
The court also examined 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a), which
deals with supplemental jurisdiction. Looking to the legislative
history of section 1367, the court noted that, in federal question
cases, the district courts have authority to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over additional claims, including claims involving
the joinder of additional parties.1 25 The court stated that the
commentary to section 1367 made it clear that the statute re-
stored the federal pendent jurisdiction that had been elimi-
nated by the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Finley v. United
States.12 6 The court also examined the case of United Mine Work-
ers of America v. Gibbs,127 regarding supplemental jurisdiction,
and found that the constitutional limits identified in Gibbs in-
cluded all causes of action arising from a common nucleus of
operative facts. 1 2  The court determined that all of the claims
asserted by the plaintiffs in the instant case arose from a com-
mon nucleus of operative facts, the crash of the aircraft. There-
fore, under section 1367, the court had jurisdiction to
adjudicate all the claims arising from the accident, including the
claims of pendent parties.129 Therefore, plaintiff's motion to re-
mand was denied.13
In Luna v. Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A., 1 31 an action
arising from the crash in Panama of a Compania Panamena de
Aviacion, S.A. (COPA) aircraft, the Southern District of Texas
ruled that federal court jurisdiction under the Warsaw Conven-
tion is exclusive and, therefore, provides an adequate basis for
removal jurisdiction, and it granted COPA's motion to dismiss
based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's decedent was a United States citizen who died in
the crash. She had purchased her ticket through a Houston
travel agent for carriage aboard a U.S. registered carrier from
Houston to Panama, and then transferring to the ill-fated COPA
flight. After the wrongful death action was removed from Texas
state court, plaintiff moved to remand, contending that federal
124 Id. at 17,890.
125 Id. at 17,891.
126 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
127 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
128 24 Av. Cas. at 17,891.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 851 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention is not exclusive in
that the Convention merely limits the available recovery and
does not govern a plaintiff's cause of action. After reviewing the
applicable precedents, the court determined that the weight of
authority and need for uniformity in air carrier liability rules
demonstrated that federal jurisdiction under the Warsaw Con-
vention is exclusive.'5 2
After ruling that jurisdiction was proper, the court dismissed
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over COPA. 13 3 The
factors the court considered as significant included the follow-
ing: (1) COPA neither solicited nor transacted passenger busi-
ness in the United States; (2) decedent's ticket was issued on the
U.S. carrier's ticket stock and the U.S. carrier merely forwarded
to -COPA its share of the ticket proceeds; and (3) although
COPA had entered into a maintenance contract with a-U.S. busi-
ness, only two airplanes had been serviced in the United States.
The court held these contacts were inadequate to confer per-
sonal jurisdiction under Texas law.1 34 The court also ruled that
Panama's status as a signatory to the Warsaw Convention did
not, in and of itself, confer personal jurisdiction in the United
States over Panamanian air carriers.'-"
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan remanded Patelczik v. Clarkston Travel Bureau, Inc. and
Northwest Airlines, Inc.,'36 an action which arose from an airport
terminal slip-and-fall incident. In remanding the action to state
court, the district court ruled that both diversity jurisdiction and
federal question jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention
were lacking.
Plaintiff had made reservations through defendant Clarkston
Travel Bureau for international transportation on Northwest
Airlines. She allegedly requested that defendant Clarkston re-
serve wheelchair assistance for her, which she did not receive.
Allegedly as a result, she was injured in a slip-and-fall accident
while waiting to board a Northwest Airlines shuttle bus during a
layover in Seattle.
Plaintiff filed her complaint in the Circuit Court for Oakland
County, Michigan, alleging state law theories of negligence,
132 Id. at 830.
133 Id. at 835.
13 Id. at 833.
135 Id. at 835.
1' No. 93-CV-74469-DT, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19265 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20,
1993).
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breach of warranty, and breach of contract. Northwest removed
the case, and plaintiff moved to remand. As plaintiff and de-
fendant Clarkston were Michigan residents, diversity jurisdiction
would be lacking unless defendant Clarkston had been "fraudu-
lently joined" as a defendant. Northwest also contended that
federal question jurisdiction existed under the Warsaw
Convention.
To prove fraudulent joinder, the court ruled that defendants
were required to show either that there was "absolutely no possi-
bility" or that there was "no reasonable possibility" that plaintiff
would be able to prove a cause of action against defendant
Clarkston.137 The court held that defendant Clarkston was not
fraudulently joined regardless of which standard was applied, as
defendants had failed to rule out all state law theories of negli-
gence alleged against defendant Clarkston.138
Northwest also argued that plaintiff's action was preempted
by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which applies to claims
arising from accidents that take place in the course of interna-
tional transportation whether on board an aircraft, in the course
of embarking, or in the course of disembarking. To determine
whether plaintiff was embarking or disembarking, the court em-
ployed a three-part test based on the following: (1) the activity
in which plaintiff was engaged; (2) who controlled the activity;
and (3) the location of the activity.'3 9
The court held that plaintiff's activity did not involve either
embarking or disembarking from an airplane because she was
waiting for a shuttle bus.1 40 The court considered the level of
control defendant Northwest exercised and found that defend-
ant Northwest had instructed plaintiff to board a shuttle bus,
not an airplane. The court also considered plaintiff's location
at the time of the injury and held that she was in a common area
of the airport, not in an area reserved for international
flights.' She had also not yet received her boarding pass. Ac-
cordingly, the court granted plaintiff's motion to remand. 142
The consolidated actions in Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.43
comprised some 103 personal injury lawsuits filed in the Califor-
137 Id. at *2.
138 Id. at *3.
139 Id.
I4 Id. at *5.
141 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19265 at *5.
142 Id. at *6.
143 820 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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nia state court arising from the aborted takeoff of Trans World
Airlines (TWA) Flight 843 from John F. Kennedy International
Airport on July 30, 1992, bound for San Francisco. After the
takeoff was aborted, the Lockheed L-1011 skidded to a stop, re-
sulting in a post-crash fire that ultimately consumed the airplane
after the passengers and crew had safely evacuated.
After TWA removed the actions of international passengers
who had connected with Flight 103 as part of their international
travel itineraries, plaintiffs moved to remand. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California denied the
motion, holding that the international passengers' claims were
covered by the Warsaw Convention, which exclusively controlled
their rights and remedies.
Recognizing that the presence of federal question jurisdiction
is determined by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which re-
quires that the federal question appear on the face of a "well-
pleaded" complaint, the court noted as a corollary of the rule
that "'Congress may so completely preempt a particular area
that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is nec-
essarily federal in character.' "144 The court also made note of
existing precedent requiring courts to examine the intent of the
Warsaw signatories to determine whether they intended that the
treaty provide the exclusive cause of action for covered
claims.145 The court noted:
After carefully reviewing the text, drafting history, and structure
of the Warsaw Convention, the court believes that the Conven-
tion's authors expected it to be the exclusive basis for recovery of
damages arising from delay, lost or damaged goods, personal in-
jury, and death during international flights. In short, the Warsaw
Convention preempts state law causes of action, not just reme-
dies ... 46
The court, therefore, denied the remand motions, ruling that
TWA's removal of the actions was proper.147
In another aspect of the TWA Flight 848 litigation, Jack v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 48 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California ruled that the numerous for-
eign plaintiffs would be required to travel to California for their
4 Id. at 1220 (citation omitted).
145 Id. at 1226.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 No. C 92-3787 BAC, 1994 WL 90107 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1994).
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depositions to be taken (the flight had been destined for San
Francisco). In so ruling, the court rejected plaintiffs' arguments
that their fear of flying caused by the aborted takeoff accident
precluded them from traveling to California, and noted that,
having chosen to file their lawsuits in California, they were obli-
gated to travel there for depositions.1 49 Plaintiffs then peti-
tioned for an interlocutory order from the Ninth Circuit
overruling the court's decision, which the Ninth Circuit denied,
after first issuing an alternative writ and entertaining briefing on
the issue.
In a third aspect of the TWA Flight 843 litigation, Jack v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,150 more than 120 lawsuits were filed in San
Francisco Superior Court by plaintiffs seeking damages for phys-
ical injuries and emotional distress. Following the aborted take-
off, fire destroyed the airplane after the passengers and crew
had safely evacuated. Some passengers, however, suffered mi-
nor physical injuries and many alleged emotional distress caused
by the incident.
After removing the actions involving international travelers to
the Northern District of California, TWA moved for partial sum-
mary judgment under the Warsaw Convention. TWA argued
that the emotional distress claims of plaintiffs whose alleged dis-
tress had not resulted in physical manifestations were not com-
pensable under the Convention, in reliance on the leading case
of Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd.1 51 TWA also argued that the Con-
vention preempted plaintiffs' state law causes of action, and
barred plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages.
Plaintiffs presented several legal challenges to summary judg-
ment, including the following arguments: (1) that the Warsaw
Convention was ineffective because it had. not been properly rat-
ified; (2) that the Convention unlawfully infringed upon the
right to international travel; and (3) that the Convention uncon-
stitutionally denied equal protection to international and do-
mestic passengers traveling on the same flight. Plaintiffs also
argued that the court should disregard the Warsaw Convention
as having outlived its usefulness. The court rejected each of
these arguments, as well as plaintiffs' contention that their claim
149 Id. at *2.
150 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
151 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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that TWA breached a "post-crash duty of care" was outside the
scope of the Convention. 152
Regarding punitive damages, the court ruled that such dam-
ages were not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention, even
in actions where air carriers were proven to have committed will-
ful misconduct.1 53 In so holding, the court relied on the cases of
In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 198315 and In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988155
The court then turned to the major dispute between the par-
ties, which concerned the compensability of plaintiffs' claims for
emotional distress. TWA argued that even the passengers suffer-
ing impact injuries were barred from any emotional distress re-
covery unless the emotional distress itself had resulted in
physical manifestations. The district court examined, in consid-
erable detail, the application of the Royd case to the present
facts, and analyzed four possible different approaches that could
be applied to determine the recoverability of emotional distress
damages. The court ultimately adopted the fourth approach,
which: (a) limited recovery of emotional distress damages to
plaintiffs suffering impact injuries to the emotional distress flow-
ing from those injuries; (b) denied emotional distress recoveries
to plaintiffs who had neither suffered impact injuries nor physi-
cal manifestations of their emotional distress from the accident;
and (c) limited plaintiffs who had suffered physical manifesta-
tions of their emotional distress to damages flowing from those
physical manifestations, and not from the accident in general. 156
As a result, TWA's motion for partial summary judgment was
granted, except as to plaintiffs whose emotional distress had re-
sulted in physical manifestations. 57
In Union Iberoamericana v. American Airlines, Inc.," after find-
ing that plaintiff's state law claims based on spoilage of a cargo
of frozen lobster were not preempted by either the Warsaw Con-
vention or the Federal Aviation Act, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida remanded the case to
state court
152 854 F. Supp. at 662.
153 Id. at 663.
154 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
155 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991).
156 854 F. Supp. at 668.
157 Id.
15 No. 93-2510-CIV, 1994 WL 395329 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 1994).
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Plaintiff's claims were based on defendant air carrier's stow-
age of the lobster in an unrefrigerated compartment on board
its aircraft. Plaintiff's state court complaint alleged breach of
contract, willful misconduct, and negligence. In its answer, de-
fendant contended that the action was governed by the Warsaw
Convention and/or by section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act
(the Act), 49 U.S.C. section 1373, and defendant removed the
action to federal court on the basis of exclusive federal question
jurisdiction.
While acknowledging that the Warsaw Convention "is the ex-
clusive remedy against international air carriers for lost or de-
stroyed cargo," the court ruled that, although the Convention
limits liability, it does not preclude plaintiffs from pursuing state
law causes of action "to obtain that limited remedy." 59 The
court also rejected plaintiff's argument for preemption under
the Act, ruling that plaintiff's claims were neither specifically
directed at regulating, nor would they have any significant effect
upon, air carrier rates, routes, or services. Accordingly, the
court held that the matter was improvidently removed and re-
manded to state court.160
b. Timeliness of Action
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York case of Balani Impex Ltd. v. Malaysian Airline System
Berhad,1 61 plaintiff Balani Impex Ltd. brought an action to re-
cover for 116 cartons of shoes, which it claimed defendant lost
in shipment. The court entered summary judgment for defend-
ant based upon plaintiff's failure to commence the action
within the two year limitation period found in Article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention.
The plaintiff's shipper had contracted with defendant to ship
245 cartons of shoes, for which defendant issued an air waybill
on December 14, 1990. Originally, all of the cartons were to go
to Manila, Philippines. On December 27, 1990, the shipping in-
structions were changed to direct the entire consignment to
Hong Kong. In Kuala Lumpur, while en route, the consign-
ment was split, and, on December 30, 1990, 116 of the cartons
went to Manila and were seized by the Philippine Bureau of Cus-
toms. The shoes were never seen again. In a letter dated Janu-
159 Id. at *2.
160 Id. at *5.
161 No. 93 Civ. 1738 (KTD), 1994 WL 176982 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1994).
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ary 9, 1991, plaintiff notified defendant that part of the
shipment did not arrive in Hong Kong. After defendant refused
voluntarily to compensate plaintiff for the loss, plaintiff com-
menced this action on February 8, 1993.
The parties agreed that the Warsaw Convention was applica-
ble. Defendant contended that the action was not filed within
the two year limitation imposed by Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention. Three events trigger the limitation: (1) the date of
arrival at destination; (2) the date the aircraft was due to arrive
at the destination; or (3) the date on which the transportation
stopped. Defendant argued that the time in which to bring the
action started running at the latest on January 9, 1991, when
plaintiff communicated its knowledge of the loss to defendant.
Despite plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, the court ruled
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. 16 2 The
116 cartons arrived in Manilla on December 30, 1990, and plain-
tiff was aware of the misdelivery onJanuary 9, 1991. Further, the
goods never arrived at Hong Kong at all, much less on plaintiff's
January 11, 1991, deadline. At the very latest, plaintiff knew by
January 11, 1991, that the shipment had gone awry. Therefore,
the latest date upon which the suit could have been timely com-
menced was January 11, 1993, and plaintiff did not initiate the
action until February 8, 1993. Accordingly, the .court granted
defendant Malaysian Airlines' motion for summaryjudgment. 163
In another case from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Royal Insurance Co. v. Emery Air
Freight Corp.,lM plaintiff-in-subrogation brought an action against
the defendant air carrier for negligence and breach of contract
for damages to a shipment of ceramic substrate that occurred
during transportation from the United States to South Korea.
Defendant moved to dismiss, contending that plaintiff had
failed to comply with the time restrictions imposed by Articles
26 and 29 of the Warsaw Convention. Defendant also filed a
third-party action against Singapore Airlines Ltd.' (SIA) seeking
contribution or indemnification. SIA moved to dismiss the
third-party claim as untimely, arguing on similar grounds.
Plaintiff alleged that its subrogor, Coming, Inc., had deliv-
ered a number of pallets of ceramic substrate to Emery on No-
vember 16, 1989. According to plaintiff, when the pallets were
162 Id. at *3.
163 Id.
164 834 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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delivered to Corning Korea on November 21, 1989, the ceramic
substrate was found to have been damaged from being loaded
upside down. Emery alleged that Coming did not complain un-
til more than a week had passed from the time of the delivery of
the goods in Korea. Plaintiff, however, produced an internal
memo dated November 23, 1989, from a Corning Korea em-
ployee discussing the damage. Coming claimed that this memo
was sent by facsimile to defendant and that Corning Korea noti-
fied defendant of the problem by telephone on November 27,
1989. Plaintiff filed its summons and complaint on November
11, 1981, and served it the next day. Defendant initiated the
third-party action against SIA on January 6, 1982.
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention provides that the right to
damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within
two years, based on (1) the date of arrival at destination; (2) the
date the aircraft was due to arrive at the destination; or (3) the
date on which the transportation stopped. 165 Article 26 of the
Warsaw Convention further provides that, in claims for damages
to goods, the carrier must be notified of a damaged shipment,
in writing, within seven days of receiving the damaged
shipment.?
Defendant argued that Article 29 did not apply to third-party
actions between carriers, in reliance on Canadian case authority.
The court held that the limited persuasive value of the Canadian
case was clearly outweighed by the contrary holdings of cases
decided by the Southern District of New York.167 Defendant
next argued that Corning failed to provide timely notice, as re-
quired by Article 26, and failed to bring the action within the
two-year period established by Article 29. However, the court
held that the evidence established that delivery of the damaged
goods occurred on November 21, 1989, and that Coming noti-
fied Emery in writing and by telephone not later than Novem-
ber 27, 1989. As the action was commenced on November 11,
1991, the court ruled that it had been filed within the two-year
limitation period."6
In considering SIA's motion to dismiss the third-party com-
plaint on the ground that it was not filed within the two-year
time limit, the court found that the motion raised a question of
165 Id. at 634 (citations omitted).
166 Id. (citations omitted).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 635.
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first impression regarding the application of Article 29 to third-
party actions. Courts are divided on whether Article 29 consti-
tutes a condition precedent to suit or a statute of limitations that
courts may apply flexibly in accordance with local law. Subpara-
graph (2) of Article 29 potentially creates confusion in stating
that "[t] he method of calculating the period of limitation shall
be determined by the law of the court to which the case is sub-
mitted.1 69 The court ruled that subparagraph (2) could be in-
terpreted to allow local statutes of limitations to modify the
limitation period in Article 29.170
After analyzing case law decisions from otherjurisdictions, the
court, however, concluded that the two-year limitation period
would not be tolled in third-party cases.1 71 The court discussed
legislative history which showed that the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention specifically considered and rejected a provision that
would have allowed tolling, if such were permitted by the law of
the forum court. Because it was uncontested that defendant's
third-party action was filed more than two years after the deliv-
ery date for the damaged substrates, the court granted SIA's mo-
tion to dismiss.17
c. Occurrences and Injuries Covered
In the diversity action of Curley v. American Airlines, Inc.,' 73
plaintiff alleged that he was detained and searched by Mexican
authorities after having been falsely identified by the captain of
his American Airlines flight as having smoked marijuana in the
aircraft lavatory. Defendant unsuccessfully sought summary
judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's state law causes of ac-
tion were preempted by the Warsaw Convention and by the Fed-
eral Aviation Act 174 as amended by the ADA.
On Christmas day; 1990, plaintiff and a friend boarded an
American Airlines flight for Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, at La
Guardia International Airport. As plaintiff disembarked in Pu-
erto Vallarta, he was asked how long he intended to stay in Mex-
ico and then was detained by an armed customs officer.
Ultimately, he was released and allowed to complete his ten-day
Mexican holiday.
169 834 F. Supp. at 634 (citations omitted).
170 Id. at 635.
171 Id. at 635-36.
172 Id. at 636.
173 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
174 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
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The plaintiff later learned that the captain of the flight had
advised American Airlines' ground crew after a flight attendant
informed him of her suspicions that the plaintiff was suspected
of smoking marijuana. He also learned that the ground crew
had advised the Mexican authorities. At his attorney's sugges-.
tion, plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation and was di-
agnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action, claiming that he had
been strip searched and cavity searched, that his life and free-
dom had been threatened, that his body had been touched by
loaded firearms, that he had been forced to stand naked in
front of others of both sexes, that he had been verbally humili-
ated, that his belongings had been searched, and that he had
been examined against his will by- a person claiming to be a doc-
tor. "' - Defendant contended that plaintiff's causes of action
were preempted by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention or, al-
ternatively, by section 1305 of the Federal Aviation Act 176
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York'stated that the applicability of the Warsaw Convention
turned on whether plaintiff's injuries were caused by an acci-
dent within the meaning of Article 17. The court found that
defendant's suspicion that plaintiff had been smoking mari-
juana did not relate to operations of the aircraft or occur in the
course of embarking or disembarking. The court also ruled that
the report of suspected marijuana smoking did not constitute an
"accident" within the contemplation of the Convention. 77 The
court also found defendant's preemption argument based on
the Federal Aviation Act insupportable. The court found that
the captain's passing on to ground personnel accurate or inac-
curate suspicions concerning a passenger had no relation to air
carrier rates or routes, nor did it refer to any services normally
expected of flight personnel. Consequently, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment was denied.178
In the Fourth Circuit case of Sakaria v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,' 79 appellants, the decedent's widow and children, unsuc-
cessfully appealed from summary judgment for defendant in a
wrongful death action against Trans World Airlines (TWA) aris-
ing from a death by heart attack that plaintiffs' claim was caused
175 846 F. Supp. at 282.
176 Id. at 282-83.
177 Id. at 283.
178 Id. at 284-85.
179 8 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1835 (1994).
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by events associated with a terrorist attack at the airport during
an intermediate stop in Rome. In affirming dismissal, the court
of appeals ruled that plaintiffs' claims were insupportable
whether considered under the Maryland wrongful death act,
plaintiffs' contract theory, or the Warsaw Convention, due to the
lack of evidence linking the decedent's heart attack with any acts
or omissions by TWA.
Decedent had booked passage on a TWA flight from New
York to Athens unaware that the flight included a scheduled
stop in Rome. Due to a terrorist attack in the TWA terminal,
the aircraft was parked on a remote section of the tarmac after
landing, and the passengers were kept on board the aircraft for
some two hours before being allowed to disembark. The passen-
gers were not exposed to the aftermath of the terrorist attack.
Approximately two hours later, the passengers were bused back
to the airplane, which continued on to Athens.
Decedent was met at the airport by a friend, who recalled de-
cedent as looking pale and terrified with black circles under
swollen eyes, and who testified that decedent "held his throat
and neck and complained of thirst while recounting his experi-
ence in Rome in angry, excited tones."180 The next day, the de-
cedent was driven on a seven-hour journey from Athens to
Volos, a remote village. After arriving, decedent refused to eat
and several times broke down in tears while describing events in
Rome. He retired to bed early that evening and the following
morning was found dead. His autopsy established the cause of
death as a heart attack.
As noted, the district court granted summary judgment on all
counts. 8 1 As for the contract theory, the court found there was
no-breach, as the stop in Rome was a scheduled part of the
flight As for the state wrongful death action, which was pre-
mised on TWA's alleged negligence in making the scheduled
landing in Rome While there was a terrorist attack there, the
court ruled that there was no evidence to support a finding of
proximate causation between TWA's alleged negligence and de-
cedent's death. Furthermore, even if breach of contract or neg-
ligence were found, the court ruled, as a matter of law, that
decedent's death was not a foreseeable result of any such
breaches of duty.18 2 With respect to the Warsaw Convention,
180 Id. at 167.
18, I& at 166.
182 Id. at 173.
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the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that plain-
tiff had waived the issue by failing to make proper pleadings and
held that this cause of action, too, foundered for lack of proof of
causation. 183
Plaintiffs also argued on appeal that the summary judgment
should be vacated for the refusal of the magistrate judge and the
trial judge to hear oral argument on the motion. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, after noting that the summary
judgment record was fairly developed and argued, and would
not have been added to substantively by oral argument. 84
In Pasinato v. American Airlines, Inc.,' 5 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted partial
summary judgment for the defendant air carrier, ruling that its
flight attendant's failure to prevent a piece of luggage from fall-
ing from an overheard compartment did not comprise "willful
misconduct," as required to avoid the $75,000 damages limita-
tion imposed by the Warsaw Convention.1 86
Plaintiff was severely injured during an international flight
when the flight attendant opened an overheard bin and a heavy
tote bag fell out. Significant factors to the court's finding that
the flight attendant had not acted with willful misconduct were
the facts that she opened the bin with both hands, in order to
have one ready to guard against falling items, and that she actu-
ally attempted to catch the falling luggage. 187 The court also
ruled that the flight attendant had not acted recklessly, finding
that she had only been involved in six previous similar occur-
rences, in each of which the falling items had been light in
weight and did not cause any injuries.1 88 The court also found
that plaintiff failed to produce evidence that defendant's em-
ployee training was inadequate with respect to use of the over-
head compartments.1 8 9
In Beaudet v. British Ainvays, PLC,190 on cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois ruled that the Warsaw Convention did not
apply to plaintiff's cause of action on the basis that her injuries
183 8 F.3d at 168-73.
184 Id. at 170.
185 No. 93 C 1510, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5676 (N.D. IlM. Apr. 28, 1994).
186 Id. at *1.
187 Id. at *7-*8.
188 Id. at *8.
189 Id. at *11.
190 853 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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were not sustained during the course of "embarking" or "inter-
national transportation."191 Therefore, the court ruled plaintiff
was authorized to proceed with her state law causes of action
and her recovery would not be limited to the $75,000 cap au-
thorized under the Convention. 92
Plaintiff held a ticket for air travel between London and Chi-
cago. She arrived at the airport over three hours before her
flight and spent some of her time in a lounge the defendant
maintained for its passengers on a different floor from the
boarding gates. The accident occurred more than an hour
before boarding for plaintiff's flight would begin when plaintiff
slipped and fell on a recently mopped floor near a magazine
rack, pulling the rack down onto her. Plaintiff fractured her
pelvis and suffered a permanent, three-quarter-inch shortening
of one leg. She rejected defendant's $75,000 offer ofjudgment,
contending that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to her
claim.
In dealing with the liability issues, the court quoted Article 17
of the Convention, which states that the Warsaw liability and
damages rules apply to injuries sustained by passengers while
"on board the aircraft or in the course of any operations of em-
barking or disembarking."M95 In its summary judgment motion,
the air carrier contended the plaintiff was in ihe course of em-
barking when the accident occurred. To determine the issue,
the court applied a "totality of the circumstances" test that
placed particular emphasis on the issues of location of the acci-
dent, activity in which the passenger was engaged, and air car-
rier control factors.' 94 Under this test, the court ruled that the
Warsaw Convention was inapplicable based on the following
findings: (1) plaintiff was on a floor of the terminal building
different from the boarding gate; (2) plaintiff's activity at the
time of the accident was directed toward obtaining reading ma-
terial, not boarding an airplane; and (3) the defendant lacked
control over plaintiff, who was acting entirely under her own
direction. In addition, as some courts add an "imminence" fac-
tor to this test, the court noted that plaintiff's boarding was at
least an hour away when the accident occurred.1 95
191 Id. at 1067, 1072.
192 Id. at 1074.
193 Id. at 1067.
194 Id.
195 853 F. Supp. at 1067-68.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri case of Hamdeh v. American Airlines, Inc.'96 claimed dam-
ages arising from a slip-and-fall at Heathrow Airport in London
that occurred while plaintiff was ascending an escalator on her
way to make her American Airlines flight connection after a lay-
over. At issue on the parties' cross-motions for summary judg-
ment was whether plaintiff was "embarking" on defendant's
international flight when the accident occurred, in order to in-
voke strict liability under Article 17 of the Convention.
The court noted that the relevant facts were undisputed.
Plaintiff and her husband had arrived at Heathrow Airport on a
KLM flight from Amsterdam, with the purpose of connecting
with an American Airlines flight to Chicago. The plaintiff and
her husband had used the escalator at the direction of defend-
ant's employee. The escalator, however, was located in the
"common use" area of the terminal, which was used by some
forty-one carriers. The defendant's transfer desk was located ap-
proximately 750 to 1000 feet from where plaintiff fell, the gate
where her flight was to board was some 2500 feet away from the
escalator, and plaintiff had not yet initiated her boarding check-
in procedures at the transfer desk.
In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the court
ruled that
[t]hree factors are primarily relevant when determining whether
an accident occurred "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking" an airplane: (1) the location of the accident; (2) the
activity in which the injured person was engaged; and (3) the
control by the defendant of such injured person at the location
and during the activity taking place at the time of the accident.197
Applying these factors to the foregoing facts, the court ruled
that plaintiff was not engaged in embarking on defendant's
flight when the accident occurred. 19
Lathigra v. British Airways PLO 99 concerned the applicability of
the Warsaw Convention to an air carrier that had acted as ticket
agent visA-vis plaintiffs, rather than as an air carrier per se.
Plaintiffs were British Airways passengers returning from Seat-
tle to Madagascar. The final leg of the flight was a connecting
flight on Air Mauritius from Nairobi to Antananarivo. Plaintiffs'
196 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
197 Id. at 247.
198 Id.
199 41 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994).
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return flight was reconfirmed with British Airways, which had
issued the tickets and had reconfirmed appellants' reservations,
but had neglected to advise appellants that the Air Mauritius leg
of their flight had been discontinued. Plaintiffs were stranded
in Nairobi for five days. Subsequently, they filed a negligence
action in Washington state court, which defendant removed
under the Warsaw Convention. Defendant then successfully
moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs' claims
were time-barred.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, holding
that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to plaintiffs' ac-
tion.200 The court of appeals noted that plaintiffs
did not allege that [defendant was] negligent in issuing the Air
Mauritius portion of their tickets. The common thread in this
dispute is the question of whether BA's conduct in reconfirming a
flight reservations is the service of an 'air carrier' in the course of
performing a contract for international transportation by air ....
If so, the Convention governs and we must affirm. If that con-
duct is more properly analogized to the service of an independ-
ent ticketing agent who could be subject to a state law negligence
claim, appellants can survive the limitations hurdle. °
The court of appeals then ruled that the alleged negligence did
not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage,
but happened days before, when defendants mistakenly recon-
firmed plaintiffs' reservations on a non-existent flight. The
court, therefore, ruled that plaintiffs' alleged damages did not
rise from a delay in the transportation by air for purposes of
Articles 19 and 30 (2) of the Warsaw Convention.0 2 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument based on federal pre-
emption, ruling that the "conduct of which appellants complain
in no way serves the 'goals of airline deregulation."20 1
In Schwartz v. Lufthansa German Airlines, °4 plaintiff allegedly
drank a bottle of beer approximately one hour before her flight
from Los Angeles to Frankfurt, a Bloody Mary three hours after
takeoff, a one-and-a-half-glass bottle of wine with dinner, and an-
other Bloody Mary within one hour afterward. Approximately
an hour later, while in the lavatory, she fell and fractured her
right ankle. The flight attendants who assisted her afterward no-
200 Id. at 537.
20, Id. (citations omitted).
2N 41 F.3d at 537-38.
203 Id. at 540.
2"04 No. CV 91-2952, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,841 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 1993).
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ticed that she smelled of alcohol, was speaking incoherently,
and appeared to be intoxicated. They also examined the lava-
tory and testified that there were no slippery substances on the
floor. When the plane landed in Frankfurt, some six-and-one-
half hours after plaintiff's fall, the physicians who treated her at
the airport testified that she still smelled of alcohol, was loud
and argumentative, and appeared to be intoxicated.
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California ruled that the case was governed by the Warsaw Con-
vention and that, to recover, plaintiff was required to prove that
she was injured as the result of an "accident" as that term is de-
fined under Article 17 of the Convention.0 5 That section re-
quires that an injury be caused by an unexpected or unusual
event that is external to the passenger for liability to arise. Plain-
tiff's injury was caused by her intoxication, an "internal" factor.
The court, therefore, concluded that defendant was not liable
for plaintiff's injury.2 0 6
d. Recoverable Damages
In Eichler v. Lufthansa German Airlines, °7 plaintiff was a passen-
ger on a Lufthansa flight from Frankfurt to New York. Instead
of boarding from a gate, the passengers were bused to the
tarmac where the airplane was parked. Lufthansa, for security
reasons, was conducting positive baggage identification. While
claiming her luggage, plaintiff stumbled and fell over a piece of
luggage that apparently had been placed behind her on the
tarmac by another passenger, breaking her arm.
The parties agreed that plaintiff was in the process of embark-
ing and, therefore, that her case fell within Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. The issues to be decided by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York were
whether plaintiff was negligent, the extent of any comparative
negligence, and the appropriate damages, if any, to award for
her injuries.
Plaintiff had only sought damages for pain and suffering. The
court ruled that the sum of $50,000 represented fair and reason-
able compensation for plaintiff's past and future suffering.208
The more challenging issue for the court to resolve was whether
205 Id.
2 6 Id. at 17,843.
207 No. 91 Civ. 8407 (CSH), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 762 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 27, 1994).
208 Id. at *11.
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comparative negligence principles could be applied in cases
where the defendant was held liable under the principles of ab-
solute liability, as under the Warsaw Convention. The court rea-
soned that the concept of "comparative causation" rather than
"comparative fault" should be applied in such cases to reduce
liability.209 The court, however, also ruled that plaintiff had not
acted negligently in that the luggage over which she had fallen
had apparently been placed behind'her while she was standing,
and, therefore, she reasonably should not be expected to have
seen it.
-In Federal Insurance Co. v. Air Express International, Corp.,210 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted partial summary judgment for the defendant air
carrier, holding that plaintiffs' claims were not governed by the
Warsaw Convention, but that its recovery was limited to the con-
tractual terms enumerated on the carrier's cargo air waybill.
Plaintiff's subrogor contracted with defendant to ship two
packages of Belgian roses extract from the Netherlands to New
Jersey. Plaintiff did not declare a special value for the shipment
on defendant's house waybill. The house waybill identified New
York as the destination.
The two packages were delivered to John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport, where they were accepted by defendant and
transported by truck to its storage facility at Newark Airport in
New Jersey. When defendant tendered delivery to plaintiff
nearly two weeks later, however, only one of the packages was
located. The missing package was valued at $52,000.
In the ensuing subrogation action, defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment limiting its liability to $9.07 per pound or $20.00
per. kilogram, pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. 2 The court
noted that the Convention allows for breaks in "undivided trans-
portation," provided the parties regarded the sequence as a sin-
gle operation. However, as the waybill stated the destination was
New York and the package was lost after leaving the JFK airport
premises, the court held the Convention inapplicable.2 1 3 The
court further ruled that plaintiff's recovery was subject to the
liability limitations on defendant's house waybill, which, like the
209 Id. at *12, *14.
210 No. 91 Civ. 4681 (SWK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5991 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
1994).
211 Id. at *1, *7, *11.
212 Id. at *3.
213 Id. at *6-*8.
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Warsaw Convention, limited recovery to $9.07 per pound or
$20.00 per kilogram. The court rejected plaintiff's contention
that it did not have notice of the waybill terms, finding that
plaintiff was a sophisticated business entity that had made more
than 400 shipments per year with defendant. Under the terms
of the house waybill, moreover, plaintiff could have declared a
special value for the shipment for an additional fee, thereby
avoiding the damages limitations.1 4
In Kalok Corp. v. Circle Freight International,2 15 defendant Circle
Freight contracted to transport 1728 hard disk drives owned by
plaintiff from the Philippines to the United States. Defendant
Northwest Airlines performed the actual transportation of the
disk drives. When the disk drives arrived in California, the pack-
aging used to protect them in shipment was found to be
crushed. Plaintiff tested all 1728 units and found that seventy-
eight had been damaged. The cost for testing the units was
$17,070.
Defendant Circle moved for summary judgment to limit its
liability according to the weight of the seventy-eight damaged
units. Under this analysis, Circle's liability would be limited to
$1365 (78 units times .875 kilograms, times $20 (250 francs) per
kilogram). Plaintiff argued that it should be allowed to recover
damages up to $31,440.00, based on the weight of the entire
shipment. Defendant Northwest moved for summary judgment
claiming that its responsibility for the shipment was discharged
when Circle accepted a check from Northwest as compensation.
Plaintiff contended that the weight of the entire shipment
should be the basis for the damages calculation, arguing that:
(1) all of the drives sustained damage within the meaning of the
Convention; (2) the value of all of the drives was affected by the
damage; (3) the Convention considers the weight of the entire
shipment in setting a maximum limit on liability that is not re-
duced in cases of partial damage; and (4) the parties' contract,
as expressed in the air waybill, required calculation of damages
based on the weight of the entire shipment. Defendant Circle
conceded that consequential damages were recoverable but ar-
gued that they were limited to the weight of the goods actually
damaged.
In accepting plaintiff's arguments, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California distinguished com-
214 Id. at *11.
215 No. C-92-4676-DJL, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,768 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 1993).
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puter components from other types of goods in that their effec-
tiveness is called into question by rough handling. As the rough
treatment made it necessary to test the drives before they could
be sold for fair market value, the court ruled that the- handling
had tangibly diminished the value of each disk drive. 16 The
court, therefore, held that the total weight of the shipment
would be used in calculating the damages available under the
Warsaw Convention and that plaintiff could recover up to
$31,440.00.217
The court, noting that the air waybill defined damage to in-
clude "any damage, delay, or loss of whatsoever nature," ruled
that this language was more specific than the language in the
Warsaw Convention, and it defined damage as including losses
of indeterminate nature.2 1 8 The court, therefore, concluded
that the contractual language supported the view that the costs
of testing were compensable damages.21
In support of its argument that its liability was discharged
when it tendered compensation to Circle, Defendant Northwest
argued that Circle's acceptance comprised an accord and satis-
faction of its liability to plaintiff. According to Northwest, Circle
had been acting as plaintiff's agent. The court rejected this ar-
gument, ruling that Northwest had not proved that Circle was
authorized by plaintiff to act as its agent, and denied North-
west's motion for summary judgment. 220
e. Proper Forum
In Shen v. Japan Airlines,21 the federal district court dismissed
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient ser-
vice of process. Plaintiffs were United States resident aliens who
had traveled from New York to Shanghai aboard a U.S. regis-
tered air carrier. In Shanghai, plaintiffs purchased round trip
tickets to Tokyo on defendantJapan Airlines (JAL). Upon arri-
val in Tokyo, the Japanese Immigration Bureau refused plain-
tiffs admission and directed JAL to detain plaintiffs and place
them on the next flight to Shanghai.2
216 Id. at 17,770.
217 Id. at 1.7,770-71.
218 Id. at 17,771.
219 Id.
20 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,772.
21 No. 93 Civ. 1501 (LIS), 1994 WL 167989 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1994), aff'd, 43
F.3d 1459 (1994).
222 Id. at *1.
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Plaintiffs filed their action in the Southern District of New
York, claiming false arrest and malicious prosection against the
defendants, who allegedly kept them in custody for over fifteen
hours without food, illegally searched them, seized their pass-
ports and luggage, and forced their return to Shaighai. De-
fendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of lack of
personal jurisdiction.
The court stated that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention
designates four places in which an action under the Convention
may be brought: (1) the carrier's domicile; (2) the carrier's
principal place of business; (3) the place of the carrier's busi-
ness through which the contract had been made; or (4) the des-
tination. The court found that JAL's domicile and principal
place of business were Japan. However, the court rejected plain-
tiffs' argument that the place of business through which the
contract had been made was New York, inasmuch as plaintiffs
had paid for their tickets with an American Express card in a
transaction that cleared through New York. 3  Plaintiffs also ar-
gued that their destination should be considered New York, as
their travel originated there. The court rejected the argument
because plaintiffs' flight could not be considered a single opera-
tion. Also, insofar as JAL's activities were directed by Japanese
governmental authorities, the court held that the act-of-state
doctrine required dismissal.22
The court also dismissed plaintiffs' action against the Japa-
nese Immigration Bureau for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to effect service as required under the FSIA.
In Esa v. Olympic AirwaysY the United States District Court
for the Central District of California dismissed the action against
a Greek air carrier, which arose from the loss of a $1700 com-
puter from a passenger's luggage during a round-trip flight
from Saudi Arabia to the United States, based on its finding that
it lacked "treaty jurisdiction ' under the Warsaw Convention.
Although it dismissed the action, the court questioned why the
carrier "would rather incur significant legal expenses defending
this action than pay what appears to be a perfectly legitimate
and inexpensive claim."22 6
223 Id. at *2-*3.
224 Id. at *4-*5.
225 No. CV 94-1979, 1994 WL 603227 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 1994).
226 Id. at *8.
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The action was originally filed in the small claims division of
the Los Angeles County Municipal Court, from which defendant
removed to federal court and moved for dismissal under the
Warsaw Convention. Article 28 of the Convention authorizes
the filing of an action in only four places: (1) the domicile of
the air carrier; (2) the principal place of business of the carrier;
(3) the place where the contract of transportation was made, i.e.
where the ticket was issued; or (4) the place of destination.
Applying Article 28 to the present action, the court found the
following: (1) defendant's domicile and principal place of busi-
ness were Greece; (2) the passenger's round-trip ticket was
purchased in Saudi Arabia; and (3) the "destination" of travel
ticketed as a round-trip is the original place of departure, which
was Saudi Arabia in this case. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the action.
In Cortes v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 7 the Florida appellate court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of both defendants, Avi-
anca and Delta Airlines, Inc., in an action arising from a trip-
and-fall of an elderly passenger after the carriers allegedly failed
to provide her with requested wheelchair services. The judg-
ment as to Avianca was based on the lack of treaty jurisdiction
under the Warsaw Convention, ano the judgment against Delta
was based on lack of proximate cause.228
Plaintiff was a sixty-two year old infirm woman who traveled
on Delta from Montreal to Miami, where she was to connect
with an Avianca flight to Columbia. Upon arriving in Miami,
plaintiff was not furnished with a wheelchair or other assistance,
as she had requested of Delta. She then made her way, unas-
sisted, to the Avianca ticket counter to check in for the Colum-
bia" flight. She again requested assistance, which was not
provided. Plaintiff fell after leaving the Avianca counter, while
attempting to use an escalator.
As noted above, Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention limits
the places where an action may be filed to the carrier's domicile
or principal place of business, the place where the contract for
transportation was made, or the destination of the involved
flight. As Avianca's domicile and principal place of business
were Columbia, and as Canada was the place where the contract
for transportation was made and was the destination, the court
227 638 So. 3d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
228 Id. at 109-10.
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found treaty jurisdiction lacking.22 9 Summary judgment in
Delta's favor was affirmed under the doctrine of superseding
cause, which the court found applicable as a matter of law due
to the series of events, including Avianca's failure to provide
plaintiff with requested assistance and the lengthy time plaintiff
spent in the terminal before falling on the escalator, that inter-
vened between Delta's acts and the incident.23 0
B. KoR N AIRLINE FLIGHT 007 CASES
In In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983,31 litigation
arising from the shooting down of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight
007 by Soviet fighter aircraft, KAL unsuccessfully sought, by way
of a FRCP 60 motion, to obtain a new trial based on "newly-
discovered" evidence several years after the original trial. The
evidence consisted of the 1993 International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization's (ICAO) report analyzing digital flight data recorder
(DFDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data that were re-
trieved, which KAL contended supported its defense to the will-
ful misconduct charge on which it had suffered an adverse
judgment.23 2
In 1989, the judgment in the KAL Flight 007 liability trial
came before the District of Columbia District Court of Appeals.
The central question in that appeal was whether the verdict of
willful misconduct against the KAL flight crew, which rendered
the Warsaw Convention liability limitations inapplicable, should
be affirmed. The dispositive issue can be summarized simply as,
"at what point did the flight go off course and why?"
The plaintiffs argued that the KAL flight crew had been off
course for some five hours, including the three spent flying in
Soviet airspace, that the aircraft had missed all its designated
waypoints, and that every possible explanation for the course
deviation supported a finding of willful misconduct. As evi-
dence, plaintiffs relied on United States radar information show-
ing that Flight 007 deviated off course shortly after taking off
from Anchorage and that the deviation increased as the flight
proceeded. Information obtained by ICAO from Russian and
Japanese radar substantially supported this allegation.3 3
229 Id. at 109.
230 Id. at 110.
231 156 F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
232 Id. at 20.
233 Id. at 24.
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In addition, plaintiffs presented the testimony of two experts.
Each testified that KAL 007's crew must have known that they
were off course. Both experts also testified that the flight crew
knew of the extreme danger associated with straying into Soviet
airspace. The nature and extent of the deviation, the experts
opined, was such that the pilots either intentionally flew off
course or systematically and repeatedly ignored fundamental,
mandatory navigation procedures.2
KAL did not call any pilots, but, instead, relied on the testi-
mony of an FAA air traffic controller and an Air Force defense
radar observer who were on duty that night. Both witnesses tes-
tified that they had not seen any indication that the aircraft had
deviated from its flight path. KAL also introduced the 1983
ICAO Air Navigation Commission Report, which showed no di-
rect evidence that the'crew was aware of the deviation. In sum,
KAL argued that the flight had proceeded off course only after
reaching the last waypoint, as a defense to plaintiffs' contention
that the pilots had given false position reports. KAL argued that
the alternative was to hold that the flight crew had lied in mak-
ing every position report and had engaged in a conspiracy to do
so. Based on this evidence, the jury's verdict of willful miscon-
duct was upheld on appeal.
In 1993, ICAO published a report reviewing the digital DFDR
and CVR retrieved from KAL Flight 007. Based on this evi-
dence, the ICAO report found that KAL Flight 007 had deviated
from course within minutes of takeoff. The evidence showed
that the aircraft. missed all of its designated waypoints, by in-
creasing margins. The DFDR data served to confirm the radar
information from Alaskan FAA and military facilities introduced
by plaintiffs at trial-for example, a chart of the flight path
based on the DFDR data, which was included in the 1993 report,
was almost identical to the plaintiffs' trial exhibits, except the
chart in the ICAO report showed an even greater course devia-
tion than plaintiffs had alleged."
In addition, unlike the 1983 ICAO report, the 1993 ICAO re-
port found that KAL 007's crew failed to use their INS as re-
quired but instead flew on a constant magnetic heading and
failed to perform the mandatory cross-check navigation proce-
dures. One of plaintiffs' trial experts reviewed the 1993 report
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expressed at trial. The 1993 report did, however, state that
there was no direct evidence establishing that the crew was
aware the flight was off course. 3 6
By way of the instant motion, KAL sought to introduce the
1993 report as newly-discovered evidence. The court ruled that
the flight and voice recorder data had existed since the disaster
occurred and were "newly discovered," although they could not
be produced because of the one year limitation of the rule. Fi-
nally, the court rejected KAL's argument that the residual clause
of FRCP 60(b) (6) applied, ruling that subsection was only effec-
tive where none of the other rule clauses applied.137
In addition, the court of appeals held that KAL's motion
lacked merit because the 1993 ICAO report actually supported
the willful misconduct verdict, by offering conclusive proof that
the flight crew flew the aircraft off course for more than five
hours. The court concluded that the "newly discovered" evi-
dence did not in any manner warrant a new trial. 3 8
In Ocampo v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd.,23 9 plaintiff sued individu-
ally and as personal representative of his late wife's estate in this
KAL Flight 007 action. After the consolidated trial before the
United States District Court for the District Court of Columbia,
which resulted in a jury finding against KAL for willful miscon-
duct that was affirmed on appeal, plaintiff sought damages
under the Warsaw Convention and the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA) .240 The jury's damages award included compen-
sation for the loss of decedent's services, society, companion-
ship, love and affection, and mental anguish. KAL then sought
to move the court for judgment as a matter of law that damages
for loss of society and mental anguish were not recoverable
under DOHSA and sought to strike those portions of the dam-
ages award.2 41
The court noted that plaintiff's rights and remedies were
based on both the Warsaw Convention and DOHSA, and it
noted that the Second Circuit has permitted awards for loss of
society under the Convention. Accordingly, the court permitted
the award for that portion of plaintiff's damages. 42 The court,
236 156 F.R.D. at 25.
237 Id. at 22-23.
238 Id. at 26.
239 No. 83-2941 (AER), 1994 WL 731569 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1994).
240 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988).
241 1994 WL 38785 at *1.
242 Id.
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however, ruled that the Convention does not allow recovery for
a plaintiff's mental anguish when the plaintiff is a non-passen-
ger outside of the zone of danger.243
The case of Hollie v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd.24 concerned,
among other things, the identification of appropriate wrongful
death beneficiaries in actions under the DOHSA. The statute
limits wrongful death beneficiaries to "the decedent's wife, hus-
band, parent, child or dependent relative."2 45 Thus, any relative
other than those specifically identified must demonstrate finan-
cial dependency to recover damages.
In this appeal from a DOHSA wrongful death action arising
from the death of one of the 269 passengers on board KAL
Flight 007, plaintiffs included the decedent's sister, brother,
aunt, and four nieces and nephews. In post-trial motions, de-
fendants challenged the recovery by certain plaintiff/relatives
on the basis that they had not proved they were dependent
upon the decedent. Defendants also argued as a matter of law
that decedent's nieces and nephews lacked standing to recover
damages for their loss of decedent's nurture, care, and gui-
dance. Finally, defendants sought to set aside the jury's award
for decedent's pre-death pain and suffering as lacking support
in the evidence, or, alternatively, to reduce this portion of the
award to $30,000.246
Noting that the Second Circuit had not defined a test for de-
termining dependency in DOHSA actions, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York turned to
the case law decided under the Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, in which a dependency test had
been adopted. 47 In reliance on these cases, the district court
ruled that "a relative who is not a wife, husband, parent, or child
of the decedent must separately establish both dependency and
pecuniary loss in order to recover damages under DOHSA."248
The court further ruled that "dependency" is " 'an independent
element which must be established in addition to pecuniary
loss.' ",249 The district court then examined the testimony
presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
243 Id. at *83.
2-44 No. 83 Civ. 7988 (PNL) (NRB), 1994 WL 38785 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1994).
245 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
246 Id. at *1-'2.
247 Id. at *3.
248 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
249 1994 WL 38785 at *4 (citation omitted).
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moving party, and concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to support a finding that all of the plaintiffs were dependents
who had lost financial support, as both of decedent's siblings
were disabled and the nieces and nephews were minors.25 °
The district court then considered the nieces' and nephews'
standing to recover damages for the loss of decedent's nurture,
care, and guidance. After examining the case law, the district
court determined that, typically, only a decedent's minor chil-
dren were entitled to receive compensation for such losses.25'
Plaintiffs, however, contended that decedent had provided nur-
ture, care, and guidance in place of her sister, who was legally
blind, uneducated, unemployed and apparently was herself in
need of care. The court, therefore, held that these losses to the
nieces and nephews would be compensable, so long as decedent
had been freely acting in loco parentis for them. However, the
court found that the evidence did not support this
conclusion. 2
With respect to decedent's pain and suffering, defendants ar-
gued that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that decedent was
conscious following the missile attack that downed Flight 007.
The court, however, found that sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence existed from which the jury could infer that decedent en-
dured conscious pain and suffering. 3  The court upheld the
$150,000 jury award for this damages element as being consis-
tent with the verdicts in other KAL Flight 007 cases.2 " The dis-
trict court, therefore, upheld the jury award with respect to
every element but the nieces' and nephews' recovery for the loss
of decedent's nurture, care, and guidance, which the court set
aside.
In Estate of Zarif v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd.,255 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled on
plaintiff's various damages claims arising from the death of his
adoptive mother in the KAL Flight 007 shootdown. The case
was tried before the court as the result of plaintiff's waiver of his
right to jury trial (five other KAL Flight 007 damages cases were
returned to the Eastern District of Michigan following the con-
250 Id. at *5.
251 Id. at *6.
252 Id.
253 Id. at *8.
254 1994 WL 38785 at *9.
255 836 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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solidated liability trial-four were tried before juries and the
other one settled). 56
Plaintiff had been adopted in 1958. He and his adoptive
mother were particularly close. After graduating high school,
plaintiff had lived at home until age twenty-three. Afterward, he
returned home every weekend from out of town to spend his
time with her. After her death, plaintiff testified that he had, on
one occasion, sought psychiatric help for his loneliness. Plain-
tiff also testified that he suffered physical changes after his
mother's death, including a disruption of his sleeping pattern,
but failed to offer any other evidence on this issue. Plaintiff al-
leged damages claims for the following: (1) his mother's pre-
death pain and suffering; (2) plaintiff's lost society, services and
care; and (3) lost economic support.
In considering the claim for decedent's pain and suffering,
the court examined, in great detail, the evidence of what tran-
spired after the missile attack and found, in conformity with the
1993 ICAO report, that Flight 007 had remained airborne for
approximately twelve minutes after being struck. The court also
found that the passengers had the opportunity to don their oxy-
gen masks, which had dropped from the overhead panels. The
court found, however, that the massive decompression would
have caused the passengers acute pain. The court then ex-
amined in detail the post-attack trauma that would have been
befallen the passengers, and rejected as speculative the opinions
of defense experts that the passengers were unconscious within
moments following the attack.257 The court awarded decedent's
estate $1 million for her pain and suffering.258
With respect to plaintiff's claim for loss of nurture, the court
declined to award compensation due to the lack of evidence
that plaintiff was economically dependent on his mother or ex-
pected any "'pecuniary benefit from a continuance of the de-
ceased's life.' "259 The court also noted that the decedent had
more than fulfilled her responsibility to plaintiff in this manner.
The court also dismissed plaintiff's claim for economic loss as
not supported by the evidence.2 °
256 Id. at 1342.
257 Id. at 1342-44, 1347-48.
258 Id. at 1349.
259 Id. at 1350 (citation omitted).
260 937 F. Supp. at 1350.
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With respect to plaintiff's claim for grief and mental anguish,
the court ruled that the plaintiff could only recover if his mental
condition had resulted in physical injury. The court found that
this had not been shown in this case. Finally, the court awarded
plaintiff $500,000 for the loss of his mother's society.261
C. PAN AM FLIGHT 103 CASES
In In re Pan Am Corp.,2 62 one phase of the Pan Am Flight 103
litigation, the Second Circuit ruled that 28 U.S.C. section 157
authorized the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York to order plaintiffs' personal injury actions
transferred from Florida state court to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. The district court
was aware of defendants' ultimate intent of moving the South-
ern District of Florida for transfer to the Eastern District of New
York or of moving for dismissal under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1407(c) (ii).263
In 1991, some 549 residents of Lockerbie, Scotland, filed
wrongful death and personal injury actions against Pan Am and
others in the Florida state court, premised upon the breach of
the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Act, which held aircraft own-
ers strictly liable for injuries caused by material falling from air-
craft. Plaintiffs selected Florida due to the fact that Pan Am and
Alert Management Systems (a co-defendant) were present there.
Three months later, Pan Am filed for reorganization in the
Southern District of New York, automatically staying plaintiffs'
actions. The stay was subsequently lifted to allow the Florida
litigation to proceed on the issue of defendants' liability.
Pan Am then moved the district court for an order transfer-
ring the Florida state court actions to the Southern District of
Florida under 28 U.S.C. section 157(b) (5). The Second Circuit
noted that Pan Am, with commendable candor, advised the dis-
trict court that, if its motion were granted, it intended to trans-
fer the cases to the Eastern District of New York, where the
Judicial panel on Multi-District Litigation had consolidated the
other tort cases against Pan Am. Plaintiffs appealed from the
district court's transfer order, arguing that section 157(b)(5)
only authorized transfers from state courts to the United States
261 Id. at 1351-52.
262 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
263 Id. at 514-15.
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district court where the bankruptcy was proceeding or to the
court where plaintiffs' cause of action arose.26"
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the bankruptcy court erred
in ruling that the transfer was proper under section 157(b) (5).
The court of appeals, however, ruled that "the transfer motion
should be made to the district court in the district where the
bankruptcy is proceeding. If the transfer motion is met with a
cross-motion to abstain, the presumption is that 'transfer should
be the rule, abstention the exception.' "265
The court of appeals was also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the court should look beyond the immediate transfer
request to recognize defendants' "ultimate scheme" to transfer
the actions to a forum that was not appropriate under section
157. The court of appeals noted that section 157 was enacted to
expand the district court's venue-fixing powers, with an eye to
centralizing adjudication of bankruptcy, and found that the dis-
trict court could order a section 157 transfer without consider-
ing any party's ultimate plans. The court also noted that, if Pan
Am's scheme to relocate the cases after the initial transfer
proved improper, the district court could simply deny any mo-
tion to transfer from the Southern District to the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York.26
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988267
was an appeal from the final judgments entered by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in
three cases arising from the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The district court awarded the
first plaintiff $9,225,000, the second plaintiff $9,000,000, and
the third plaintiff $1,735,000. Defendants challenged both the
jury finding of liability and the amounts of the damage awards.
The terrorist bombing of Flight 103 resulted in, among other
things, a consolidated thirteen week liability trial controlling all
of the Flight 103 cases filed against Pan Am in the United States.
At the close of that trial, the jury returned a special verdict find-
ing defendants guilty of willful misconduct. The jury had been
instructed that, although the Warsaw Convention generally lim-
ited a carrier's liability for damages to $75,000 per passenger,
the limit does not apply if the jury finds that the carrier acted
264 Id.
m65 Id. at 516 (citation omitted).
266 Id.
267 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994).
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with "willful misconduct" in causing a plaintiff's damages. In
this regard, the liability trial centered on Pan Am's alleged non-
compliance with FAA directives concerning inspection of "unac-
companied" baggage.
The jury found that Pan Am had willfully disobeyed these di-
rectives, resulting in the unaccompanied luggage containing the
explosive device being loaded on board the aircraft. Subse-
quent to the liability phase of the trial, the jury awarded com-
pensatory damages to the three plaintiffs. The cases of the 207
other passengers would be affected by the outcome of this
appeal.
The Second Circuit characterized the defendants' arguments
on appeal as falling into four categories:
(1) the exclusion of evidence relating to Pan Am and Alert's
alleged non-compliance with ACSSP regulations concerning un-
accompanied baggage;
(2) the admission of evidence showing other alleged miscon-
duct on appellants' part, coupled with a disallowance of defense
testimony concerning alternative causation theories;
(3) challenges to various other evidentiary rulings; and
(4) challenges to the damages awards.26 With only a few ex-
ceptions, the court of appeals dismissed each of defendants' ar-
guments on these issues.
With respect to the first issue on appeal, the main line of ex-
cluded evidence allegedly would have proved the FAA's oral
waiver excusing Pan Am from complying with the relevant secur-
ity regulations. Defendants argued they believed they were in
compliance with FAA regulations and, therefore, could not be
found to have committed any willful breach. Defendants also
argued that the court improperly barred evidence of their com-
pliance with applicable British safety regulations (requiring X-
rays of luggage transferred from other air carriers) that also
could have negated the inference of willful misconduct.269
Regarding the oral waiver argument, the court of appeals
noted that the relevant regulations expressly required that
waiver applications and approvals be in writing and that "Pan
Am offered no proof that it ever applied for a written exemp-
tion." 27" The Second Circuit also noted that Pan Am's chairman
268 Id. at 812.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 815.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
admitted that the Pan Am knew that waivers had to be in
writing.27
1
The Second Circuit also noted that, in excluding testimony of
the alleged oral waivers, the trial court had properly treated the
proffered evidence as an attempt to mount "a so-called govern-
ment authorization defense," which was improper because any
oral waivers by the FAA would have been ineffective as exceed-
ing the agency's authority. The court of appeals also noted that
evidence of the alleged oral waiver would be "irrelevant since
Pan Am was charged with knowing the regulations, including
those that stated amendments and exemptions to the regula-
tions must be in writing. " 2 1
In addition, defendants sought to argue that the security
measures in place at Heathrow conformed with legal require-
ments and that any nonconformities were due to innocent mis-
takes regarding the law. Applying the maxim that "ignorance of
the law is no excuse," the Second Circuit rejected this argument
as well, noting that the applicable regulations were clear in their
requirements.273
The Second Circuit, no doubt painfully aware of the harsh-
ness of the exclusion order, further held that, even if the trial
court had erred, the error was harmless because the record was
"replete with evidence that wholly undermines Pan Am's claim
of good faith" and that "the overwhelming evidence" at trial es-
tablished that Pan Am had ignored repeated warnings and sig-
nals that its existing security measures were insufficient.274 In
the Second Circuit's view, this evidence "overwhelmingly sup-
ported the jury's conclusion that but for Pan Am's wholly inade-
quate terrorist prevention techniques and its deliberate
indifference and overt acts of willfulness, the bombing and the
senseless loss of life would not have occurred." 275
With respect to the appellants' argument concerning the ex-
clusion of the evidence of the applicable British regulations, the
court of appeals noted that the exclusion of the documentary
evidence did not amount to an abuse of discretion. The appel-
lants sought to place before the trial court documentary evi-
dence in the form of British Department of Transport
271 Id.
272 37 F.3d at 816.
27 Id. at 817-19.
24 Id. at 819.
275 Id. at 820.
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documents and circulars to the effect that Pan Am's reliance on
X-raying interline bags would have complied with British secur-
ity directives. The court of appeals noted that the exclusion of
the evidence was proper on the basis that it was irrelevant,
vague, and remote. The court of appeals, however, emphasized
that appellants had presented a strong defense to the jury that
any bomb in the luggage should have been visible on X-ray, a
fact to which the parties had stipulated.276
The second issue on appeal alleged trial court error in admit-
ting evidence of other alleged misconduct on appellants' part,
coupled with a disallowance of defense testimony concerning al-
ternative causation theories. The court of appeals, however, af-
firmed the trial court's admission of this evidence, ruling that
evidence of Pan Am's conduct with regard to passenger safety in
general was properly received. With respect to the exclusion of
appellants' expert witness testimony concerning other possible
causation theories, the court of appeals ruled the exclusion was
within the trial court's broad discretion. 77 The court of appeals
also ruled that the trial court's rulings limiting cross-examina-
tion and expert testimony was "unremarkable and without
error."
278
With respect to the third issue on appeal-appellant's further
evidentiary objections-the court of appeals, after examining
each argument, ruled that none of the trial court's rulings com-
prised reversible error. 79
With respect to the fourth issue on appeal, the court of ap-
peals vacated one of the loss of society awards for a determina-
tion of whether the plaintiffs, some of whom were adult
offspring, were financially dependent on the deceased family
members. The court of appeals also ruled that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury that damages for the loss of a
parent's care and guidance should have be limited to the period
of a child's minority, absent a showing of specific circumstances
that the parental guidance had "'a pecuniary value beyond the
irreplaceable values of companionship and affection.' "280
In concluding, the majority opinion commented that this was
"not a paradigm of a perfect trial. The critical question though
276 Id. at 820-21.
277 37 F.3d at 823-24.
278 Id. at 825.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 830 (citation omitted).
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is whether the trial was fair. Here we are satisfied. . . that de-
fendants received a fair trial."281.
One judge dissented on the basis that the evidentiary exclu-
sions had deprived appellant's of a fair trial. This judge de-
parted from the majority's analysis on the basis of his view that
the proper focus was not on whether Pan Am had willfully vio-
lated regulations but whether it used X-ray screening techniques
with knowledge that injury to passengers would probably result,
or with reckless disregard of the probable consequences.
D. DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAs ACT (DOHSA) CASES 2812
In Preston v. Frant,28 3 plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the
dismissal of their state law claims for survival damages in this
DOHSA action arising from the death of their son in a helicop-
ter crash on a flight from the Connecticut mainland to Nan-
tucket Island.
The dismissalwas based on the district court's conclusion that
Connecticut law, which allowed recovery of a decedent's lost fu-
ture earnings in a survival action, was preempted by general fed-
eral maritime law.28 In its discussion, the Second Circuit noted
that the gradual expansion of federal maritime law required rec-
ognition of an expanding scope of preemption.28 5 The court
also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the helicopter accident
did not have a sufficient maritime nexus to justify applying mari-
time law, noting that the helicopter had been engaged in a
traditional maritime activity-providing transportation between
an island and the mainland-when the accident occurred. 86
In Boswell v. Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc.,287 on summaryjudg-
ment, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas found that a stepchild is an appropriate beneficiary of a
wrongful death action under general maritime law.288
281 37 F.3d at 846.
282 See also DOSHA cases reported elsewhere in this compedium: Ocampo v.
Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., No. 83-2941 (AER), 1994 WL 731569 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
1994); Hollie v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., No. 83 Civ. 7899 (PNL) (NRB), 1994
WL 38785 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1994).
283 11 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 31 (1994).
m Preston v. Frantz, No. B-88-285 (WWE), 1992 WL 553984 (D. Conn. Nov.
16, 1992).
285 11 F.3d at 358.
286 Id. at 358-59.
287 854 F. Supp. 461 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
2" Id. at 464.
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Plaintiff's decedent drowned in the capsize of a line handling
boat. In the ensuing wrongful death action against the ship-
owner and shipyard, defendants argued that the decedent's
stepchild lacked standing to maintain a wrongful death action
because she had not been formally adopted.2 8 9 The court found
that DOHSA controls the determination of wrongful death ben-
eficiaries, which the act defines as "decedent's wife, husband,
parent, child, or dependent relative," without expressly men-
tioning unadopted stepchildren. 290 Defendants argued the
court should look to Texas law to determine what familial rela-
tions should be recognized under DOHSA, under which the
stepchild would be ineligible.2 91 The court instead looked to
DOHSA and federal case law interpreting the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act, under which a pragmatic, rather than
a legalistic, interpretation of the "dependent relative" was ap-
plied. 92 Accordingly, the court ruled that the unadopted
stepchild was an appropriate wrongful death beneficiary. 9 3
In Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Co., Inc.,2 94 interpret-
ing the Jones Act,295 the DOHSA, and general maritime law, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the estates
of seamen who drown on the high seas cannot recover lost fu-
ture earnings in a survival action.
Davis involved claims by the estates of seamen who drowned
in the Bering Sea while trapped in a sinking ship. The seamen
died without dependant heirs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling that, although survival actions are viable
under general maritime law, general maritime law does not en-
hance or replace statutory remedies. 96 The seamen's estates
had remedies available under both the Jones Act and the
DOHSA, neither of which provides for recovery of future earn-
ings in a survival action.297
289 Id. at 463.
29o 46 U.S.CA. § 761 (West 1975).
291 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-768 (West 1975 & App. 1995).
292 854 F. Supp. at 463.
293 Id. at 464.
294 27 F.3d 426 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 510 (1994).
295 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (West App. 1995).
2%6 27 F.3d at 430.
297 Id. at 428.
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E. OTHER AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
1. Liability and Defenses
a. Standard of Care
In Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc.,298 the Ninth Circuit ruled
that an air carrier's standard announcement upon arrival, which
warns that baggage stored in overhead bins could shift during
flight, did not, as a matter of law, fulfill its duty to provide ade-
quate. safety for passengers. 99
The action arose from a serious head injury suffered by plain-
tiff when a briefcase fell from an overhead bin. Plaintiff did not
allege that the air carrier's personnel were negligent in storing
the briefcase or in opening the bin, but merely that her injury
was foreseeable and that the air carrier did not prevent it. The
air carrier successfully moved for summary judgment, from
which plaintiff appealed.
In reversing the summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit noted
that in 1987 the air carrier had received 135 reports of items
falling from overhead bins and that installing 'netting inside of
the bins would not necessarily be prohibitively expensive or in-
convenienL300 The Ninth Circuit held that the issue of whether
the air carrier had fulfilled its obligation to protect its passen-
gers simply by reciting its standard arrival announcement
presented a jury question."0 '
In Steering Committee v. United States,302 the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's ruling that the pilots of an Aeromexico
DC-9 involved in a mid-air collision with a single-engine Piper
Aircraft over Cerritos, California, were not negligent in any
manner related to the causes of the accident. An advisory jury
found the United States fifty percent liable for the crash.303
The collision, which resulted in the deaths of all sixty-four
persons aboard the DC-9, the three persons on board the Piper,
and fifteen persons on the ground, occurred while the Aer-
omexico flight crew was in contact with an FAA facility while
inbound for landing at Los Angeles International Airport. The
district court consolidated actions for wrongful death, personal
injury, and property damages against the estate of the Piper pi-
2 24 F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 1994).
w Id. at 42.
3N Id. at 41.
30 Id. at 40-42.
02 6 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 1993).
M Id. at 573-74.
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lot, Aeromexico, and the United States. The court bifurcated
the liability and damages issues. Aeromexico did not dispute
liability for those suing for damages not to exceed $75,000 per
passenger, pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.
Ajury was impaneled to decide the liability of the Piper pilot's
estate and to render an advisory verdict regarding the United
States' liability. The jury found each of these defendants fifty
percent liable and further found that the Aeromexico crew had
not acted negligently.
The government requested an interlocutory appeal, claiming
the district court erred in applying the California Evidence
Code, which establishes a presumption of negligence in cases
involving statutes, ordinances, or administrative regulations. 314
The government also claimed the court erred in articulating the
standard of care applicable to pilots under the "see-and-be-seen"
federal aviation regulation.3°5 The Ninth Circuit granted inter-
locutory appeal over all liability issues in the case.30 6
The district court focused on the definition of the appropri-
ate standard of care under the see-and-be-seen vigilance require-
ment. The court had ruled that "[t]he requirement... 'is one
of vigilance to see and avoid those aircraft the pilot could reason-
ably be expected to see. [The rule] does not require pilots to see all
other aircraft.' "307 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit defined "vigi-
lance" as the care that a reasonably prudent pilot would exercise
under the circumstances. 30 8 The panel ruled that "the reason-
ably prudent pilot need not be superhuman in seeing and avoid-
ing other aircraft, but he or she must scan the sky with such
frequency and respond with such precision as is possible." 0 9
Expert evidence was presented to the district court that a rea-
sonably vigilant Aeromexico crew would not have seen the Piper
until it was too late to do anything about it. Although the gov-
ernment presented contrary evidence, the district court was not
required to accept that evidence. In light of the evidence
presented, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court's ruling
that the Aeromexico crew was diligent and professional was not
clearly erroneous. 310
304 CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West 1995).
305 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1986) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (1995)).
306 Id. at 573-74.
307 Id. at 579 (citation omitted).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 6 F.3d at 580.
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In Fillpot v. Midway Airlines, Inc.,"'1 the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant air carrier in a
case arising from a passenger's slip-and-fall on a natural accumu-
lation of ice while walking across the tarmac to the terminal
building after deplaning in a winter storm.1 2 In affirming the
judgment, the appellate court rejected the air carrier's argu-
ment that, after a passenger deplanes, the carrier should only be
subjected to the ordinary negligence standard of care.313 Even
under the elevated standard of care required of common carri-
ers, however, the appellate court held that defendant had not
breached its duty to plain "tiff.3 1 4 The basis for the ruling was
that, under Illinois premises liability law, "absent a contractual
duty, a landowner does not have a duty to remove or take other
precautions against the dangers inherent in natural accumula-
tions of snow or ice."31 5
Sheffer v. Springfield Airport AuthoritysP 6 was an action that also
arose from a passenger's slip-and-fall on an icy airport tarmac.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the plaintiff's verdict, rul-
ing that the defendant air carrier did not have any duty to pas-
sengers to remove or provide warnings of natural accumulations
of ice.3 "7
b. Employment Practices
In Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 18 airline mechanic Norris
appealed the appellate court's dismissal of his complaint for re-
taliatory discharge to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Norris had
been employed by Hawaiian Airlines for approximately six
months when the incident giving rise to his discharge occurred.
While conducting a pre-flight inspection of an Hawaiian Air-
lines DC-9, Norris noticed a worn tire. When the tire and bear-
ing were removed, Norris noted that an axle sleeve was scarred
and grooved. In Norris' opinion, and that of other mechanics,
the sleeve was unsafe and should have been replaced. After his
supervisor ordered that the tire be replaced without changing
311 633 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
312 Id. at 238.
313 Id. at 241.
314 Id. at 242.
315 Id.
316 632 N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 1304 (Il1.
1994).
317 Id. at 1071-72.
318 842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994).
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the sleeve, Norris refused to sign the maintenance record for
the work. After Norris' supervisor told him he would be fired if
he did not sign the maintenance item, Norris still refused and
was eventually terminated. Norris then commenced a union
grievance procedure and sued the airline for wrongful
discharge.
Finding that the dispute arose from Norris' concern for the
safety of the flying public, and not from workplace safety con-
cerns, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the Railway
Labor Act (RLA)31 9 did not preempt Norris' claim.320 The court
then analyzed whether Norris' complaint stated a claim arising
under Hawaii law. The court found that state tort claims existed
and rejected the defendant's arguments that the state claims
only applied to "at-will" employees, not to union members.3 '
The United States Supreme Court granted the air carrier's pe-
tition for certiorari but upheld the Hawaii court's finding that the
RLA did not preempt Norris' state court causes of action. The
Supreme Court applied the analysis set forth in Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef Inc.322 Lingle holds that state law is pre-
empted by the Labor Management Relations Act only if a state
law claim is depends upon the interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement to which the plaintiff is subject.3 23
The Ninth Circuit case of Baker v. Delta Airlines, Inc.3 21 was an
appeal from consolidated cases brought by pilots and flight en-
gineers of Delta Airlines arising from Delta's refusal to allow pi-
lots to extend their employment after age sixty as second
officers (flight engineers), a process known as "two-step
downbidding."
The pilots had all been employees of Western Airlines prior to
its acquisition by Delta. Western had been under a court injunc-
tion to allow two-step downbidding. The first group of plaintiffs
had already reached age sixty while working for Western and
had been trained, or were in the process of beginning training,
as second officers when Delta acquired Western. Delta in-
formed them after the takeover that they would not be eligible
to continue employment with Delta as second officers because
Delta's policy prevented two-step downbidding. These plaintiffs
319 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
320 842 P.2d at 645.
321 Id.
322 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
323 Id. at 409-10.
324 6 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 1993).
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alleged that Delta, as a successor to Western, was required to
employ them as second officers pursuant to the court order that
bound Western. 25
Another group of plaintiffs were former Western captains who
were under age sixty when Delta took over Western. Upon
reaching age sixty, Delta refused to allow them to two-step
downbid. These plaintiffs alleged that Delta's policies violated
the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA). -26
The final plaintiff had been employed as a second officer by
Delta for thirty-one years and was forced to retire when he
reached his sixtieth birthday. He alleged that Delta's policy vio-
lated the ADEA and that the violation was willful.
As to the first group of plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
Delta was a successor to Western and was bound by the order. 27
As to the second group of plaintiffs, the court reviewed evi-
dentiary issues from the findings in Delta's favor below. Plain-
tiffs argued that the lower court had abused its discretion in
excluding internal Delta memoranda related to the age sixty
rule. The court held that exclusion of the documents was not
harmless error. 32
As to the flight engineer's ADEA claim, Delta challenged the
finding below that its violation of the ADEA was willful. Delta
claimed that in forcing the flight engineers to retire at age sixty
it had relied on Iervolino v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,32 wherein the
Eleventh Circuit had affirmed a jury's finding that Delta's age
sixty rule was lawful. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Delta's reli-
ance on Iervolino constituted good faith as a matter of law. 30
In Bowdry v. United Airlines, Inc.,31 prospective employees who
qualified for first-hire status under the ADA sued United alleg-
ing-violation of the ADA. The United States District Court for
the District of Colorado held that the prospective employees
had the duty to notify prospective employers that they were as-
serting first-hire rights, over plaintiffs' argument that they were
not required to give notice of their first-hire rights except upon
request. 32 The court noted that, if plaintiffs' view was correct,
325 Id. at 635.
326 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
327 6 F.3d at 639.
328 Id. at 642.
329 796 F.2d 1408, 1419 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987).
330 6 F.3d at 644-45.
331 846 F. Supp. 918 (D. Colo. 1994), rev'd, 58 F.3d 1483 (10th Cir. 1995).
332 Id. at 920.
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"the prospective employing carrier will not know which appli-
cants to treat as protected employees" 5 5 and that neither the
ADA, federal regulations, case law, nor common sense imposed
on the air carrier an affirmative duty in this respect. The court,
therefore, granted defendant's summary judgment motion as to
plaintiffs who had not given notice of their first-hire status but
denied summary judgment as to the plaintiffs who had given
notice.
In Lay v. St. Louis HelicopterAirways, Inc.,3s4 plaintiff unsuccess-
fully appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
defendants in this action for wrongful termination, fraud, and
tortious interference with a business expectancy arising from his
discharge as an emergency medical services helicopter pilot.
Appellant had been a full-time helicopter pilot for several
years with defendant St. Louis Helicopter Airways, which con-
tracted with the Area Rescue Consortium of Hospitals (ARCH)
to provide emergency transportation services. After he refused
to make three flights because of dangerous weather conditions,
the director of ARCH told plaintiff's employer that he did not
want plaintiff dispatched on ARCH flights anymore. Plaintiff,
an "at-will" employee, was then terminated from his
employment.
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment
on the wrongful termination cause, ruling that plaintiff was an
at-will employee and could be discharged with or without cause.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that he fell within the
"public policy" exception to the at-will doctrine, based on his
failure to produce evidence of "the codes and regulations" for
the operation of aircraft that plaintiff had argued demonstrated
"a clear mandate of public policy promoting aviation safety." 5
On the fraud cause, the court affirmed summary judgment
against plaintiff's claim that his employer had fraudulently rep-
resented that he expected his pilots to comply with the opera-
tions manual and with FAA regulations. In dismissing this
argument, the court of appeals noted that, although plaintiff al-
leged that he was terminated for refusing to make the flights, he
had testified in his deposition that he had been terminated be-
SSS Id.
334 869 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
335 Id. at 176.
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cause "he hadn't satisfied someone at ARCH," a reason he had
not challenged in opposing summary judgment.3 3 6
The plaintiff also asserted a claim for intentional interference
with a business expectancy against ARCH and its director, argu-
ing that the statements of ARCH's director were motivated by
improper purposes. Specifically, plaintiff argued that the ARCH
director intended to cause him to violate FAA regulations, pilot
codes of conduct, and his operations manual. The court of ap-
peals affirmed summary judgment on this cause, too, noting
that the ARCH director had not requested plaintiff's termina-
tion and that ARCH had the contractual right to identify pilots
it did not want dispatched on ARCH flights.3 3 7 The court of ap-
peals also noted that the evidence did not support an inference
that the director's statements were motivated by anything other
than legitimate corporate reasons.33 8
c. Civil Rights
In the unpublished opinion of Commercial Energies, Inc. v.
United Airlines, Inc.,339 the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded the district court's grant of de-
fendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Scott, Commercial Energies' general counsel, and Dodds, its
President and Chairman of the Board, traveled aboard United
Airlines flight 342 from Denver to Washington, D.C. on busi-
ness. While deplaning at Dulles International Airport, Dodds
decided he would exit the aircraft at row 9, instead of using the
exit door indicated by United flight personnel. Flight attendant
McArthur grabbed Dodds' shoulder, but Dodds pulled away and
continued his exit. Scott followed through the same exit with
other passengers.
Inside the terminal, United personnel summoned airport po-
lice who asked Dodds and Scott if they "were the two black men
who attacked a stewardess."31 Scott replied that he would dis-
cuss the incident "whenever the person[s] who purportedly had
claimed that Professor Scott and Mr. Dodds had done anything
wrong were present for the discussion.""' Scott attempted to
6 Id. at 177.
337 Id. at 178.
s3 Id. at 178-79.
33 No. 93-1725, 1994 WL 251849 (4th Cir. June 10, 1994).
40 Id. at *1.
34 Id. at *2.
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enter a nearby conference room and the police arrested both
men. Dodds was charged with assault and battery of a flight at-
tendant and Scott with obstruction of justice. The charges
against Scott were dismissed at the preliminary hearing, and the
trial judge later dismissed the charges against Mr. Dodds.
Commercial Energies, Dodds, and Scott filed their complaint
against United, Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, Of-
ficers Smeal and Harris, and United employee McArthur in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
at Alexandria, alleging civil rights violations, false imprison-
ment, interference with prospective business advantage, and ma-
licious prosecution. The malicious prosecution cause of action
was abandoned because it was time barred by the applicable stat-
ute of limitations.
The district court dismissed the complaint upon defendants'
FRCP 12(b) (6) motion for failing to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 civil rights conspiracy count against the private par-
ties because of insufficient allegations of state action.M2 The
court also affirmed the dismissals of the common law counts.34
The private parties did not make any arrest and, therefore,
could not be held responsible for a false arrest. In addition,
under Virginia law, in order to allege interference with prospec-
tive business advantage, the tortious conduct must be aimed at
injuring the plaintiff's business and not merely incidental to
it.344 The court of appeals, however, reversed and remanded the
dismissal of plaintiffs' civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. section
1985 because the allegations were sufficient to allege that de-
fendants' actions were motivated by race. 45
d. Detention of Excluded Aliens
Aliens without United States visas may legally enter the coun-
try, under certain conditions, as part of their "immediate and
continuous transit through the United States."3 46 This process is
called "transit without visa" (TWOV).7 In addition, any alien
who attempts to gain admission to the United States fraudu-
342 Id. at *4.
4 Id.
344 1994 WL 251849 at *4.
345 Id.
346 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(0(1) (1995).
347 Id.
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lently or without proper documentation is excludable.4 These
aliens, however, may request political asylum and remain in the
United States while their requests are pending.
Air carriers transporting TWOV aliens into the United States
are required by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to have on file "immediate and continuous transit agree-
ments." 49 Form 1-426, an INS transit agreement, authorizes air
carriers to make intermediate stops in the United States for ser-
vice and fueling in return for their guarantee that TWOV aliens
will travel on to their country of destination. 3 0 Form 1-426 re-
quires that the carrier shall remove from the United States any
alien who is not entitled to TWOV status.5 1
The Form 1-426 agreements hold air carriers responsible for
the costs associated with delays in removing excluded aliens
from the United States.3 52 What is not clear is whether the air
carriers are liable for the costs of maintaining excluded aliens in
custody while their asylum requests are pending.
Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States5 3 consisted of two consoli-
dated actions by air carriers seeking reimbursement of their ex-
penses in maintaining excluded aliens while their asylum
requests were pending. The aliens involved were nationals of
the Peoples Republic of China, Lebanon, and Somalia, and pos-
sibly other countries, as many had destroyed their travel docu-
ments en route. The carriers asserted that jurisdiction in the
Court of Federal Claims was proper under the Tucker Act,
which provides for jurisdiction over "any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
forliquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort."ss4 Although the carriers argued that jurisdiction was
proper under each of the five prongs of the Tucker Act, the
court rejected each basis and dismissed the action.
s48 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)-(d) (1988).





353 31 Fed. C1. 25 (1994).
354 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988).
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The carriers first argued that jurisdiction was proper under
the immigration user fee statute.355 This statute imposes a $5
user fee, which air carriers collect and remit to the government,
for the immigration inspection of passengers arriving in the
United States. 3 56 The user fees are kept in a separate account
within the general fund of the United States Treasury for dis-
bursement to the attorney general for expenses incurred in con-
ducting immigration inspections or in detaining and deporting
"excludable aliens arriving on commercial aircraft and ves-
sels."3 57 The court ruled that a federal statute may support
claims courtjurisdiction under two circumstances: (1.) a plaintiff
claims to have been improperly required to pay money to the
government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part
of the sum; and (2) where the provision of law relied upon
grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to be
paid a certain sum. 358 The court ruled that jurisdiction was im-
proper on either basis, as the carriers had paid private security
service, not the government, to maintain the aliens in custody
and because the statute only authorized reimbursement of the
attorney general's expenses, not expenses incurred by private
parties. 359
The air carriers next argued that the government's require-
ment that they pay the aliens' detention expenses comprised a
"taking" in violation of Fifth Amendment due process. The
court dismissed this argument after applying a three-factor test
emphasizing: (1) the character of the government action; (2)
the economic impact of the regulation on the plaintiff; and (3)
the extent to which the regulation interfered with "distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations. "360 The court's analysis stressed
that transporting TWOV aliens into the United States was not a
"right" of air carriers, that the expenses were not so great as to
deprive air carriers of their economic rights to conduct business
properly, and that the air carriers had decided to risk incurring
the costs of detaining TWOV aliens in return for their
business.36 1
355 8 U.S.C. § 1356(d)-(k) (1988).
356 Id. § 1356(d), (f).
357 Id. § 13561(h)'(2)(A).
358 31 Fed. C1. at 30 (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002,
1007 (Ct. C1. 1967)).
359 Id. at 30-33.
360 Id. at 33.
361 Id. at 35.
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The air carriers next argued that requiring them to pay the
detention expenses breached the INS's agreement under Form
1-426, which does not expressly allocate this cost to carriers. Al-
ternatively, they argued that an implied-in-fact contract was cre-
ated by the INS's order to detain the aliens. The court rejected
both arguments, ruling that claims court jurisdiction does not
embrace suits against government officials based on contracts
made "in the implementation of a sovereign function"3 62 and
that the implied contract claim was, at best, a quasi-contract
claim based on quantum meruit over which the court lacks juris-
diction. 363 The court also characterized the Form 1-426 agree-
ment as a revocable license, instead of a contract.3 6
The air carriers also argued that the claims court had jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. section 1491(a)(1), which authorizes
claims "for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort."3 65 Stating that every noted decision under
this heading was actually an illegal exaction case, the court re-
jected this argument as well.366
Finally, the air carriers argued that the regulations authoriz-
ing the INS to require carriers to pay detention costs were in-
consistent with 8 U.S.C. section 1356(g), which arguably
provides that immigration services for excludable aliens will be
provided at no cost to air carriers. The court dismissed this basis
forjurisdiction in a footnote, as fitting neither statutory category
discussed above and as requiring the court to consider injunc-
tive relief, which is beyond the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdic-
tion.3 67 The court also ruled that it was bound to defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it was charged
with administering. 68
In Argenbright Security v. Ceskoslovenske Aeroline,369 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
the defendant air carrier liable for the cost of maintaining an
illegal alien stowaway while his petition for political asylum was
S62 Id.
363 31 Fed. CL at 36 (citing Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 340-41
(1925)).
%4 Id. at 36.
N5 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
366 31 Fed. C1. at 87.
367 Id. (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 & n.40 (1988)).
6 Id. at 30 n.6.
369 849 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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pending. The court then dismissed the air carrier's third-party
action against the INS for reimbursement.
The subject alien arrived in New York from Czechoslovakia in
1992 as a stowaway on defendant's aircraft. At the instruction of
the INS, he was detained by plaintiff security service for approxi-
mately six weeks until his petition for asylum was decided. Sub-
sequently, plaintiff sued the air carrier for the cost of detaining
the stowaway. That action was settled, leaving the air carrier to
pursue its third-party claim against the INS.
The cost of detaining an "excluded" alien prior to deporta-
tion are charged to the transporting air carrier.7 0 INS regula-
tions provide that a stowaway may be paroled into the carrier's
custody pending adjudication of an asylum claim.3 7 ' The INS,
however, has not expressly stated whether stowaways should be
considered as "excluded" aliens. The court, noting that a
stowaway's only possibility for admittance to the United States is
through asylum, ruled that stowaways are "automatically ex-
cluded from the very outset,"3 72 and, therefore, qualify as "ex-
cluded" for purposes of recovering detention costs.3 73Alternatively, the air carrier argued that its liability should be
limited to the $3000 "penalty" cap authorized in 8 U.S.C. section
1323(d). The court rejected this argument, holding that section
1323 applied as a kanction for failure to deport or detain an
alien and was unrelated to recovery of costs of detention under
8 U.S.C. section 1227(a).3 74
e. Limitation by Contract
In Csizmazia v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,3 75 enforcing the
two-year limitation period that was printed on the defendant air
carrier's passenger ticket stock and included in its tariff filed
with the Department of Transportation, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed this
action on defendant's unopposed motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The court enforced the contractual limitation period
after finding that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to plain-
tiff's action and declined to consider the issue of whether the
370 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1988).
371 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f) (3) (1995).
372 849 F. Supp. at 281.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 282.
375 CV-94-1593 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994) (text available in AVIATION UTIG. RF'.,
Sept. 13, 1994, at 20518).
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action was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of
1978.
Plaintiff had filed suit in the civil court of the City of New
York, Queens County, alleging that he had purchased tickets for
himself and his family for a round-trip with defendant from New
York to Budapest with intermediate stopovers in Belgium. Plain-
tiff alleged that when he purchased the tickets, the travel agent
agreed that if plaintiff's health deteriorated while on the trip he
could, change the date of his return flight in return for a $100
fee. Plaintiff claimed his health deteriorated while in Hungary
and that his doctor advised that he not return to New York as
scheduled. Defendant, however, allegedly refused to allow
plaintiff to change his return flight, and instead required him to
purchase a new ticket. Plaintiff then returned to New York on
his scheduled flight but required hospitalization in both Brus-
sels and New York. Plaintiff then filed this action for his medical
expenses and lost wages for the period he was hospitalized.
Defendant removed the action to federal court and sought
dismissal on several grounds including: (1) the two-year statute
of limitation under the Warsaw Convention; (2) the two-year
limitation period contained in defendant's tariff and printed on
passengers' tickets; and (3) the ADA preemption. Plaintiff
neither filed opposing papers nor appeared for argument. The
court held that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable, as
plaintiff's health problem had not been caused by an "accident"
within the meaning of the Convention. 76 The court enforced
the contractual limitation period after finding that the air car-
rier had properly included the limitation in the tariff it filed
under section 403(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.3 77 Thus, the
coxlrt did not have to consider the ADA preemption issue. 78
f. Miscellaneous
In the Sixth Circuit appeal of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Tennes-
see State Board of Equalization,79 various air carriers successfully
challenged the district court's dismissal of their action seeking
to enjoin the State of Tennessee from enforcing its method of
taxing property physically located within the state. The carriers
argued that the high rate of taxation imposed discriminated
376 Id. at 20520.
377 Id. at 20521-22.
378 Id.
379 11 F.3d 70 (6th Cir. 1993).
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against interstate commerce. The action was dismissed on the
district court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Tax
Injunction Act380 to enjoin Tennessee's enforcement of its tax
structure.
The Tax Injunction Act prohibits district courts from en-
joining or otherwise restricting the levy of state taxes where
there is a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" available in the
state's courts.3 1 The air carriers argued that the state remedies,
which only provided the carriers with a hearing before the
Board of Equalization and a right to petition for review with the
Tennessee Courts of Appeals, were inadequate. The primary ba-
sis for their argument was that the Board of Equalization had
already taken an adverse position on the issue in unrelated liti-
gation pending in federal court.
The Sixth Circuit held that the issues raised on appeal con-
cerned a factual determination reached in the state process
before the Board of Equalization.3 1 Pursuant to Tennessee
rules of procedure, factual, as opposed to legal, determinations
of the Board are not subject to review by the Tennessee Court of
Appeals. 8 3 Because the board was the sole arbiter of the factual
determination, the court of appeals held that the air carriers did
not have a "plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy available to
them through the state proceedings.8 4
In Transcontinental Freight Systems, Inc. v. Air France,38 5 granting
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment under the In-
terstate Commerce Act, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ruled that en route delays of freight
transported by a foreign air carrier were insufficient to change
the character of the shipment from the "continuous movement"
recognized under 49 U.S.C. section 10526(c)(8)(B). Conse-
quently, the court ruled that defendant was not required to pay
plaintiff the full shipping rate filed in plaintiff's Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) tariff where defendant had success-
fully negotiated a lower rate.
Transcontinental Freight Systems, Inc. (TFS), an Illinois-
based motor freight carrier, made more than 300 shipments of
380 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
381 See, e.g., Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909 F.2d
1266, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1990).
382 11 F.3d at 72.
383 Id.
984 Id. at 74.
385 No. 92-C-8161, 1994 WL 736026 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1994).
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freight under contract with Air France between December 20,
1989, and August 23, 1991. After Air France transported the
freight to the United States, TFS Would receive the delivery at
the airport and transport it to recipients. TFS would also pick
up freight from the recipients and transport it to the airport for
shipment by Air France. Freight would sometimes sit, either at
the airport or at the recipients' places of business, for several
days.
During the time in question, TFS billed Air France at a rate
considerably lower than that filed in its ICC tariff. Air France
paid the charged amounts in full. Subsequently, TFS sought
payment from Air France of the difference between the rates it
had charged and the rates filed in its ICC tariff. TFS argued
that, under 49 U.S.C. section 10761 (a), it was not authorized to
charge lower rates than specified in its tariff. The court granted
Air France's motion for summary judgment, ruling that, under
49 U.S.C. 10526(a) (8) (B), foreign air carriers with proper au-
thorization from the Department of Transportation are not re-
quired to pay tariff rates but may negotiate lower rates, so long
as the carriage in question is part of a "continuous move-
ment."3 86 In rejecting TFS's argument that the en route delays
changed the character of the carriage, the court further ruled
that the shipper's intent at the commencement of transporta-
tion fixes the character of the shipment.8 7
In Idris v. Hanson,38 8 after conducting a de novo review under
Pennsylvania law, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summaryjudgment
in favor of the cross-defendant air carrier on a baggage service
claim. The underlying action concerned a personal injury aris-
ing out of the cross-complainant's baggage handling operations.
On, appeal, the baggage service charged the district court with
error in finding, as an undisputed fact, that it had failed to no-
tify the air carrier of its indemnity claim "without undue delay"
as required under the parties' contract. The Ninth Circuit ruled
that "in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the question
[of] whether notice was reasonable and therefore timely, has
been one for the court."38 9
The court of appeals also rejected the baggage handler's argu-
ment that an indemnitor was required to demonstrate that it was
Id. at *1.
37 Id. at *8.
3N No. 91-55022, 1993 WL 385449 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1993).
3 Id.
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prejudiced by the late notice to sustain a defense. In doing so,
the court distinguished the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of
Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co.s90 on the basis that the notice-
prejudice rule had been developed in insurance litigation in-
volving contracts of adhesion.
In Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Intra Brokers, Inc.,391 the Ninth
Circuit upheld a permanent injunction precluding the defend-
ant broker from selling plaintiff's non-transferable discount
flight coupons. The action arose from defendant's purchase
and resale of the coupons, which prohibited barter, sale, or re-
demption for cash.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the broker's argument that the air
carrier either had waived or was estopped from seeking an in-
junction, based on its alleged verbal assurances to brokers for
more than a year after the coupons were first issued that it
would not enforce the restrictions. 392 The court noted that the
filing of the lawsuit strongly indicated that no permanent waiver
was intended and held the estoppel doctrine inapplicable be-
cause the broker failed to establish detrimental reliance on any
continued waiver of the restrictions in the future.393 The court
also ruled that the carrier was not required to prove that it
would suffer monetary damages, as it had the contractual right
to enforce the restrictions regardless of financial impact.3 94
2. Damages - Limitation by Contract
In Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc.,3 95 granting defendant's
motion to dismiss certain causes of action and denying its mo-
tion for summary judgment, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York ruled: (1) that no cause of
action lies for a pet's emotional distress or pain and suffering;
(2) that the pet lacks standing to sue; and (3) that the extent of
an air carrier's duty to notify passengers of the conditions under
which their pets would be transported raised factual issues for
the jury's decision.
Plaintiff sued American Airlines for negligence in causing the
death of his pet, a two-and-a-half-year-old golden retriever
named Floyd, on a flight from Phoenix to New York. Plaintiff
390 371 A.2d 193, 195 n.2 (Pa. 1977).
391 24 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 1994).
392 Id. at 1103-04.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 1105.
395 844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
alleged that American failed to warn him that Floyd would be
transported in an environment that was not air-conditioned
while the airplane was on the ground. The temperature in
Phoenix had reached 115 Fahrenheit that day.
Plaintiff's action included tort claims for intentional and neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of companionship,
and for Floyd's pain and suffering. The action included a puni-
tive damages claim based on the tort of "outrage." Plaintiff also
alleged that American had breached its contractual duty to de-
liver Floyd in the same healthy condition in which the airline
received him.
Pursuant to FRCP 12(b) (6), American moved to dismiss plain-
tiff's first four causes of action, arguing that New York law does
not recognize a cause of action for emotional distress caused by
an animal's suffering and that an animal has no standing to sue.
The court granted this motion. 96
American also moved, pursuant to FRCP 56, for summary
judgment limiting plaintiff's damages under his breach of con-
tract claim in accordance with the liability limitations on its
ticket stock. Noting that plaintiff was not an experienced air
traveler and had never shipped an animal before and that Amer-
ican did not inquire about Floyd's value, explain alternative
shipping options, or suggest that Floyd not ride in the non-air-
conditioned cargo hold, the court denied summary judgment
holding that whether plaintiff had adequate notice regarding
the liability limitations was a fact issue. 97
In Wagman v. Federal Express Corp.,3 g8 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland granted partial summary
judgment limiting defendant's liability to $100, as stated on the
defendant delivery service's airbill, in an action arising from the
late delivery of a package. The package contained a complaint
initiating a lawsuit. Because of the delayed delivery of the com-
plaint, the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitation. Plain-
tiff claimed the entire amount of damages he and his family had
allegedly suffered in an automobile accident, the subject of the
time-barred action, against the delivery company.
In granting partial summary judgment, the court found that
both the airbill and defendant's delivery envelope bore numer-
ous, clear, and prominent warnings concerning the liability limi-
396 Id. at 159.
397 Id. at 162-63.
398 844 F. Supp. 247 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995).
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tation, which also notified customers of their option to declare
an excess value in return for a supplemental fee. 399 The court
ruled that federal law, which controls the liability of interstate
common carriers for loss, damage, or delay of goods in transit,
validates liability limitations, particularly if the shipper has rea-
sonable notice and an opportunity to avoid the limitation by
paying an increased fee. 400 The court also rejected plaintiff's
attempt to avoid the limitation by claiming that the delayed de-
livery was tortiously caused, ruling that the liability limitation
would apply in any event.4 1 The court also held that federal law
preempted plaintiff's advertising misrepresentation claim.40 2
IV. SELLERS' AND MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
AND DEFENSES
A. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
For well over a decade, manufacturers have complained that
the cost of liability insurance made it economically unfeasible to
continue production of general aviation aircraft. The manufac-
turers cited drastic declines in domestic production figures, with
attendant losses of jobs, as substantive proof of the "products
liability crisis." The General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994403 (the Act) represents Congress' long-awaited effort to ad-
dress these concerns.
The Act establishes a statute of repose limiting the time in
which a lawsuit arising from an incident involving a general avia-
tion aircraft can be brought against a manufacturer. Subject to
certain significant limitations, the Act states that no civil action
for personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage arising
out of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be
brought against the aircraft manufacturer, or the manufacturer
of any new component part, after the applicable limitation
period.40 4
The limitation period is eighteen years, measured from the
date the aircraft was first delivered to the purchaser or lessee, if
delivered directly from the manufacturer, or the date when the
aircraft was first delivered to a person engaged in the business of
399 Id. at 248-49.
400 Id. at 250.
401 Id. at 250-51.
402 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988).
403 Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
404 Id. § 2(a).
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selling or leasing such aircraft.4 °5 In the case of any new compo-
nent part alleged to have caused the accident, the limitation pe-
riod begins on the date when the new component part was
installed.4 °6
For purposes of the Act, a general aviation aircraft is any air-
craft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certificate
has been issued by the FAA and which had, at the time the cer-
tificate was issued, a maximum seating capacity of fewer than
twenty passengers. °7 To be covered under the Act, however,
the aircraft must not have been engaged in scheduled passen-
ger-carrying operations, as defined under the Federal Aviation
Act, at the time of the accident 408
The Act expressly supersedes any state law to the extent the
law permits a covered civil action to be brought after the appli-
cable limitation period.1 9 Furthermore, the Act only applies
prospectively.410
The exceptions to coverage under the Act are significant.
First, the Act does not apply if a claimant specifically pleads, and
eventually proves, that the aircraft or component part manufac-
turer knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld from
the FAA relevant performance, maintenance, or operational in-
formation in applying for a type or airworthiness certificate.41
Second, the Act does not apply if the claim involves the injury or
death of a person who was a passenger for purposes of receiving
treatment for a medical or other emergency. 412 Third, the Act
does not apply to claims for death or injury suffered by a person
who was not on board the aircraft at the time of the accident.413
Fourth, the Act does not apply to an action brought under a
written warranty which, but for the Act, would have been
enforceable.41 4
While each of the foregoing exceptions apply in limited cir-
cumstances, the ultimate effect of each will have to be devel-
oped through case law. The third exception, for example, may
405 Id. § 3.
4w Id. § 2(a)(2).
407 Id. § 2(c).
408 Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(c).
409 Id. § 2(d).
410 Id. § 4(b).
411 Id. § 2(b)(1).
412 Id. § 2 (b) (2).
413 Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(b)(3).
414 Id. § 2(b)(4).
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have interesting effects. That exception, which deals with claims
arising from injury or death of a person not on board the air-
craft, would clearly apply in actions arising from injuries to per-
sons on the ground and, possibly, in mid-air collision cases, as
well.
The Act applies only to actions against manufacturers of air-
craft or component parts, in their capacities as manufacturers.415
While the legislative history indicates that the purpose of this
language is to make the Act inapplicable to, for example, a man-
ufacturer's liability predicated upon maintenance or repair
work, the products liability laws of many states impose strict lia-
bility upon manufacturers in their capacities as "sellers." A lit-
eral reading of the Act could potentially provide a loophole in
such instances. In addition, the Act does not protect sellers
other than manufacturers and does not address whether contri-
bution or indemnification actions by non-manufacturer sellers
would be subject to the statute of repose.
B. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The Sixth Circuit case of Dean v. Sikorsky Aircrafp"6 involved a
collision of two UH-60A "Blackhawk" helicopters at Fort Camp-
bell in March 1988 that killed several United States Army per-
sonnel. The heirs filed wrongful death actions in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleg-
ing defects in the design of the aircraft and the night vision gog-
gles worn by the pilots. After the cases were consolidated, the
defendants moved for summary judgment under the federal
common-law government contractor defense recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp. 417
Under Boyle, liability for design defects in military equipment
cannot be imposed pursuant to state law when:
(1) the United States approved reasonably precise design
specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
(3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States. 4 18
415 Id. § 2(a).
416 Nos. 92-6417, 93-5020, 1994 WL 6045 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 1994).
417 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
418 Id. at 512.
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Manufacturers of military products are shielded from tort lia-
bility for product design defects if all three parts of the Boyle test
are met. Applying the three-prong Boyle test, the district court
found: (1) the pertinent contractual provisions met the first
Boyle element by providing "reasonably precise specifications"
for the design of the aircraft, which were reviewed and approved
by the government; (2) there was no dispute that the aircraft
and goggles were manufactured in conformity with the designs;
and (3) the contractors warned the government of any known
relevant hazards unknown to the government.41 9 The court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.4 20
In Miller v. United Technologies,421 a Connecticut state court
granted defendants' United Technologies Corp., General Dy-
namics Corp., and Chandler-Evans, Inc., motion for summary
judgment on the basis of government contractors immunity as
defined in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.422
These wrongful death products liability actions were brought
in Connecticut state court by plaintiff Miller as administrator of
the estates of two deceased Egyptian military pilots who died in a
crash after the main fuel pump failed during the flight of an F-
16jet fighter owned and operated by the Egyptian Air Force.
General Dynamics Corp. delivered the F-16 to the United
States Air Force on March 12, 1982. The airplane was later
transferred to the Egyptian government pursuant to an agree-
ment reached between the United States and Egypt during the
Camp David Accords. It was undisputed that the crash followed
the failure of the main fuel pump resulting from a known pro b-
lem of cavitation erosion.
The court found that the first part of the Boyle test was met
because General Dynamics and the Air Force developed reason-
ably precise specifications, which were incorporated into a de-
sign subsequently reviewed and approved by the government.423
The court found the defense was still valid even though the gov-
ernment later directed Chandler-Evans to develop a new pump
in an effort to cure the cavitation problem, ruling that "the con-
tractor is not deprived of the defense for a government ap-
419 1994 WL 6045 at *1.
420 Id. at *2.
421 Nos. CV 85 022 17 88S, CV 85 022 75 18S, 1993 WL 280191 (Conn. Super.
Ct. July 16, 1993).
422 487 U.S. at 500.
42S 1993 WL 280191 at *6.
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proved product because it works with the government to
develop an improved product."424
The court found that the second part of the Boyle test was sat-
isfied because the fuel pump was manufactured in conformity
with government approved specifications.425 The court also
found that the cavitation problem was known to the government
at the time of manufacture, relieving the supplier of any duty to
warn.
426
C. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp.427 required the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
to construe the "economic loss" doctrine, which generally limits
the purchaser of a product to contract remedies in cases where
the incident resulted only in damage to the product itself. The
action arose from an incident involving a helicopter purchased
from a used aircraft broker equipped with an engine manufac-
tured by defendant. Plaintiff's lawsuit sought direct and conse-
quential economic losses based on negligence and strict
products liability.
The court granted summary judgment, relying on the leading
case of East River Steamship Corp. v. TransAmerica Delaval, Inc.,42 8
which states that there is "no cause of action in tort... when a
defective product purchased in a commercial transaction mal-
functions, injuring only the product itself and causing purely
economic loss."429 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that
the East River rule would not apply to plaintiffs lacking contrac-
tual privity with a defendant, noting that East River also involved
a plaintiff who was a remote purchaser.43 °
On appeal, the Second Circuit certified to the New York
Court of Appeals the question of whether the economic loss rule
would be recognized under New York law even in cases where
contractual privity is lacking. The court of appeals held that a
buyer in an arms length commercial transaction could not re-
cover in tort under either strict products liability or negligence
424 Id.
425 Id. at *7.
426 Id. at *9.
427 840 F. Supp. 231 (E.D.N.Y.), question certified, 20.F.3d 66 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 635 N.E.2d 294 (N.Y. 1994), cert. answered, 84 N.Y.2d 685 (N.Y. 1995).
428 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
429 840 F. Supp. at 232.
430 Id. at 234.
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theory for damage caused by a defect in the product where only
the product itself was damaged.43 1 Accordingly, the certified
question was answered in the negative.432
In Midwest Helicopter Airways v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 3 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled
that plaintiff, an insurer subrogated to the interests of the lessee
of a helicopter, would be limited to contract remedies in an ac-
tion arising from the crash of the helicopter. The claim arose
from a crash that occurred after the tail rotor drive system
failed. As subrogee, plaintiff sought consequential damages in-
cluding: (1) the insured's expense in locating, acquiring, and
upgrading a replacement helicopter; (2) the lost revenue that
would have been generated had the helicopter not crashed; and
(3) certain expenses incurred in investigating the accident and
storing the wreckage. The action was founded on negligence
and strict liability tort theories.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, averring that recov-
ery for these consequential damages was barred under Wiscon-
sin's "economic loss doctrine," which generally precludes
recovery, in products actions not alleging personal injury or
damage to property other than the product itself. The court
granted the motion after ruling that Wisconsin had adopted the
economic loss doctrine and after citing with favor United States
Supreme Court cases describing economic losses as being the
"core concern of contract law."43 4 Accordingly, the court dis-
missed the tort claims after noting that neither the Wisconsin
legislature nor the courts had extended the concept of privity to
embrace remote-purchaser parties.435
In Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopter,436 the purchaser
of a used helicopter sued the helicopter manufacturer for negli-
gence, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation. Plaintiff/ap-
pellant Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. purchased a used
Model 214B helicopter manufactured by Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, Inc., in 1981. According to Rocky Mountain's complaint,
it discovered that water had been trapped inside the rotor
blades from the helicopter being used for logging operations in
Alaska. Rocky Mountain removed the rotor blades and shipped
431 84 N.Y.2d at 694.
432 Id.
433 849 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 42 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994).
434 Id. at 671.
45 Id.
4s6 24 F.3d 125 (10th Cir. 1994).
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them to Bell for evaluation. One rotor blade was repaired and
the other replaced at a total cost of approximately $130,000.
When Bell refused to pay the cost of the repair and replace-
ment, Rocky Mountain filed this action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah, which the court dismissed
pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
In reviewing the dismissal, the Tenth Circuit applied the
choice of law provisions of Utah, the forum state. Utah courts
apply the "most significant relationship" analysis to determine
choice of law in a tort action.4 7 Considering that the helicopter
was manufactured in Texas and that the parties had past deal-
ings in Texas, the court held that Texas law governed resolution
of the tort claim.438 The Tenth Circuit then ruled that,
although there was a split in authority, the most recent pro-
nouncements by the Texas Supreme Court indicated that Texas
would not recognize tort actions for purely economic losses.43 9
The court also ruled that, while not formally embraced under
Utah law, the courts would apply the "most significant relation-
ship" analysis to determine the choice of law in contract ac-
tions.44° The Tenth Circuit was persuaded that Texas law was
appropriately applied in dismissing the contract action as
well." 1
Rocky Mountain also claimed breach of warranty and misrep-
resentation based on Bell's statements to the FAA that the heli-
copter blades were designed to prevent water trapping. With
regard to the warranty claim, the Tenth Circuit noted that
Rocky Mountain did not have contractual privity with Bell and,
therefore, could not recover under an express warranty theory
unless it could show that Bell should have expected Rocky
Mountain to rely on these statements. 4 2 Under the misrepre-
sentation cause, the court held Rocky Mountain must show that
Bell made the statements to the FAA intending that Rocky
Mountain act upon them. 443 Because it found these elements
lacking, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissals of these
claims. 4 "
437 Id. at 128.
438 Id. at 129.
439 Id. at 129-30.
440 Id. at 129.
441 24 F.3d at 129.
442 Id. at 130.
443 Id. at 132.
4" Id.
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D. AGENCY AND SuccEssoRs' LBILITY
In Cosgrove v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.,445 a case arising
from a crash caused by a progressive fatigue failure, the owner,
lessee, and pilot of the subject helicopter filed a products liabil-
ity action against the manufacturer. As affirmative defenses, the
manufacturer alleged that each plaintiff was comparatively at
fault for their failure to properly inspect and maintain the heli-
copter but did not assert any counterclaims for contribution.
The jury found that proper inspection and maintenance by any
of the plaintiffs would have prevented the failure.
The evidence also revealed that a nonparty to the action, a
mechanic, was also comparatively at fault for failing to conduct
proper inspections and maintenance. Plaintiffs had hired the
mechanic, as an independent contractor, to conduct a pre-
purchase inspection, which, the jury found, would have detected
the progressive failure in time had it been done properly. After
plaintiffs purchased the helicopter, they hired the mechanic as
an employee to work for them in maintaining the helicopter.
With respect to attributing the mechanic's liability to any of
the parties, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota instructed the jury that any negligence of the
mechanic occurring after he became an employee was attributa-
ble to the lessee-plaintiff. In its special verdict, the jury allocated
comparative fault between the mechanic's acts as an independ-
ent contractor and as the lessee-plaintiff's employee and re-
turned fault apportionments with respect to the parties.
After the jury verdict was received, defendant moved the
court to attribute the mechanic's negligence as an independent
contractor to plaintiff-owner on the basis that the owner alleg-
edly had a non-delegable duty to inspect and to maintain the
helicopter, or, alternatively, that the mechanic had been acting
as the owner's agent while acting as an independent contractor.
The court rejected defendant's arguments on both bases, specif-
ically holding that the duty to inspect and to maintain the heli-
copter was not non-delegable.
Defendant also moved for leave to amend its answer to assert
counterclaims for contribution against the plaintiffs based on
their comparative fault. Defendant feared that it would be
prejudiced if it could not offset plaintiffs' recovery in proportion
to their comparative fault. The court denied leave to amend,
-5 847 F. Supp. 719 (D. Minn. 1994).
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ruling that defendant's argument that he would be prejudiced
was premature, insofar as the Minnesota Comparative Fault Stat-
ute" 6 allows parties a full year afterjudgment is entered to move
the court to reallocate liability among solvent parties to compen-
sate for a negligent party's insolvency.
E. FALSE CLAIMs ACT
In United States v. Northrop,447 the Ninth Circuit remanded this
qui tam suit for a factual determination of whether plaintiff was
"an original source" of information used by the government to
prosecute its False Claims Act (the Act) case against Northrop
Corporation.
A private citizen may bring a civil action for damages "for the
person and for the United States Government" under the Act." 8
If the government takes over the action, it has "primary respon-
sibility for prosecuting the action."" 9 The person who brought
the action may continue as a party and is entitled to recover
fifteen to twenty-five percent of any proceeds, unless the action
is based primarily on information discovered independently by
the government. In such case, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to
recover no more than ten percent.450
In the present case, Boeing Corporation contracted with
Northrop for Northrop to supply flight data transmitters for Air
Force cruise missiles. The transmitters were required to tolerate
.a maximum low temperature of minus-65 degrees Fahrenheit.
The damping fluid used by Northrop, however, solidified at mi-
nus-50 degrees Fahrenheit. Northrop allegedly concealed this
fact by falsifying tests and failing to properly inspect.
In early 1987, plaintiff, a former Northrop employee, supplied
federal investigators with information and evidence that North-
rop falsified tests on the transmitters. In October 1987, plaintiff
and another Northrop employee filed suit under the Act alleg-
ing improper inspection procedures and falsification of test re-
sults. The government intervened in the action and filed an
amended complaint. The government obtained an indictment
against Northrop that included plaintiff's false test allegations,
along with a separate allegation that Northrop used inadequate
446 MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (West 1988).
447 5 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994).
448 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (1988).
449 Id. § 3730(c)(1).
450 Id. § 3730(d)(1).
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damping fluid in the transmitters. Northrop pleaded guilty to
the fraudulent testing and inspection allegations. The charges
concerning the damping fluid were dismissed.
Plaintiff was then allowed to sever his complaint and proceed
on the counts not adopted by the government. He attempted to
amend his complaint to allege the damping fluid fraud allega-
tions. In order to maintain this additional allegation, plaintiff
had to demonstrate he was "an original source" of the informa-
tion and that the information was not publicly disclosed. Under
the rationale of Wang v. FMC Corp,4" plaintiff would be "an orig-
inal source" if "(1) he has 'direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which his allegation is based'; and (2)
that he 'has voluntarily provided information to the Govern-
ment before filing' his qui tam action."452 Plaintiff would also
have to show that he played some part, either directly or indi-
rectly, in the public disclosure of the allegations of the proposed
amendments. Additionally, Northrop argued that plaintiff
could not maintain the amendment because he accepted the
terms of the settlement the government reached with Northrop
after the government intervened in the original action and that
plaintiff could not inject the new claim over the government's
objection.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case "to determine whether
the government's disclosure of the damping fluid allegations
was the result of a criminal investigation that was instigated as a
consequence of the information [plaintiff] provided to the gov-
ernment."4 53 If the district court finds plaintiff was an original
source under these guidelines, the court would then consider
Northrop's independent arguments.
V. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY
AND DEFENSES
A. DISCRETIONARY FuNCTION EXCEPTION
Sutton v. Eares454 was the second appeal in consolidated per-
sonal injury and wrongful death actions arising from the colli-
sion of a pleasure boat with a Navy mooring buoy. The accident
occurred in the waters of the United States Naval Weapons Sta-
tion at Huntington Harbor, California. The plaintiffs, who in-
451 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
452 Id. at 1417 (citation omitted).
4-5 5 F.3d at 412.
4- 26 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1994).
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cluded the four survivors and representatives of the five persons
killed in the accident, filed negligence claims against the United
States pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA).155
In the previous appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district
court's finding of government liability and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of the discretionary function excep-
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act. In the second appeal, the
United States challenged the trial court's application of the dis-
cretionary function exception and various aspects of the plain-
tiffs' damages awards.
With regard to the discretionary function exception issue, the
district court found against the government on the following
negligence causes of action:
1. failure to take adequate precautions to monitor the safety of
boaters traversing Weapons Stations waters;
2. failure to maintain a system of boater permits, as allegedly
required by certain federal regulations;
3. abandonment of a previous policy for briefing boaters on
rules and regulations for traversing Weapons Stations waters;
4. failure to foresee that minimally qualified boaters would be
operating in Weapons Station waters;
5. failure to foresee that intoxicated boaters would traverse
Weapons Station waters or to take reasonable actions to protect
harbor users;
6. failure to mark the harbor speed limit adequately or with
lighted signs;
7. failure to illuminate the mooring buoy in question; and,
8. abandonment of a previous system allowing boaters easier ac-
cess to information regarding the Weapons Station.4"
After conducting a de novo review of the district court's ruling
that the discretionary function exception did not apply to any of
these negligence causes of action, the Ninth Circuit ordered a
reversal with respect to the first through fifth and eighth causes.
As for the sixth and seventh causes, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the Navy's failure to provide adequate warnings of obstructions
to navigation it had placed in the water did not involve "social,
economic, or political policy" and, therefore, was not a pro-
tected, discretionary function.457 The Ninth Circuit also re-
455 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (1988).
456 26 F.3d at 907.
457 Id. at 910.
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jected the government's argument against recognizing a federal
common-law duty to warn in SIAA actions.45 a
With regard to the issue of damages, the government chal-
lenged the district court's damages awards on several grounds,
including the award of loss-of-society damages to the parents of
certain decedents absent proof of financial dependency and the
use of "across-the-board" damages amounts. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed both aspects of the awards.45 9 With respect to loss-of-
society damages, the Ninth Circuit ruled that proof of depen-
dency was not required in an SIAA action, in contrast to recent
holdings of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits and the treat-
ment of such claims under the Jones Act and DOHSA. With
respect to the "across-the-board" awards, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed on the basis that damages need not be awarded with
mathematical certainty and that the amounts awarded were not
"grossly excessive or monstrous," or lacking in evidentiary
supportA °
In Jet Power, Inc. v. United States,46' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed plaintiff's
civil rights and Federal Tort Claims Act claims arising from the
FAA's issuance of an airworthiness directive requiring that cer-
tain engines repaired by plaintiff, a FAA-certified service facility,
be recalled due to inadequate repairs and overhauls. The dis-
trict court found that plaintiff's claims were "inextricably inter-
twined" with the propriety of the airworthiness directive, review
of which is reserved by statute to the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals.
Plaintiff had originally filed a lawsuit challenging the validity
of the airworthiness directive. After that action was dismissed,
plaintiff proceeded with the present action alleging that various
civil rights violations occurred in the issuance of the airworthi-
ness directive and asserted a Federal Tort Claims Act cause
against the United States. Plaintiff alleged: (1) that the defend-
ants conspired to violate its rights; and (2) that the United
States had wrongfully refused to rescind the airworthiness direc-
tive and to provide adequate supervision over other defendants'
conduct. The government moved to dismiss.
458 Id. at 911-12.
459 Id. at 920.
4w Id. at 914-18.
461 No. 93-1259-CIV, 24 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,916 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 1993).
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By statute, FAA orders are subject to review by the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Airworthiness directives have
been held to be "orders" for purposes of the statute. Thus, the
issue presented in the motion to dismiss was whether the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the courts of appeals could be circumvented
by collaterally attacking the validity of an FAA order in a district
court civil rights action.
The district court concluded that such a collateral attack was
not authorized under existing law.462 The court noted that,
while the plaintiff took painstaking measures to downplay the
importance of the airworthiness directive to its action, the alle-
gations underlying the civil rights and tort claims were "inescap-
ably intertwined" with the issuance and interpretation of the
airworthiness directive. s Thus, to resolve the liability issues,
the court would necessarily have to determine the validity of the
airworthiness directive, a task reserved by statute to the courts of
appeals. Accordingly, the district court held that it lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's civil rights and Federal
Tort Claims Act claims and dismissed the action.464
B. AIR TRAMC CONTROL NEGLIGENCE 465
In Remo v. United States,466 plaintiffs brought a Federal Tort
Claims Act action alleging air traffic controller negligence in
connection with the midair collision of two light airplanes. At
trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the evidence established that the control-
ler was not negligent in allegedly failing to observe one of the
aircraft on his radar or in timing the release of the other aircraft
from radar services in preparation for its landing at an uncon-
trolled 'airport.
The action involved a mid-air collision between a Beech A36
Bonanza and a Cessna 182 that killed all seven passengers on
board. The wrongful death plaintiffs alleged that the air traffic
controller breached his duty to warn the Cessna pilot of the
presence of the Bonanza. Plaintiffs also alleged that the air traf-
fic controller prematurely released the Cessna to the common
traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) at the destination airport, as
462 Id. at 17,920.
463 Id.
4 Id. at 17,920-21.
465 See also Spring v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1993).
466 852 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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the airplane was still within the airport radar service area of a
neighboring, controlled airport.
Based on expert testimony reconstructing the flight path of
the aircraft, the court held that the Bonanza would not have
appeared on radar.4 67 The court also held that the air traffic
controller properly released the Cessna to the CTAF because no
conflicting traffic was displayed on his radar.468
The. Federal Tort Claims Act wrongful death-action in Budden
v. United States4 9 was based on alleged negligence by a Flight
Service Station (FSS) weather briefer in failing to provide the
decedent pilot with an adequate preflight weather briefing. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit, applying Nebraska law, affirmed the
trial court's judgment that the pilot's continuation of the flight
into deteriorating weather constituted the intervening, sole
proximate cause of his crash, relieving the United States of lia-
bility even though the court found that the flight briefer had
acted negligently.
The crash occurred on an evening Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
helicopter ambulance flight. The pilot had called the Omaha
FSS for a weather briefing. Although the briefer had three types
of forecasts available (the Chicago area forecast, various termi-
nal forecasts, and transcribed weather broadcasts (TWEBs)), the
briefing only included information from the terminal forecasts.
These forecasts did not mention the possibility of rime icing,470
freezing drizzle, and cloud ceilings below 1000 feet, which were
included in the area forecast and TWEBs. The crash occurred
in freezing drizzle in an area with cloud ceilings of 500-1000
feet. The evidence indicated that the weather had worsened
gradually as the helicopter proceeded on its flight.
In affirming the judgment, the majority ruled that "[w]hile
[the briefer] knew or should have known that the pilot would
rely on the weather information in taking off on the flight, the
briefer was not duty bound to anticipate that [the pilot] would
continue the mission despite weather conditions which man-
dated aborting the flight."471 Strongly dissenting, one judge
467 Id. at 367.
468 Id. at 368.
469 15 F.3d 1444 (8th Cir. 1994).
470 Rime icing is icing that occurs when an aircraft passes through a cloud. 15
F.3d at 1447 n.3.
471 15 F.3d at 1450.
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called the majority's ruling "a complete aberration under Ne-
braska law and any other existing law." 472
The wrongful death action of Webb v. United States473 arose
from a triple-fatality Piper PA-28-181 crash near the Roswell,
New Mexico airport on February 5, 1988. The heirs of the pilot
and the two passengers alleged that FAA Flight Service special-
ists at the Cedar City, Utah, and Roswell FSSs, and the Roswell
Tower controllers, had negligently failed to provide pertinent
weather information to the pilot before he departed Salt Lake
City and while en route to Roswell. At the close of the trial, the
United States District Court for the District of Utah ruled that
the government's failure to advise the pilot of adverse weather
conditions at Roswell was a contributing cause of the accident.
The pilot was VFR-rated only, with just 122 hours of total time,
and had obtained his license only a few months before the acci-
dent. He had contacted the Cedar City FSS several times for
weather information before departure. Due to computer
problems, Cedar City lacked the latest information concerning
weather at Roswell. The court determined that the Cedar City
FSS personnel were negligent in failing to inform the pilot that
he would need to obtain additional weather information. Be-
cause the pilot had made an en route stop near Albuquerque,
however, the court did not find this negligence to be a proxi-
mate cause of the crash.
While on the ground at Albuquerque, a friend advised the
pilot to check Roswell weather because of the possibility that a
weather system had moved into southern New Mexico. After
takeoff from Albuquerque, the pilot contacted the Roswell FSS
and was advised that the Roswell weather included a measured,
variable overcast ceiling at 1000 feet with five miles of visibility,
with a remark that the ceiling appeared to be at 500 feet, varia-
ble to 1400 feet. In response to the pilot's further inquiry, the
FSS specialist confirmed that the Roswell airport was still operat-
ing under VFR. The specialist did not, however, advise the pilot
of the possibility of whiteout associated with the low cloud ceil-
ing and snow on the ground, nor did he recommend against
proceeding under VFR.
Within minutes after the pilot received this weather report,
the Roswell FSS made a special weather observation that indi-
cated a broken ceiling at 600 feet, a 1600-foot overcast, and visi-
472 Id. at 1446.
473 840 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Utah 1994).
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bility of five miles. The airport then went under Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR). The Roswell FSS did not communicate this
information to the pilot, although it did relay it to Roswell
Tower.
When the pilot contacted Roswell Tower, he was informed of
the special observation and that the field had gone IFR. At that
time, the pilot was twenty-four miles northwest of Roswell at
9500 feet and was flying in clear skies with sufficient fuel to re-
turn to Albuquerque. Instead, he requested a special VFR clear-
ance into Roswell, which the tower controllers granted.
Subsequently, the controllers advised the pilot of the presence
of twenty-eight-inch-high banks of snow alongside the active run-
way but did not caution the pilot of the danger of whiteout. The
crash occurred after the pilot, in attempting the special-VFR ap-
proach, apparently tried to execute a 180-degree turn while at
only 200-300 feet above ground level. The court found that the
crash occurred after the pilot experienced whiteout, of which
the government should have warned, and that the controllers
also should have warned the pilot against proceeding VFR 47
The court held the government forty percent at fault for causing
the accidenL475
In Worthington v. United States,476 a Federal Tort Claims Act
case alleging air traffic controller negligence, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's ruling that spatial disorientation
suffered by the pilot was a superseding cause of his crash, which
killed the pilot and his three passengers.
The accident occurred during an attempted missed instru-
ment approach atJacksonville, Florida. The evidence indicated
that the pilot was spatially disoriented upon reaching decision
height, and veered left, striking a group of trees. The ensuing
wrongful death action against the United States was based on
alleged air traffic controller negligence in failing to provide ma-
terial weather information that was known to the controllers in-
volved. This information included: (1) visibility at the airport
had deteriorated to one-sixteenth of a mile; (2) the tower con-
troller had been unable to see an aircraft landing previously; (3)
that aircraft's pilot had reported the base of the fog as 100 feet,
and had difficulty taxiing because of the fog; and (4) another
pilot, who had previously executed a missed approach, reported
474 Id. at 1521.
47 Id.
476 21 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1994).
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the fog extended to 250 feet above the surface. Approach con-
trol had also been late in handing off the decedent's flight to
the tower controller.
According to plaintiff, the decedent's widow, the controller's
negligence had aggravated the pilot's disorientation by increas-
ing his workload, a theory on which the district court had dis-
credited plaintiff's experts. The Eleventh Circuit reversed on
this point, finding that the evidence compelled the conclusion
that the controller's actions had contributed to the pilot's disori-
entation and resulting crash.477
The final issue addressed by the Eleventh Circuit was whether
decedent's negligence in executing the missed approach was a
superseding cause of the crash, breaking the chain of proximate
causation as to the United States. The court of appeals ruled
that the air traffic controllers' negligence was a proximate cause
of the decedent's disorientation, that his subsequent negligence
was foreseeable, and, accordingly, the court reversed the
judgment.47
C. OTHER GOVERNMENT LIBILrY
In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Johnson,47 9 the General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA) appealed on behalf of the United States
from a United States District Court for the District of Columbia
ruling that certain post-payment audits of airline transportation
bills were not authorized by law and that the United States was
required.to return money withheld from the airlines based on
the improper audits.
The case addressed the government's practice of transporting
its employees by purchasing individual tickets subject to "con-
trolled capacity" fares. In the post-deregulation environment,
there may be limited numbers of seats available at different fares
on any given flight. If a government employee has chosen a
date and flight, the regulations governing the transport of gov-
ernment employees require that the employee be provided with
the lowest cost ticket to the destination, unless a higher cost ser-
vice is determined to be more advantageous to the government.
At issue was the GSA's assumption that the government was
always entitled to the lowest fare regardless of whether any seats
set aside for that type of fare remained open. The GSA did not
477 Id. at 403.
478 Id. at 406-07.
479 8 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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consider the seat limitations available at the time of purchase in
performing its audits or in determining what was to be paid by
the government.
The circuit court held that the government was not per se enti-
tled to the lowest applicable fare and that it was improper for
the GSA to place a burden on the airlines to prove at audit that
there were no seats available at the lower fares.48 0 The court of
appeals upheld the district court order requiring the govern-
ment to return withheld funds to the airlines, but it declined to
award postjudgment interest on the basis that there must be a
specific waiver of sovereign immunity for interest to be recover-
able against the government.481
The case of USAir, Inc. v. United States Department of the Navy8 2
arose when, in October 1994, a civilian Navy employee boarded
a flight operated by the defendant air carrier's predecessor-in-
interest, wrapped his briefcase in his garment bag, and stored
both in an overhead compartment. The .employee admitted
that the briefcase probably was unstable when he closed the bin.
A short time later, a flight attendant opened the bin, and the
briefcase fell on a passenger's head, causing injuries for which
he incurred over $92,000 in medical expenses.
After the plaintiff successfully sued the air carrier, recovering
$550,000 in damages, the air carrier brought a contribution ac-
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court en-
tered summary judgment for the government, finding, as a
matter. of law, that the Navy employee had not acted negligently
and that, even if he had, the flight attendant's negligence was a
superseding cause.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that triable issues ex-
isted with respect both to the Navy employee's negligence and
to whether the flight attendant's acts comprised a superseding
cause.4s3 Reversal on the negligence issue was based on the em-
ployee's admissions that the briefcase was precariously stored
and that he could have requested a flight attendant's assistance
or repositioned the briefcase himself. With respect to the super-
seding issue, the court of appeals applied California law defin-
ing a superseding cause as an intervening cause that is not
reasonably foreseeable at the time the defendant's negligence
480 Id. at 795.
481 Id. at 798.
482 14 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1994).
483 Id. at 1412-13.
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occurs.4 4 The Ninth Circuit reversed on this issue, determining
that the Navy employee should have foreseen that his briefcase
might fall if the bin were opened.4 5 The Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case with instructions that fault be apportioned be-
tween USAir and the Navy.48 6
In United States v. 1980 Lear Jet, Inc.,4s7 LearJet appealed from
the district court's judgment limiting its recovery on a
mechanic's lien that it filed against an aircraft seized by the
United States to the principal amount, excluding costs and in-
terest. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that under applica-
ble Arizona law the lienholder was entitled to recover each of
these elements of its lien.
The aircraft involved was a 1980 Lear Jet owned by Areo
Servicios Ejecutivos Sinaloenses S.A. de C.V. (ASES) that the
government had seized under federal forfeiture statutes applica-
ble to property used in, or obtained from the proceeds of, crimi-
nal acts. Prior to the government's seizure, ASES had entered
into a maintenance and repair agreement with Learjet, under
which Learjet had performed $55,736.53 in work for which it
had not been paid.
Following the seizures, Learjet filed a claim with the district
court to recover the amount of its repair bills plus costs, fees,
and interest. The district court limited Learjet's recovery to the
principal amount. On appeal, Learjet argued that it was entitled
to recover costs incurred in protecting its claim in the forfeiture
proceeding, as well as interest that had been lost on the princi-
pal during the three years the government spent in resolving the
matter. The Ninth Circuit agreed, rejecting the government's
argument that the doctrine of sovereign immunity insulated it
from liability for anything more than the principal amount.
The Ninth Circuit explained that Learjet was not actually suing
the government but was merely asserting its statutory right to
recover the full amount of its lien against property.48 Under
applicable Arizona law, the court held, Learjet was entitled to
recover the lien principal, along with costs and statutory inter-
est. The case was remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.48 9
484 See Earp v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
485 14 F.3d at 1413.
486 Id. at 1414.
487 38 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1994).
488 Id. at 401.
489 Id. at 402.
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In Roscoe v. Department of Forestry,49° the appellant unsuccess-
fully appealed the dismissal of his negligence action against the
California Department of Forestry (CDF) for setting a backfire
that caused 200 acres of his property to burn. In upholding the
dismissal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's view that a CDF helicopter was not a "motor vehicle"
within the meaning of an exception to government immunity
for injuries caused by negligence in the operation of emergency
motor vehicles.
The action related to CDF's actions in combatting a forest fire
occurring in northern California in August 1990, when a CDF
helicopter accidentally started the backfire in the wrong loca-
tion. The court of appeals held the CDF was immunized from
tort liability by Government Code section 850.4, which provides
a broad immunity in favor of fire-fighting entities.491 Plaintiff
claimed that a statutory exception applied, which authorized
tort actions arising from negligent operations of "emergency ve-
hicles." This argument foundered, however, on the court's in-
terpretation of the terms "motor vehicle" and "vehicle," which
was based on California Vehicle Code definitions phrased in
terms of vehicles moving upon roads.orTails, i.e., other than air
vehicles.492
VI. AIRPORTS AND FIXED BASE OPERATORS
A. PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
In the interlocutory appeal of Estate of Cook v. Gran-Aire,
Inc.,493 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling that strict liability would not be applied in a wrongful
death action against the owner of an aerobatics instruction air-
plane that crashed, killing the pilot and his flight instructor.
The action arose from the crash of a 1980 Bellanca Decathlon
that the NTSB found was caused by improper ivelding in the
manufacturing process, which caused fatigue cracking that re-
sulted in a right wing separation during the decedent's instruc-
tional flight. Defendant, who owned the airplane and employed
the flight instructor, also owned several other airplanes that
were leased to pilots for an hourly fee. The Decathlon, however,
490 No. A059860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (text available in AVIATION LITIG. REP.,
Dec. 28, 1993, at 19469).
491 Id. at 19471-72.
492 Id. at 19471.
493 513 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 520 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. 1994).
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was never leased and was used only for instruction by defend-
ant's employees. Although Wisconsin extends strict products li-
ability to lessors, the court of appeals ruled that the defendant
was not a lessor with respect to the Decathlon, as the airplane
never left the possession and control of defendant or his em-
ployees, as was required for a lease to be found.4 94
In Blum v. RES Associates, Ltd.,49 the Georgia Court of Appeals
ruled that the present operator of an airport where an airplane
was cannibalized during a former operator's tenure was not lia-
ble to the airplane owner under a successor-in-interest theory.
The case arose from property damage to an airplane occurring
in 1988. The owner first filed an action for breach of oral con-
tract against the operator who leased the airport from 1986 until
1991, then amended the complaint to add the operator who
took over the airport in 1991.
The bases for the amendment were the new operator's lease
with the county and the asset purchase agreement between the
present and former operators. In affirming the directed verdict
for the present operator, the appellate court ruled that nothing
in the airport lease with the county bound the new operator to
the former leaseholder's liability for the incident and that the
asset purchase agreement only included liabilities on contracts
that were existing at the time the assets were transferred in 1991,
more than three years after the airplane owner's storage con-
tract with the previous leaseholder had lapsed.496 The former
operator of the airport entered, into a consent judgment with
the airplane owner.
B. LAND AND USE REGULATIONS
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich.,497 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's ruling that
the user fee structure at Kent International Airport in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, which is owned by Kent County, was not viola-
tive of the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA)498 or the Com-
merce Clause. The Court rejected the arguments of certain
commercial airlines that the fee structure unlawfully favored
general aviation users.
494 Id. at 653.
495 439 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
49 Id.
497 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994).
498 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1994).
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Seven commercial airlines had challenged the airport's "cost
of services" fee allocation system, which apportioned costs
among three types of users: (1) commercial air carriers; (2) gen-
eral aviation users; and (3) airport concessionaires. The airport
allocated its air-operations costs entirely to air carriers and gen-
eral aviation users. Terminal maintenance costs, on the other
hand, were allocated only to airlines and concessionaires, such
as restaurants and car rental agencies, in proportion to the
square footage of each tenant's space. The airport, moreover,
only charged general aviation users some twenty percent of their
allocated costs, while charging market rates for leased terminal
space that were well in excess of actual costs. The surplus gener-
ated from terminal leases was used to subsidize the general avia-
tion shortfall and to generate surplus revenues that added more
than $1 million per year to the airport's reserve fund.
After the county unilaterally increased the air carriers' fees,
they challenged the new rates, attacking: (1) the airport's failure
to allocate air operation costs to concessionaires, who derived
substantial benefits from the air operations; (2) the surplus gen-
erated by charging market rates for terminal space; and (3) the
airport's failure to charge general aviation users their full allo-
cated costs. The air carriers alleged that these factors rendered
the fees unreasonable and were thus violative of the AHTA,
which prohibits states and their subdivisions from collecting
user fees other than "reasonable rental charges, landing fees
and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of
airport facilities" under the Airport and Airway Improvement
Act of 1982 (AIAA) .499 The air carriers also challenged the fee
structure as violative of the Commerce Clause. The district
court ruled that the air carriers possessed an implied right of
action under the AHTA but had no cause of action under the
AIAA or the Commerce Clause. The court ultimately found that
the fee structure did not violate the AHTA.
The AHTA prohibits levying a "fee or other charge directly or
indirectly on persons traveling in air commerce or on the car-
riage of persons traveling in air commerce." °° Section 1513(b)
contains a savings clause allowing airports to levy "reasonable
rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from air-
craft operators for the use of airport facilities."501
499 49 U.S.C. § 47107 (1995).
500 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (1988), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b) (1995).
501 49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1988), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 40116(e) (1995).
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Because the Court lacked guidance as to a standard for rea-
sonableness of fees under the AHTA, it employed the measure
of reasonableness of fees used in a Commerce Clause analysis, as
delineated in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.50 2 Under Evansville, a fee is reasonable if it (1)
is based on some fair approximation of use of the facilities; (2)
is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred; and (3)
does not discriminate against interstate commerce.50 Applying
this test, the Court found the county's levy on the air carriers
was reasonable and, therefore, passed muster under the AHTA.
The Court ruled that the airport's decision to allocate air opera-
tions costs to the air carriers and general aviation users, but not
to concessionaires, represented a " 'fair, if imperfect, approxi-
mation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are im-
posed' "504 and that the air carriers' fees were not" 'excessive in
comparison with the governmental benefit conferred.' "505 The
Court also rejected the air carriers' argument that it was
mandatory to take into account concession revenues in deciding
whether the air carrier fees were reasonable. 0 6
With respect to the air carriers' argument that general avia-
tion users were being undercharged, the Court found that the
carriers had failed to submit any evidence establishing that the
general aviation users were engaged in interstate commerce,
and it exempted general aviation on this basis. With respect to
the argument that the airport was overcharging concessionaires
in order to amass surpluses, the Court ruled that the statute did
not authorize judicial review of the propriety of such surpluses,
in that the AHTA only requires that the fees charged not be
" 'excessive in relation to costs incurred by the taxing authori-
ties.' "57 In addition, section 1513(b) of the statute only dis-
cusses fees charged to "aircraft operators," not concession-
aires.508 The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether
a private right of action existed under the AHTA.50 9
502 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
503 Id. at 716-17.
504 114 S. Ct. at 864.
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In Board of County Commiksioner v. FAA,5"' the court upheld the
FAA's approval of the City and County's plan to relocate the
cargo facilities at the new Denver International Airport without
requiring a supplemental environmental impact statement
(EIS).511 The FAA's record of decision (ROD) filed December
24, 1992, determined that " 'implementation of the proposed
[airport layout plan] revisions will not affect the quality of the
human and natural environment in a significant manner or to a
significant extent not already considered in the [original] 1989
EIS.' "512
Petitioners filed a complaint challenging the FAA's decision
on two grounds: (1) that the ROD was erroneous; and (2) that
the FAA had failed to ensure the relocation met the require-
ments set forth in the Clean Air Act. 1 3 The court, in rejecting
petitioners' first argument under the "clear error of judgment"
rule, noted that the ROD indicated that relocation would re-
duce airplane taxi distances and the distances traveled by cargo
ground vehicles, reducing exhaust emissions below the levels
pertaining to the original EIS.5" 4 With respect to petitioners'
second argument that the FAA violated section 7506(a) of the
Clean Air Act, the court noted that the FAA found the airport
"conforming" in a 1989 evaluation of airport plans and that peti-
tioners failed to cite any material nonconformity in the subse-
quent plans.-15 The court also noted that the city of Denver had
a continuing duty to assure the airport met appropriate stan-
dards and that any later-discovered nonconformity could be ad-
dressed if and when necessary. Petitioners also argued that the
FAA had violated its duty to ensure that the new airport would
be operated safely and efficiently, which the court rejected as
speculative.51 6
In City of Grapevine v. Department of Transportation,51 7 approval
of the FAA's funding of a plan to expand the Dallas/Forth
Worth International Airport (DFW) was found proper after a
petition opposing the expansion was brought by various individ-
uals and subdivisions of the State of Texas. Petitioners chal-
510 18 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
511 Id.
512 Id. (quoting the FAA's ROD).
513 42 U.S.CA. § 7506(a) (West 1995).
514 18 F.3d at 953.
515 Id.
516 Id.
517 17 F.3d 1502 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 635 (1994).
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lenged the funding on several grounds, including: (1) the FAA's
alleged categorical exclusion of certain items from its Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Study (FEIS); (2) the FAA's failure to con-
sider certain alternatives to the expansion; and (3) the FAA's
alleged error in determining that the expanded airport would
not create noise that would interfere with the historical use of
nearby properties.5 1
FAA Order 5050.4A allows the FAA to exclude certain items,
such as ground transportation improvements, on a categorical
basis from being considered in the FEIS. Petitioners argued
that the FAA was nevertheless required to consider the " 'overall
cumulative impact of the proposed action and the consequences
of subsequent related actions.' "I" The court rejected this argu-
ment as negating the exclusion option. The court also found
that, in any event, the FAA had considered the cumulative envi-
ronmental effects of several excluded categories of
improvements.520
Petitioners also contended the FAA did not sufficiently con-
sider alternatives to the planned expansion, such as off-site loca-
tions and "wayport" facilities for connecting flights. The court,
however, found that the FAA had considered such alternatives
and had found that they could not be completed in a timely
manner.
5 21
Petitioners also argued that the FAA erred in applying noise
"use" standards appropriate for "residential properties" to the
nearby "historical sites." Under these measurements, the FAA
contended that the airport noise at the historical sites poten-
tially affected by the expansion was too low to constitute an in-
compatible "use" within the meaning of section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act.522 The court accepted the
FAA's use of residential property noise standards, after finding
that the historical sites involved were being used as private
residences.5 23
Finally, petitioners argued that approval of the west runway
expansion was unlawful in that the FAA did not complete the
review process required by the National Historic Preservation
518 Id. at 1503.
519 Id. at 1504.
520 Id. at 1505.
521 Id. at 1506.
522 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1995).
523 17 F.3d at 1507.
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Act (NHPA).524 The court ruled that the FAA had not violated
the NHPA, after finding that the approval was conditioned upon
successful completion of a subsequent reevaluation. 525
The case of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. FAA 52 6 involved the issue
of a passenger facility charge (PFC). In 1990, the Federal Avia-
tion Act (Act) was amended to allow airports to petition the FAA
for permission to impose a PFC on passengers. Under the Act,
PFCs are only authorized for use in financing specific airport
projects. The statute also requires' that the airport provide writ-
ten notice of proposed PFCs to air carriers, identifying the
projects to be financed.2 7
Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority petitioned the FAA
for permission to impose a $3.00 PFC to fund four projects, and
it proposed a fifth, alternative project to be funded if the FAA
disapproved any of the first four. In its written notice to peti-
tioner and other airlines, however, the airport failed to identify
the fifth project. The FAA approved the petition, including
funding of the fifth project if any of the first four could not be
implemented in a timely manner.
Petitioner challenged the FAA's approval on the basis that the
FAA had failed to consider the potential economic and competi-
tive burden of the PFC on the airline industry, which petitioner
argued was required under the general "public interest" criteria
specified in the Act. The district court had interpreted the PFC
statute as only requiring the FAA to consider specified criteria,
including the enhanced capacity, safety or security, noise reduc-
tion, and opportunities for enhanced competition that were
presented by a proposed PFC project, under which the pro-
posed projects were deemed as appropriate. On appeal, the Dis-
trit of Columbia Circuit rejected the bulk of petitioner's
arguments, but it did hold that the FAA violated the consulta-
tion provisions of the PFC statute and that the airport had failed
to give notice of the proposed fifth alternative project, preclud-
ing the use of PFC funds for that project.5 21
In Kansas v. United States,529 appellants brought an unsuccess-
ful, three-prong constitutional challenge to the Wright Amend-
524 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6 (1995).
525 17 F.3d at 1508-09.
526 14 F.3d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
527 49 U.S.C. § 1513(e)(11)(C) (Supp. 11 1990), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 40117
(1995).
528 14 F.3d at 72.
529 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 354 (1994).
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ment, section 29 of the International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979,530 which forbids airlines from offering
direct interstate flights from Love Field in Dallas, with certain
exceptions for limited charter and commuter airline service,
and for flights to contiguous states. Appellants' challenge was
based on the Port Preference Clause, the First Amendment, and
the right of interstate travel. The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of the government's summary
judgment motion.'
The Wright Amendment was enacted out of concern that the
viability of Dallas-Forth Worth Airport (DFW) could be under
mined if Southwest Airlines, which refused to leave Love Field
for DFW, was allowed to operate on an unrestricted basis.
Under the amendment, interstate passengers flying from Love
Field were required to make an intermediate stop in one of the
contiguous states and to change airplanes prior to arriving at
their final destinations. Passengers were also required to buy
separate tickets for the different flights, and they were not al-
lowed to check baggage through to the final destination.
The Port Preference Clause states that "no preference shall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of
one state over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or
from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in an-
other."" 2 The clause was enacted in response to a pre-Constitu-
tion federal law requiring ships sailing to Baltimore to "enter
and clear" at Norfolk. This requirement, in effect, allowed Vir-
ginia to tax vessels bound for Chesapeake Bay, deterring ships
from using those Maryland ports. The court rejected the Port
Preference Clause argument because a preference between two
airports in the same state did not violate the clause and because
air traffic inbound to Texas was not required to make an inter-
mediate stop in any other state.533
Appellants next argued that the Wright Amendment violated
the rights to free access to interstate travel. The court rejected
this argument based on a finding that the purpose of the
Amendment was to promote interstate travel by channeling traf-
fic through the new DFW airport. The court ruled that any de-
terrent effect the Amendment might have was trivial. 53 4
530 Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
531 16 F.3d at 437.
532 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 6.
533 16 F.3d at 440-41.
534 Id. at 441-42.
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Appellants' last argument was that the Wright Amendment vi-
olated the right to free speech because it prevented Southwest
from "offer[ing] for sale" transportation outside the contiguous-
state area. Southwest was only allowed to provide information
about further travel upon customer request. The court, citing
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,5 5 stated
that the commercial speech in question could be restricted pro-
vided " 'the government's interest in doing so is substantial, the
restrictions directly advance the government's asserted interest,
and the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.' "536 Applying this rule, the court found that
the Wright Amendment expressed the government's substantial
interest in ensuring that adequate facilities would exist for inter-
state travel in the Dallas-Fort Worth area and that the advertis-
ing ban was narrowly tailored in proportion to the interests it
served.53 7
In County of Westchester v. Commissioner of Transportation,"' the
Second Circuit, applying Connecticut law, reversed a summary
judgment declaring that Westchester County had gained a pre-
scriptive aviation easement over Connecticut property for use by
Westchester County Airport. The basis for the reversal was that
the use of airspace as an approach zone was not "adverse," an
essential element for an easement by prescription.5 9
Defendants were Connecticut landowners whose property was
near the airport adjacent to the border in New York. The ap-
proach zone for Runway 29 was almost entirely in Connecticut.
Several trees on defendants' property had grown into the
mandatory "clear zone" airspace for this runway, which short-
ened its useable length by approximately 1300 feet and pre-
vented its use by larger airplanes. Prior to filing the action, the
county offered to trim the trees, but the defendants refused to
cooperate.
The parties agreed before the district court that New York
choice of law rules indicated that Connecticut law would apply.
After motions in the district court, the county's only remaining
claims were state law claims, including a claim of a prescriptive
aviation easement.
535 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986).
536 16 F.3d at 442.
537 Id. at 443.
538 9 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 2102 (1994).
5" Id. at 247.
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The county sought two separate easements: (1) an "aviation
or flight" easement, giving it a right to use airspace above de-
fendants' properties; and (2) a clearance easement, giving the
county the right to cut down the obstructing trees. The district
court granted summary judgment for the county on the pre-
scriptive easement claim, and it certified the question of
whether the clearance easement was included in the aviation
easement to the Second Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1292(b). The Second Circuit certified the question to the Con-
necticut Supreme Court, which found, instead, that the county's
use of the airspace was not "adverse," an essential element for a
prescriptive easement.54 ° The basis for the Connecticut court's
finding was that, to be "adverse," a use must be such that a land-
owner would have a right of action against the user and that
defendants lacked any right of action because federal law bars
the issuance of state law injunctions affecting aircraft use of
United States airspace.M Based on this ruling, the Second Cir-
cuit reversed the county's summary judgment.
Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. City of Bridgepor" 2 was a case in which
plaintiff had previously sued defendants for their alleged unfair
denial of access to the runway at Sikorsky International Airport,
where plaintiff hoped to operate an aircraft service facility from
his adjacent land. In that action, plaintiff had won ajury award
totaling $2 million in compensatory damages, plus punitive
damages of $37,900 from each defendant. The subject of the
action was defendants' alleged wrongful denial of airport access
with the intent of depressing the value of plaintiffs' adjacent
land. Defendants allegedly had offered plaintiff airport access,
but only in return for conveying the land to defendants for a
price that plaintiff contended fell below just compensation.
In the present action, plaintiff sought a permanent injunction
allowing him airport access. The court ruled that a permanent
injunction was unauthorized, as plaintiff was unable to show that
his legal remedy of damages was inadequate, or that plaintiff
would be denied airport access if he reapplied, as some ten years
had passed since defendants had first refused access and all of
the key players had since relinquished their authority regarding
airport policy and procedure. The court ruled that the absence
540 Id. at 246.
541 Id.
542 849 F. Supp. 10 (D. Conn. 1994).
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of a threat of continuing or future injury made a permanent
injunction unwarranted.S
In Hawley v. City of Cleveland,-' Cleveland taxpayers chal-
lenged the city's lease of airport space to the Catholic Diocese
for use as a chapel as violating the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the Constitution." 5 The district court's en-
try of judgment in favor of defendants was affirmed on appeal
by the Sixth Circuit.
In analyzing appellants' Establishment Clause claim, the Sixth
Circuit applied the test announced by the United States
Supreme Court in the seminal case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,54 as.
refined in subsequent cases. To pass constitutional muster, the
district court held that the lease was required to have a secular
purpose that, as its primary effect, neither advances nor inhibits
religion and which does not foster an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.M 7 In upholding the lease, the district
court concluded that the chapel served the secular purpose of
accommodating the religious needs of travelers, would not
cause a reasonable observer to conclude that the city endorsed
the Catholic religion, and did not constitute an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement, a holding that was affirmed on
appeal.m
In Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus,M 9 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that certain city
zoning ordinances restricting seaplane operations were pre-
empted by federal law based on its finding that the applicable
federal statutes and regulations indicated a congressional intent
to preempt the field.
Plaintiff, a seaplane pilot, owned a waterfront home on Lake
Angelus in Michigan. After plaintiff landed a seaplane on the
lake, he was advised by local authorities that two city zoning or-
dinances barred seaplane operations. These ordinances pre-
scribed minimum operating altitudes and restricted seaplane
landings on Lake Angelus. Plaintiff then filed this action, chal-
lenging the ordinances as being preempted by federal law,
-s Id. at 12.
- 24 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 1994).
545 U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
56 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
547 24 F.3d at 822.
548 IdS
549 856 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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among other issues. The parties filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment.
In considering the cross-motions, the court referred to section
1508(a) of the Federal Aviation Act (the Act), which states that
"[t]he United States of America is hereby declared to possess
and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the
airspace of the United States, including the airspace above all
inland waters,"550 and FAR Part 91, which prescribes rules gov-
erning all aspects of aircraft operations, including minimum
safe altitudes.55" ' The court found that the comprehensive na-
ture of these laws and regulations indicated Congress' intent
that federal law occupy this field, and it ruled that the city ordi-
nances were preempted. 552
In the appeal of Board of Commissioners v. Isaac,553 the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the FAA's decision to withdraw proposed fund-
ing for the construction of a major cargo hub at Front Range
Airport near the new Denver International Airport (DIA).
Petitioners, who advocated funding of the proposed cargo
hub, were concerned that the air cargo facilities at DIA were
inconveniently located and did not provide ready access to inter-
state highways. In 1991, they proposed expanding Front Range
Airport, an existing general aviation facility, into a cargo hub.
The FAA approved the expansion in a March 1992 ROD. Later,
the FAA issued a funding letter allocating $15 million to the
project, " 'subject to revision after bids have been opened; and
... subject to signed leases with the air cargo carriers.' ,,554 The
funding was only for the fiscal year of 1992, with any future
funding conditioned on enactment of "new legislation." The
expansion of Front Range began, and carriers and service busi-
nesses signed lease options, while others expressed their inter-
est, but only if the FAA provided further funding.
In August 1992, DIA officials decided to relocate air cargo op-
erations from the north side of the airport to the south side,
thereby eliminating the significant problems associated with
DIA's previously proposed cargo operations. Air carriers began
abandoning Front Range to return to DIA. When the "signed
550 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1988), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (1995).
55.1 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (1995).
552 856 F. Supp. at 326.
553 18 F.3d 1492 (10th Cir. 1994).
554 Id. at 1495.
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leases" referenced in the ROD failed to materialize, the FAA
withdrew the ROD and funding for the Front Range project.
Petitioners sought review of the FAA's actions, stating that
there was no substantial evidence supporting the reversal of the
agency's position and that the FAA's decisions were arbitrary
and capricious.555 In reviewing the record, the court found the
crux of the ROD was the assumption that DIA was not a viable
air cargo facility. However, once DIA decided to switch its cargo
location, DIA became an economically viable alternative to
Front Range. The court, therefore, ruled that the withdrawal of
the ROD was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also ruled
that it was prohibited by section 701 (a) (2) of the APA from re-
viewing a FAA decision to withdraw tentative funding, which the
court found was committed to the agency's discretion.
Petitioners also argued that the FAA was equitably estopped
from reversing its original funding decision. The court, citing
Penny v. Giuffrida,556 ruled that a party seeking estoppel against
the government must establish affirmative misconduct. The
court also noted that petitioners had failed to meet their burden
of proving misrepresentation or concealment. 55 7
Finally, petitioners argued. that a conflict of interest existed
between the DIA airport administrator and the FAA, an argu-
ment the court found was waived by petitioners' failure to raise
it below.558
In Banner Advertising, Inc. v. People,559 the Colorado Supreme
Court found that an ordinance by the City of Boulder that pro-
hibited commercial signs towed by aircraft was preempted by
federal law and, therefore, was not enforceable.
Banner Advertising, Inc. originally appealed from the Boul-
der Municipal Court's finding that Banner had twice violated a
Boulder ordinance specifically prohibiting commercial sign tow-
ing by aircraft. On both occasions, Banner had received FAA
authorizations to conduct commercial banner towing. Banner
appealed to the Boulder District Court, which rejected its pre-
emption arguments by focusing on the wording of the FAA cer-
tificate issued to Banner. The certificate stated that the
authorization did not " 'constitute a waiver of any state law or
555 See Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1995).
556 897 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1990).
557 18 F.3d at 1499.
558 Id.
559 868 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1994).
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local ordinance not otherwise preempted by the United States
Constitution or Federal Statute or Regulation.' 560 The Boul-
der District Court found that the FAA, by the wording of its cer-
tificate, had left room for local regulation. The Colorado
Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court, finding that the
FAA certificate language only stated a fundamental principle of
the doctrine of federalism, and it held that the ordinance was
preempted.561
In Kleiser, Inc. v. Airport Commission,16 2 plaintiffs appealed from
the involuntary dismissal of their action at the close of their
case-in-chief, arising from an action against the Airport Commis-
sion for alleged violations of public bidding law in failing to
award contracts to the highest bidder.
The action concerned a lease for a tract of land owned by the
Airport Commission. Plaintiffs contended that they submitted
the highest bid but that it was rejected by the commission. On
appeal, plaintiffs argued that the commission acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in failing to award the lease to the highest bid-
der. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, however, rejected this ar-
gument, finding that the commission had acted in good faith.
The court affirmed the dismissal based on the fact that the party
receiving the contract had properly satisfied the bidding
requirements. 56 3
In Maryland Aviation Administration v. Newsome,564 the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's reversal
of a state Department of Transportation Board of Airport Zon-
ing Appeals order denying a variance that was sought by a home
construction contractor. The variance, if granted, would have
allowed the contractor to develop single-family homes within
the Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI) Noise
Zone.
Appellee sought to build a single-family housing complex con-
sisting of twenty-seven houses on land near BWI, which was in-
tended to house an estimated sixty-eight people. The board's
denial of the variance was based on the location of the property
within the BWI Noise Zone, an estimate that airport noise was
not expected to decrease in the area, and that the population
560 Id. at 1079.
561 868 P.2d at 1084.
562 640 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
563 Id. at 753-54.
5r- 637 A.2d 469 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. granted, 643 A.2d 441 (1994).
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density in the proposed development would be significantly
greater than in its surroundings. On appeal to the trial court,
appellee successfully argued that the board had exceeded its dis-"
cretion in considering factors other than airport noise in deny-
ing the variance.
The court of special appeals affirmed the trial court decision
after reviewing the BWI Noise Zone regulations, finding their
purpose to be limiting airport noise exposure by developing
plans for monitoring and abating noise impact, in part by regu-
lating land use within the BWI Noise Zone. 65 The appellate
court also found that the regulations did not authorize the
board to regulate population densities within the BWI Noise
Zone and, therefore, that the board's denial of the variance was
arbitrary and capricious due to its consideration of density
factors."C
In Sharp v. Howard County Board of Appeals,567 the latest round
of a fifteen year land use dispute over a private airstrip, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected the challenge by a
group of nearby property owners to the county zoning board's
decision granting the airstrip owners a special zoning exception
allowing its use. The court found that the zoning board had
acted within its discretion in granting the special exception,
which was based on a finding that the use of the land as an air-
strip did not cause any adverse effects above and beyond those
inherently associated with such excepted uses, irrespective of
their location within the county.568 Specifically, the appellate
court noted the uncontroverted testimony that the airstrip was
well-maintained, that the special use exception that was granted
only allowed three aircraft to be based at the airstrip, and that
the owners had prohibited pilots using the airstrip from over-
flying the three local schools. The court also noted the results
of a study indicating: (1) since 1983, only 341 takeoffs and land-
ings, or one every five-and-one-half days, had been recorded at
the airstrip and (2) the zoning board had determined the noise
associated with the airstrip was within the state's maximum for
property zoned for single family, detached homes.569
In announcing its decision, the appellate court admitted that
it had "no illusion that this [o] rder will end the string of appeals
56 Id. at 474.
566 Id. at 474-75.
567 632 A.2d 248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
W8 Id. at 259.
569 Id. at 252-53.
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and remands" over the land use dispute, and commented, "Id
imperfectum manet dum confectum erit (it ain't over until it's
over)."570
In State v. Metropolitan Airports Commission,171 the Minnesota
Supreme Court, ruling that federal law relating to. the operation
of airports preempts the enforcement of state and municipal
noise pollution regulations, reversed a court of appeals ruling
that had reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC).
This action arose from the attempt of certain public interest
groups to enforce Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA)
noise regulations against the MAC, which is the proprietor of
the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport. Plaintiff/appellants were non-
profit organizations seeking a declaratory judgment that the air-
port's commission was subject to the noise pollution regulations
authored by the MPCA. The issue before the court of appeals
was whether these state regulations were preempted by federal
law. Although issues of aircraft flight, airspace management,
and aircraft noise are generally controlled by federal law, airport
operators may impose nondiscriminatory restrictions, even if
they directly control aircraft flight.
In San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco,572 the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the validity of MPCA restrictions, as applied to MAC,
because the restrictions neither directly controlled aircraft
flight, nor attempted to do so indirectly by compelling an air-
port proprietor to restrict aircraft flight. The court contem-
plated the possibility that enforcement of the noise standards
would result in attempts to control aircraft flight, but it left that
issue for future consideration.
In Malone Parachute Club, Inc. v. Town of Malone,573 a skydiving
club's challenge to a town board resolution prohibiting
skydivers from landing on public airport property, without first
obtaining liability insurance naming the town as an additional
insured, was upheld in this New York action. The club unsuc-
cessfully challenged the order on three bases: (1) that the order
was preempted by federal law; (2) that the order lacked a ra-
tional basis; and (3) that the order was passed in violation of
local open public meetings laws.
570 Id. at 249.
571 520 N.W.2d 388 (Minn. 1994).
572 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).
573 610 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. 1994).
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With respect to the first issue, the club argued that the order
conflicted with an FAA regulation requiring that airports receiv-
ing federal funds be made available for all aeronautical users,
including skydivers. While acknowledging the general preemp-
tion rule, the court noted that it was subject to an exception
allowing municipalities to enact regulations in their capacities as
airport proprietors, so long as the regulations do not directly
conflict with existing federal statutes or regulations. The court
ruled that the regulation cited by the club as preemptive permit-
ted municipalities to impose "reasonable" limitations on skydiv-
ing, including the requirement for liability insurance.5 74
The club's "rational basis" and "open meeting laws" chal-
lenges fared no better. The court ruled that the requirement
that liability insurance be provided for the town was reason-
able.5 75 Although the court noted a possible violation of the
open meeting laws, it found that the challenge order was even-
tually passed at an open meeting. Thus, the court allowed the
town resolution to stand.
In the case of Town of Brookhaven v. Spadaro,576 the town of
Brookhaven, New York, sought a permanent injunction prohib-
iting defendants from operating an airstrip and FBO on private
property. A small portion of the property was zoned for use as a
gasoline station and the remainder was zoned for residential
use. On appeal, the appellate, division reversed the summary
judgment for defendants. The reversal was based on alleged
representations made by defendants to the Town Board in 1961
that they intended to operate an aircraft repair facility when the
.portion of property was rezoned to authorize the gasoline
station.
Defendants argued, before the appellate division, that be-
cause they had revealed their intended use of the property when
they petitioned for rezoning of the portion of property in 1961,
the repair facility was established as a valid nonconforming use.
Defendants argued that their use of the adjoining property as an
airstrip constituted a valid "accessory use" to the repair facility.
The appellate division, however, rejected defendants' conten-
tion that the Town Board's rezoning of the portion of the prop-
erty for business thereby authorized a non-permitted use of the
574 Id. at 688.
575 Id.
576 612 N.Y.S.2d 175 (N.Y. 1994).
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property "to begin or to continue." 77 The court noted that de-
fendants' rezoning petition merely indicated that the property
was purchased for various purposes, some of which were con-
forming uses. The court ruled that these facts did not support
the inference urged by defendants. 578
The court gave even less credence to defendants' attempts to
justify use of the residentially zoned portion of the property as
an airstrip, which normally would be an unlawful use. The court
found no authority for transforming a prohibited use into a per-
mitted one, merely on the basis that the use was "accessory" to
the use of an adjoining parcel.57 9
In Nelson v. McMinn County"Ps0, plaintiff, who lived adjacent to
the McMinn County Airport, had unsuccessfully applied to the
county commissioners for permission to have "through the
fence" access to the airport. After the county denied his applica-
tion, plaintiff attempted to donate the land to the county under
a reservation requiring the county to lease the land back to him
and to allow airport access from the property. When the county
refused, plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that the
county was required to accept the land donation, as it had ac-
cepted a similar donation with another landowner a decade-and-
a-half previously.
After the trial court granted the county's motion for summary
judgment, plaintiff appealed on two issues: (1) that the trial
court erred in failing to allow him a trial on the merits; and (2)
absent a compelling reason, the county could not deny him per-
missive use of the airport while granting the same privilege to
another. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the sum-
mary judgment, finding an absence of any triable issue of mate-
rial fact that the county had acted illegally, arbitrarily, or
capriciously. 51 The court also observed that "it is elementary
that a party cannot be required to accept title to real property
against his will."58 2
577 Id. at 177.
578 Id.
579 Id.
580 No. 03A01-9312-CH-00428, 1994 WL 139530 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21,
1994).




In Harriss & B & H Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Norsworthy .& DBS
Investments, Inc.,585 the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed sum-
maryjudgment in favor of an aircraft owner against a fixed base
operator's attempt to enforce an artisan's lien for hangar space
and parts that were ordered but not installed on the owner's
aircraft.
Texas statutory law authorizes an artisan's lien in favor of a
person who "repairs and performs maintenance work."584 As
the ordered parts had never been installed on defendant's air-
planes, the court held the lien invalid because the repairs and
maintenance had not been performed. In addition, as the stat-
ute does not expressly authorize liens for storage charges, unlike
other Texas statutes creating artisan's liens, the court held the
lien invalid as to those charges as well. 585
In an unpublished portion of its opinion, the appellate court
also affirmed summary judgment on the issue that the one and a
half percent monthly interest charged by the FBO was usurious,
as it was in excess of the six percent per annum legal rate, but it
reversed summary judgment against the FBO owner, as his per-
sonal participation in setting the interest rate was disputed.
In Louisiana Bank of Ouachita Parish v. Zadoorian,8 6 the Louisi-
ana court determined that a repairman's lien for aircraft repairs
held priority over a chattel mortgage only with respect to repair
work that was requested before the mortgage was recorded.
On November 6, 1991, the FBO took in defendant's 1966
Piper airplane for an annual inspection. On November 21,
1991, while the airplane was undergoing the inspection, the
owner pledged it as security for a $120,000 note executed by the
plaintiff bank. A UCC-1 form recording the chattel mortgage
was filed on December 9, 1991, and a FAA aircraft security
agreement was filed on December 23, 1991.
In August 1992, plaintiff bank filed a petition for executory
process. The FBO, which had stopped work on the Piper but
had retained it in its possession, intervened in the lawsuit to as-
sert a statutory repairman's lien. The court determined that the
repairman's lien had priority over the chattel mortgage for work
583 869 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ) (partial
publication).
584 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.301 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
585 869 S.W.2d at 602.
586 637 So. 2d 641 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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requested prior to December 9, 1991, when the UCC-1 form was
filed, even if the work was actually performed after that date.5"7
Except for storage fees incurred from the time plaintiff bank
filed its petition, the FBO's claim for fees incurred for services
requested after December 9, 1991, was disallowed. The basis for
the ruling was that the statute creating the repairman's lien only
authorized recovery for services requested while the chattel
property remained in the repairman's possession, which the
court concluded would terminate with recording of the chattel
518mortgage. 58
VII. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
In the Fifth Circuit case of National Union Fire Insurance Co. v.
Care Flight Air Ambulance Service, Inc.,589 defendants/appellants
General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) and Avemco In-
surance Co. appealed from a summary judgment in favor of Na-
tional Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., arguing that
the insured's conversion of its leased aircraft extinguished its
rights to indemnification under a hull policy issued by National
Union. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, applying Texas law.
GECC leased a Piper airplane to Care Flight Air Ambulance
Service, Inc., under a written lease that prohibited Care Flight
from subleasing the airplane without GECC's consent. The
lease also required Care Flight to obtain hull insurance, which it
did through National Union. The National Union policy con-
tained a breach of warranty endorsement that excluded cover-
age for losses caused by conversion of the aircraft by the named
insured or under its direction. Care Flight subsequently entered
an unauthorized sublease, in violation of the GECC lease. Care
Flight's lessee, in turn, subleased the airplane to the person who
was in possession when it was seized by Colombian authorities
for violations of that nation's air traffic laws.
GECC's insurer, Avemco, paid $2.5 million in settlement of
the loss and then, by way of subrogation, demanded indemnifi-
cation from National Union under the Care Flight policy. On
appeal, Avemco challenged the district court's holding that
Care Flight's unauthorized sublease was, as a matter of law, a
587 Id. at 644.
588 Id.
589 18 F.3d 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 293 (1994).
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conversion under the National Union policy. National Union
cross-appealed from the court's order denying its attorneys fees.
Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit rejected appellants' con-
tention that the facts used to establish a breach of contract
could not also serve to establish the tort of conversion. The
court further held that Texas law recognizes the tort of conver-
sion where a party uses chattel in a manner inconsistent with its
authorization. 590 Finally, the court held that the owner's formal
demand for return of the property is not necessary to establish
conversion in cases where the demand would have been
futile. 91
Appellants next argued that the war risk endorsement to the
National Union policy should have afforded coverage because
Columbia "confiscated" the airplane. The court also rejected
this argument because the war risk endorsement of the policy
stated that it neither varied, altered, waived, nor extended any
of other terms of the policy.592 Furthermore, the court held that
once Care Flight converted the aircraft, subsequent events such
as confiscation could not, as a matter of law, revise the .extin-
guished insurance coverage. The court also awarded National
Union its attorneys fees in defending this action, but not for a
separate, related lawsuit that had been filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
In Avenwo Insurance Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,593 an unsuccess-
ful appeal from the dismissal of an action for indemnity and
contribution, the Tenth Circuit held, over a vigorous dissent,
that a subrogated insurer would be treated -as "the pleader" for
purposes of FRCP 13(a). The basis for both the district court's
dismissal and the Tenth Circuit's affirmance was that the in-
surer, for purposes of procedural as well as substantive law,
"stands in the shoes" of the insured litigation party.594 The dis-
missal resulted from the insured pilot's neglect, in an action
filed by an injured passenger, to file a counterclaim against
Cessna for indemnity or contribution for the pilot's settlement
of another injured passenger's claim.
The action arose from the crash of a Cessna airplane owned
by the pilot, in which two passengers were injured. One passen-
590 Id. at 328.
591 Id.
592 Id. at 325.
599 11 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1993).
594 Id. at 1000.
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ger reached a settlement agreement with the pilot, which the
insurer funded. The other passenger filed actions against the
pilot and Cessna, which were consolidated. Prior to the consoli-
dation, Cessna filed a third-party complaint against the pilot,
based on alleged negligence in causing the crash. The pilot did
not file a counterclaim against Cessna for indemnity or contri-
bution for the settlement with the first passenger, but, along
with his insurer, subsequently filed a separate action.
The dismissal and affirmance were based on the following
findings: (1) that the insurer's subrogation action was a compul-
sory counterclaim in the second passenger's lawsuit because it
arose out of the same "transaction or occurrence" (the crash);
and (2) that the insurer should, like the pilot-insured, be
treated as the "pleader" for purposes of FRCP 13(a). The dis-
sentingjudge argued vigorously that the "plain language" of the
compulsory counterclaim rule precluded construing the term
"pleader" to include a party's insurer.595
B. CONFLICTS OF LAW
The matter of Spring v. United States5l concerned the applica-
tion of conflicts of law rules in a Federal Tort Claims Act wrong-
ful death action where the negligence and the resulting
accident occurred in different states. The case arose from dece-
dent's death in the crash of a Piper Cherokee at Gambrill State
Park in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Maryland, on a flight from
Louisville; Kentucky. After being cleared for final approach to
land, the decedent strayed off course and crashed. Plaintiff, the
administrator of the estate of the deceased, claimed that the
negligence of the air traffic controllers at Dulles International
Airport and Baltimore-Washington International Airport were
proximate causes of decedent's death, in that both groups of
controllers should have observed the decedent's flight going off
course and should have provided warnings.
Before the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, the government sought to have Maryland law apply
while plaintiff advocated that Virginia law apply. The parties'
positions resulted from the fact that the Maryland wrongful
death statute limits recovery by parents for the deaths of adult
children to pecuniary losses, while the Virginia statute appar-
ently does not. The district court then analyzed the different
595 Id. at 1003 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
596 833 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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approaches to the problem of which state's "whole law" should
be applied, in view of a recognized split in authority between
application of the law of the place where each act of negligence
occurred 597 and application of the whole law of the place of the
last act or omission or of the act or omission having the most
significant causal effect.598 After finding that both Virginia and
Maryland law follow the rule of lex loci delicti in tort actions for
substantive law purposes, and lex fori for procedural law, the
court held that it was immaterial which approach was used. The
court then determined that the "place of the wrong" was Mary-
land and, therefore, held that the Maryland wrongful death stat-
ute would be applied.59
The court next considered the issue of whether the damages
aspect of the wrongful death statutes should be considered as a
matter of substantive or procedural law, as the lawsuit had been
filed in Virginia. The court ruled that the limitation of a par-
ent's right to recover for the death of an adult child to the pecu-
niary loss was properly deemed as substantive law.60 The court
also noted that, under Maryland law, statutory definitions of re-
coverable damages were clearly recognized as substantive, which
reflected the majority view, while Virginia law was lacking in au-
thority on the issue. 01
The case of In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany on
August 29, 1990,602 concerned the applicable choice of law aris-
ing from the USAF C-5A Galaxy crash at Ramstein Air Base in
Germany, which killed thirteen of the seventeen persons on
board. Defendants Lockheed Corp. and General Electric Co.
removed seven of the wrongful death actions to federal court,
with six removed to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida and one removed to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Defend-
ants then successfully moved the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation for transfer of the Florida cases to the Western Dis-
trict of Texas, where they moved the court for an order that
Georgia law, which would bar plaintiffs' claims on the basis of
597 See Cohn v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Insurance Co.
of N. Am.v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
598 See Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1978).
599 833 F. Supp. at 577.
600 Id. at 578.
601 Id.
602 MDL No. 919 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 1993) (text available in AVIATION LiTIG.
REP., Dec. 28, 1993, at 19,436).
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the ten year statute of repose, would apply to liability issues.
Plaintiffs, who favored the application of Texas law, opposed.
A transferee court presiding over diversity actions consoli-
dated under the multi-district rules is bound to apply the choice
of law rules of the transferor courts. 60 3 As both Texas and Flor-
ida employed the "most significant relationship" approach of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, however, the
court found no conflict in this area.6°4
The court then ruled that Georgia liability law would apply
because the airplane was designed and manufactured in Geor-
gia, entered into the stream of commerce in Georgia, and the
injury-causing conduct occurred there.0 ' The court also noted
that Lockheed's principal place of business was in Georgia,
while General Electric's place of incorporation and principal
place of business were New York. In addition, the court stated
that "to hold that a manufacturer must defend itself against the
laws of the state simply because an injured plaintiff is a citizen of
that state circumscribes the Restatement's objective of certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of results," and the court noted
that the present cases involved plaintiffs from five different
states.
C. EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PRACTICE
In Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,6°6 an action
arising from a settling defendant's motion to have the judgment
below vacated as moot after the United States Supreme Court
granted the defendant's petition for United States certiorari, the
Court severely restricted the availability of vacatur in federal
court cases where an appeal or other review procedure has been
mooted through settlement. Even though the parties may have
voluntarily agreed in the settlement to permit vacatur, the
Supreme Court warned that the doctrine will only be applied to
settled cases under "exceptional circumstances. "607
The underlying dispute concerned the propriety of a bank-
ruptcy reorganization plan that Bonner had filed under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code60 ' in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Idaho. Bancorp had moved to suspend
603 Id. at 19436.
604 Id. at 19436-37.
605 Id. at 19439.
6 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
607 Id. at 393.
608 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
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the automatic stay of its intended foreclosure on certain Bon-
ner-held properties, arguing that Bonner's reorganization plan
was unconfirmable as a matter of law. After the bankruptcy
court granted the motion, the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho reversed a ruling and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, leading to Bancorp's filing of a petition certiorari. After
the petition was granted, Bonner stipulated to a consensual plan
of reorganization, which the parties agreed constituted a settle-
ment that mooted the case. Bancorp then requested the
Supreme Court to exercise its power under 28 U.S.C. section
21066" to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, which
Bonner opposed.
In declining to vacate the judgment, the Supreme Court used,
as the departure point for its analysis, the leading case on vaca-
tur, United States v. Munsingwear, Inc."' ° In Munsingwear, the
United States had sought injunctive and monetary relief for vio-
lation of a price control regulation. While the United States'
appeal from dismissal of its complaint was pending, the com-
modity at issue was decontrolled, mooting the case. The
Supreme Court interpreted Munsingwear to stand for the propo-
sition that vacatur should be granted in cases where appellate
review was "prevented through happenstance," as where a case
on review has "become moot due to circumstances unat-
tributable to any of the parties" or where "mootness results from
the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower
court."611 However, the court ruled that cases in which moot-
ness occurred through setdements to which both parties volun-
tarily agreed fell outside of the scope of the cases in which
vacatur should ordinarily be applied.612
The Supreme Court's analysis placed great weight on the
strong public interest in "the orderly operation of the federal
judicial system" and the public value of judicial precedents,
which the Court stated "are not merely the property of private
litigants."6 1 3 Perhaps due to this focus on the public interest in
the maintenance of judgments, the Court's analysis placed cor-
respondingly little emphasis on the parties' rights to freedom of
contract. Accordingly, the Court ruled that vacatur would only
be granted, under "exceptional circumstances," in cases termi-
w9 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988).
610 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
611 115 S. Ct. at 390 (emphasis added) (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 36).
612 I& at 390-91.
613 Id. at 386.
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nated through settlement. Although the Court did not specify
what circumstances it would deem "exceptional," it expressly
cautioned that "exceptional circumstances do not include the
mere fact that the settlement agreement provides for vaca-
tur."614 In dicta, the Court stated that its ruling should be con-
sidered as having equal effect on requests for vacatur lodged at
the appellate court level as on vacatur requests presented to the
Supreme Court.61 5
Commander Properties v. FAA61 6 involved a class action suit
against Beech Aircraft Corp. and its owner, Raytheon Corp.,
based on the allegedly defective wing design of certain King Air
models, which required a costly modification. Plaintiffs had ob-
tained an order from the Kansas district court staying the class
action while they sought the FAA's determination of whether
the wing design was defective. After the FAA determined that
the design was not defective, so long as airworthiness directives
were complied with and the aircraft was flown within its ap-
proved flight envelope, plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals for review. The
basis for plaintiffs' petition was that the FAA's determination
comprised ajudgment on the common law claims raised in their
complaint, which was beyond the FAA's authority. The D.C. Cir-
cuit denied the petition, noting that the FAA had confined its
analysis to FAA regulations concerning testing for strength and
load requirements and had not mentioned plaintiffs' common
law claims. The D.C. Circuit noted that the FAA had merely
found that the aircraft at issue had passed initial certification
testing and were currently considered airworthy after compli-
ance with the airworthiness directives.61 7
In Lamkin v. Braniff Airlines, Inc.,618 the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judg-
ment after plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the defend-
ant air carrier had acted negligently in any manner causing
plaintiff's burn injuries, which occurred when a cup of hot cof-
fee spilled on plaintiff's tray table when the passenger in the
seat ahead reclined the seat back.
Plaintiff offered one expert who had admitted at his deposi-
tion that he had no knowledge about the proper temperature
614 Id. at 393.
615 Id.
616 11 F.3d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
617 Id. at 206.
618 853 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1994).
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for coffee served on airline flights, the proper functioning of
coffee makers installed on air carrier aircraft, the defendant's
training procedures for coffee service, or any alleged defects in
the tray tables attached to passenger seat backs. Plaintiff, more-
over, failed to show that there was any defect in the coffee
maker that would have caused the coffee to be unusually hot,
nor did she identify any evidence to show that the crew should
have known that the coffee was extremely hot. Plaintiff also ar-,
gued that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to her case,
which the court rejected after finding that the type of accident
involved was not one that necessarily implicated air carrier negli-
gence.61 9 The court also rejected plaintiff's failure to warn
claim because she herself knew the coffee was hot, as she had
placed the cup on the tray table to allow it to cool.620
In Farley v. Cessna,621 on Cessna's cross motion for a protective
order, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that plaintiff's discovery requests seeking doc-
uments relating to design specifications and engineering draw-
ings for components of Cessna's Model C-140 aircraft and other
high-wing Cessna aircraft, which contained proprietary informa-
tion, were subject to protection.
Plaintiff, a passenger, was injured in a crash of a 1946 Cessna
Model C-140 single engine aircraft. He alleged that the airplane
became fuel-starved, lost power, and descended uncontrollably
during climb out. He further alleged that his injuries were sus-
tained solely because of the defective and dangerous design of
the aircraft. During discovery, plaintiff requested specific infor-
mation, which Cessna agreed to provide, subject to a protective
order. Plaintiff refused to comply with this condition, resulting
in Cessna's cross-motion for a protective order.
Using the factors identified in Pansy v. Borough of Strouds-
burg,622 the court balanced plaintiff's need for information
against the injury that might result if uncontrolled disclosure
were compelled. The court determined that Cessna was entitled
to a protective order based on the following factors:
1) Cessna specifically identified the proprietary information it
sought to protect;
619 Id. at 33.
620 Id. at 32.
62, No. 93-6948, 1994 WL 396479 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1994).
622 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994).
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2) Cessna, as a private litigant, had a strong privacy interest in
protecting this information from disclosure to counterfeit parts
manufacturers;
3) an uncontrolled disclosure could threaten public health and
safety by encouraging manufacture of counterfeit parts; and
4) the protective order would not cause undue hardship to
Farley.623
The court issued the protective order limiting disclosure of the
documents to the litigants, counsel, and experts in this case.
The court also indicated its willingness to revisit this issue if
plaintiff could demonstrate Cessna manufactured faulty fuel
systems.
In Engebretsen & Hartford Insurance Co. v. Fairchild Aircraft
Corp., 624 plaintiff, a commuter airline pilot, appealed to the
Sixth Circuit from a defense judgment in his lawsuit for injuries
sustained in a landing incident involving the Fairchild Metro III
he was flying. The flight had been on final approach to the
Greater Cincinnati International Airport in Covington, Ken-
tucky, when the flight crew, sensing an uncommanded nose-
down pressure on the controls, disconnected the automatic stall
avoidance system (SAS)-a stick-pusher-installed in the air-
craft. Apparently in the belief that the system remained en-
gaged and was malfunctioning, however, the crew then landed
at a speed approximately fifty percent faster than normal. Some
time later, the pilot discovered that he had sustained back inju-
ries and went on flight disability status. The cause of the SAS
malfunction was traced to inch-deep water pooling in the belly
of the aircraft where the system was installed.
Plaintiff filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky; alleging that the Metro III design was defective in
that the SAS could malfunction in the. event of water pooling in
the fuselage. The action was bifurcated for trial, and, at the
close of the liability phase, the jury returned a verdict for de-
fendant. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found
that plaintiff had failed to prove that the aircraft design was de-
fective or that the SAS had continued to create nose-down pres-
sure after the crew had switched off the system. The jury also,
responded negatively to a special interrogatory asking whether
defendant had proved that plaintiff had been contributorily
negligent.
623 1994 WL 396479 at *2-*3.
624 21 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 1994).
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Plaintiff appealed, alleging insufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting the defense verdict The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding
that there was evidence to support the lower court finding that
the amount of water that had accumulated in the fuselage was
unforeseeably great and that the SAS had, in fact, stopped creat-
ing nose-down pressure when it was switched off.
Plaintiff also appealed from the district court's denial of his
motion for a new trial. Plaintiff argued that the court had erred
by admitting into evidence two reports by defendant's accident
reconstruction experts after the jury instructions had been read.
Plaintiff further objected to the reports as being hearsay and ai
being irrelevant, insofar as they reported test results that, plain-
tiff argued, were not conducted under sufficiently similar cir-
cumstances to those involved in the landing incident. The Sixth
Circuit rejected all three of plaintiffs' arguments, ruling that the
reports were admissible because plaintiff himself had referred to
them in cross-examining the experts, the hearsay exception was
inapplicable because the information was of the type relied
upon by experts in the field, and that the tests were conducted
under sufficiently similar circumstances to be probative.
In Sherer v. Hartzell ropeller, Inc.,6 21 decedent, plaintiff's hus-
band, was the pilot-in-command of a twin-engine commuter
plane that crashed while attempting to land. Plaintiff filed suit
against the manufacturer of the airframe and of the propellers.
In this decision, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio denied the propeller manufacturer sum-
mary judgment, ruling that the factual issues regarding its
liability created jury questions.
The motion considered the following undisputed facts: (1)
that the accident resulted from the pilot, either deliberately or
inadvertently, placing the power levers into a reverse-thrust posi-
tion while still airborne; and (2) that the propeller manufac-
turer had placed incorrect feathering springs in both propellers
during overhaul.
The propeller manufacturer also argued that no dispute ex-
isted with respect to the fact that the pilot would have been un-
able to regain control of the aircraft even if the correct springs
had been installed. In support, the propeller manufacturer ar-
gued that plaintiff lacked any evidence-such as quantitative
data that the correct springing would have moved the propeller
625 No. 1:89 CV 0821 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 1994) (text available in AVIATION
LrrlG. REP., Oct. 25, 1994, at 20785).
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blades out of reverse thrust more quickly or that any delay con-
tributed to the accident-to support a contrary finding. The
court, however, found that this issue was properly in dispute,
proclaiming that it was faced with both "dueling experts" and
"dueling tests." 626
The court also relied on information from the NTSB report
showing that the decedent pilot's selection of reverse thrust did
not-necessarily make the accident inevitable. The court noted
that the case had been pending for more than four years, in-
cluding interlocutory appeals, and that the propeller manufac-
turer had admitted to putting the wrong springs in the
propellers.627 Under these circumstances, the court declared
that it was "not inclined to hold, on summary judgment, that
[defendant/propeller manufacturer] cannot be liable.628
In Glenn v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,629 plaintiffs unsuccessfully ap-
pealed from ajury verdict for defendants in this negligence and
products liability action and from the trial court's denial of
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs contended that the
trial court erred in limiting the time for opening and closing
arguments and also erred in several evidentiary rulings. The
Tenth Circuit upheld the verdict in all respects.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' contention that the
ten minute and twenty-two minute limitations on opening and
closing arguments deprived them of a fair trial on the basis of
waiver, as plaintiffs had not lodged any contemporaneous objec-
tion to the limitations, and the lack of any plain error. With
respect to the court's evidentiary rulings, which included the ad-
mission of certain engineering drawings, the court of appeals
noted that plaintiffs, again, had failed to lodge any contempora-
neous objection. Plaintiffs' appeal from the denial of their new
trial motion was similarly unsuccessful, as the Tenth Circuit
ruled that they had failed to show that the verdict was insupport-
able based on the evidence.
In Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp.,6 0 de-
fendant United Technologies Corp. appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit from the jury verdict and the district court's previous denial
of its motion for judgment as a matter of law in an action
626 Id. at 20789-90
627 Id. at 20791.
628 Id.
629 32 F.3d 1462 (10th Cir. 1994).
630 35 F.3d 507 (10th Cir. 1994).
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brought by Pegasus Helicopters, Inc., the third-hand purchaser
of a Bell 214B helicopter. Pegasus had prevailed at trial on
claims of breach of express warranty and breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arising out of United
Technologies' manufacture and refurbishment of the helicopter
engine fuel control unit.
Pegasus, which provided high-altitude, heavy-lift helicopter
services, had operated the subject helicopter for four years when
it removed the fuel control unit for a scheduled overhaul. After
installing the refurbished fuel control unit, however, the heli-
copter could no longer deliver the reliability and performance
Pegasus required. Pegasus then filed the present action against
United Technologies.
At the close of Pegasus's case, United Technologies moved for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing there was no evidence to
support the breach of warranty claims. The district court de-
nied the motion, and identified, as supporting evidence, several
tags that were attached to the fuel control unit reciting that it
had been inspected and accepted in accordance with the origi-
nal equipment manufacturer's specifications. Although United
Technologies argued that Pegasus was never advised of the na-
ture of those specifications, it was uncontested that the helicop-
ter could not attain altitudes of more than approximately 10,000
feet with the refurbished fuel control unit, whereas United
Technologies' internal specifications provided for a much
higher maximum operating altitude.
United Technologies renewed its motion for judgment as a
matter of law at the close of the case, which the court again de-
nied. The jury returned a Verdict in favor of Pegasus in the
amourit of $412,000 plus prejudgment interest. Following the
jury verdict, United Technologies once again moved for judg-
ment as a matter of law, or, alternatively, for a new trial. The
district court denied both motions and the appeal ensued. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court that
there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reason-
ably find for Pegasus.6"' The court of appeals, however, re-
manded the matter to the district court for a recalculation of
the prejudgment interest awarded, holding that interest was
only authorized beginning from the date each element of conse-
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The negligence action of JetCraft Corp. v. Flight Safety Interna-
tiona 633 arose from an accident involving a Cessna CE 650 Cita-
tion owned byJetcraft and being operated on a training flight by
Flight Safety International (FSI) under supervision of an FSI
flight instructor. The four trainee pilots on board were all em-
ployed byJetCraft. The accident occurred during a touch-and-
go landing when the left landing gear retracted, causing the air-
craft to veer off the runway after the left wingtip struck the
ground. The instructor pilot was handling the gear and flap
controls at the time. Plaintiff brought this unsuccessful appeal
from the jury's verdict in FSI's favor.
Plaintiff claimed that the district court had erred in failing to
submit their bailment theory of negligence to the jury. Under
applicable Kansas law, FSI, as bailee of the aircraft, owed plain-
tiff a duty of ordinary care. Additionally, under a particular ap-
plication of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, plaintiff argued it was
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of negligence based on its
argument that the aircraft was under the instructor pilot's exclu-
sive possession and control when the accident occurred.
The Tenth Circuit rejected both charges of error. With re-
spect to the bailment theory, the court of appeals ruled that, at
most, the instructor pilot was in exclusive control of the gear
and flap controls, not the entire aircraft, and that bailment only
applied when an entire item of property is entrusted to the
bailee.63 4 The court also held res ipsa loquitur inapplicable, rul-
ing that plaintiff had not established the "exclusive control" ele-
ment due to the presence of the JetCraft pilots on board the
airplane. 635 Although, as the technical pilot-in-command, the
instructor exercised ultimate authority as to the operation, the
Tenth Circuit refused to equate this with having exclusive pos-
session and control of the aircraft.
The court also determined that evidence of a FAA certificate
action against the instructor pilot was not admissible due to lack
of relevancy. The certificate action arose from the instructor pi-
lot's failure to have an authorized Flight Safety pilot on board
when he had fulfilled his flight currency requirements. The
court ruled that the certificate action involved a collateral mat-
ter "far too remote to the controlling question of [the instructor
633 16 F.3d 362 (10th Cir. 1993).
634 Id. at 364.
635 Id.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
pilot's] negligence at the time of the accident to warrant submis-
sion to the jury."6"
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court had
properly excluded statements by plaintiff's human factors ex-
pert that the instructor pilot had caused the accident by inadver-
tently retracting the landing gear. The court of appeals found
that the expert's opinion was speculative, in view of the lack of
foundational evidence. 5 7
The case of McGilvra v. National Transportation Safety Board,63'
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) enforcement action,
arose from the NTSB's denial of a FOIA request for a copy of
the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) tape recovered from the
March 31, 1991, United Airlines Flight 585 crash in Colorado
Springs. Plaintiff, a relative of a crash victim, sought the tape for
use in a wrongful death action. The United States District Court
for the District of Colorado held that the NTSB could not be
compelled; in response to a FOIA request, to produce CVR
tapes, which are barred from public disclosure under 49 U.S.C.
appendix section 1905(c). 6 "9 That statute limits the NTSB's au-
thority to disclosing transcripts of the pertinent portions of the
tapes, not the tapes themselves. Consequently, FOIA Exemp-
tion 3, which authorizes the withholding of information specifi-
cally exempted by statute, was found applicable. 64°
In issuing its ruling, the court rejected the argument that the
NTSB's discretionary authority to disclose CVR tapes to "parties
to the field investigation" constituted a "public" disclosure. 64
The court also noted that a party involved in litigation arising
from an accident, as opposed to a FOIA enforcement plaintiff,
could possibly gain access to CVR tapes under a protective order
preventing public disclosure. 642
In the state court appeal of Broin v. Philip Morris Companis,
Inc.,6 43 a group of thirty non-smoking flight attendants success-
fully challenged the trial court's dismissal of their class action
allegations against various tobacco manufacturers and distribu-
tors for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to second-hand
636 Id. at 365.
67 Id at 366.
638 840 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1993).
639 Id. at 102.
wb Id. at 101-02.
64, Id. at 102.
642 Id. at 103.
W 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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smoke in airplane cabins. The trial court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss the class action allegations on the grounds
that, while the potential class size of 60,000 flight attendants was
large, the class representatives had raised issues that might not
be shared by the entire class. The trial court had also found that
the plaintiffs could not adequately safeguard the interests of the
entire class, many of whom were from foreign countries.
In rejecting the trial court's concerns, the Florida District
Court of Appeals found that all of the elements necessary to cer-
tify the class existed. 44 The class described was both distinct
and numerous. Further, the claims of the class members were
sufficiently common in that they were all passive inhalers of sec-
ond-hand smoke and all were allegedly treated in the same man-
ner by the cigarette manufacturers.
The appellate court rejected defendants' argument that dif-
fering statutes of limitations broke the thread of commonality
between the class claims, stating that the trial court could ad-
dress this concern by dividing the class into sub-classes.645 The
court similarly dismissed the trial court's concern of inadequate
class representation and lack of typicality as speculative. 64 The
court opined that the common issues shared by the class were
not affected by such concerns as the residences of the class
members and that the potential differences between the injury
claims of individual claimants should foreclose class action
status.
6 4 7
In the memorandum decision of Lear v. Upali (USA), Inc.,648
Gates Learjet Corp., defendant in this case arising from the un-
explained inflight disappearance of one of its business jets, un-
successfully appealed from the New York trial court's denial of
its motion for summary judgment. The motion was based, in
part, on the argument that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
would have created a rebuttable inference of negligence by de-
fendant, was inapplicable, based on the fact that the manufac-
turer lacked "exclusive control" over the instrumentality of the
accident, one of three essential elements of the doctrine.
In holding that this condition was satisfied, the court noted
that defendant had manufactured the airplane and had pro-
644 Id. at 889.
645 Id. at 891.
646 Id. at 892.
647 Id.
648 613 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. 1994).
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vided training for the pilot and that either defendant or its dis-
tributor had maintained the airplane.649 On these facts, the
appellate division summarily concluded that the defendant was
in control of all relevant instrumentalities.
The case of Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. CarY650 arose from the death
of respondents' decedent, who died as a passenger in a proto-
type aircraft. Immediately before the crash, the airplane was
traveling straight and level, at less than maximum speed, when
the right wing separated due to fatigue. The only issue in dis-
pute was the cause of the fatigue. After the trial court entered
judgment on the jury's verdict for defendants, the plaintiffs
appealed.
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed 651 on the grounds that
the jury's failure to attribute at least partial causation to the pilot
was against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence. On review, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals6 52 and remanded the case for consideration under
the correct standard of review-whether the evidence support-
ing the jury's verdict was sufficient to prevent a manifestly unjust
result. On remand, the court of appeals held that the defense
verdict was proper under the evidence submitted.653
D. SANCTIONS
In Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.,65 defendants un-
successfully appealed from a $4.9 million judgment in a wrong-
ful death action brought by the heirs of two Marine pilots who
were killed in an air crash. On appeal, defendants contended
that the trial court abused its discretion in enforcing discovery
sanctions that precluded them from contesting liability or prov-
ing-comparative fault. Defendants also contended that plaintiffs
were not entitled to damages exceeding $25,000, as their com-
plaint had only stated that damages were in excess of the trial
court's jurisdictional minimum of that amount.
The core of plaintiffs' product liability claim alleged that the
aircraft's engine fuel nozzles were defective. During pretrial dis-
covery, plaintiffs had been forced to involve the court no less
649 d.
650 867 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1993).
65 863 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ granted).
652 867 S.W.2d at 27.
653 Carr v. Jaffe Aircraft Co., 884 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994,
writ denied).
6" 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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than fifteen times to obtain orders compelling the production
of information from defendants. The trial judge found that de-
fendants' conduct amounted to "obfuscation, confusion, denial
and total stonewalling,"6 5 and, at one point, the judge became
so exasperated that he warned defendants' counsel as follows:,
"Let me tell you at a particular time I'm going to issue sanc-
tions. 56 Once issue [ ]sanctions are awarded in this case, you'll
wish you had to do it over." 57 In return to counsel's response of
"I understand that, your honor," the judge had further stated,
"No. Not really. Not until you've seen what issue[ ] sanctions
land on you. "658
Plaintiffs subsequently moved for issue and evidentiary sanc-
tions, which the court granted after noting that defendants had
failed to produce documents despite the issuance of fifty court
orders and that documents that defendants had claimed were
destroyed had later been found to exist. On its own motion, the
court also struck defendants' answers "in light of all the con-
certed activities to deter discovery." 659
Defendants then dismissed their counsel and substituted an-
other, who filed a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions
on the basis of the former counsel's affidavit that the offensive
acts were attributable to his office, not to defendants. Although
the court denied the motion, it modified its order striking the
answer to allow defendants to contest damages. Defendants
then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial from pro-
ceeding on this basis, which the court of appeals denied.
On appeal, defendants argued that the discovery sanctions
were inappropriate, insofar as the objectionable conduct had
been due to their counsel, not defendants themselves. The
court of appeals rejected this position, noting that the trial
judge had wide discretion in imposing discovery sanctions, and
finding that the evidence of client misconduct was "substan-
tial. '660 Defendants also contended that, because the trial court
struck their liability defenses, it should have entered ajudgment
by default and only allowed plaintiffs to prove their damages up
to the $25,000 stated in the complaint, resulting in a remittitur
of the $4.9 million judgment. The court of appeals rejected this
655 Id. at 29-30.
656 Id. at 29.
657 Id.
658 Id.
659 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29.
660 Id. at 31-32.
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argument, too, noting that plaintiffs had merely alleged that
their damages exceeded the trial court's jurisdictional mini-
mum.661 The court of appeals also affirmed the striking of com-
parative fault defenses, ruling that, "[h]ad the court allowed
Pratt to point the finger of liability at others, Pratt would have
been unprepared to defend against a shifting of responsibility
and Pratt would have been rewarded 'for its bad faith discovery
tactics.' "662
E. JURY TRLAL
In the wrongful death action of Craig v. Atlantic-Richfield
Co., 663 plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the district court's ruling
for the defendant, challenging the court's denial of her jury trial
demand and its rulings on various agency and negligence issues.
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had correctly de-
termined that plaintiff had waived her right to a jury, and it af-
firmed the court's other rulings. 664
Plaintiff's decedent was killed in an airplane crash in Indone-
sia in an airplane operated by Airfast. Decedent was employed
by Brinkerhoff, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Crowley, and
worked on an off-shore oil drilling platform that Brinkerhoff
and Crowley operated. Brinkerhoff had contracted with Atlan-
tic-Richfield Indonesia (not a defendant in the case), a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Atlantic-Richfield Co. (ARCO), to operate
the platform at a lease concession operated by Hudbay Oil.
Hudbay then contracted with Airfast to transport Brinkenhoff
employees, including plaintiff's decedent, from their former
work site in Singapore to Indonesia, and thence by helicopter to
the platform. Decedent was killed in the crash of one of the
chartered flights from Singapore to Indonesia when the pilot
attempted to land in severe fog.
ARCO originally demanded a jury trial, and plaintiff's coun-
sel subsequently stated in an affidavit that he relied on this de-
mand in not making his own. The district court, however, ruled
that ARCO did not have standing to demand a jury trial. The
district court also held that ARCO was not the decedent's em-
ployer within the meaning of the Jones Act, and, therefore, was
66, Id. at 33.
662 Id. at 34.
66 19 F.3d 472 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 203 (1994).
664 Id. at 479.
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not liable for his death. The court then proceeded to try the
case and entered judgment for defendants.
On appeal from the district court's denial of ajury trial, plain-
tiff argued that she had relied on ARCO'sjury demand and was
entitled to a jury trial under the Jones Act, the district court's
diversity jurisdiction, and the discretion vested in the district
court under FRCP 39(b). The Ninth Circuit rejected each of
these arguments.665
Plaintiff also argued that defendants were estopped from op-
posing her jury trial demand by their silence on the issue for
more than eight years. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
"some support" existed in its previous decisions for the "general
proposition that a party's course of conduct may prevent it from
relying on procedural protections in Rule 38 and 39."61 But,
the court of appeals held that "under Rule 39(a) (2), the court
may, on its own initiative, remove a case from the jury docket if
it finds that the right to ajury trial did not exist under a statute
or the Constitution. 6 7 That is what the district court did."
Plaintiff also contended that the Airfast pilot's negligence
should have been imputed to Brinkerhoff and Crowley under
agency theory, which the Ninth Circuit rejected after finding
that the defendants lacked the requisite control.668 The court of
appeals also rejected plaintiff's challenge to the district court's
finding that neither Brinkerhoff nor Crowley had acted negli-
gently, ruling the neither company had any reason to anticipate
Airfast's negligence, as Airfast was "a reputable and well-estab-
lished air carrier."6 9 The Ninth Circuit also rejected plaintiff's
argument that liability should be imputed to the defendants on
the basis that the Airfast airplane was an "appurtenance" of the
oil drilling platform.
The extraordinary decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Shaffer v. Maier 71 arose out of a wrongful death action brought
by the estate of a pilot whose Cessna 340 piston twin crashed
because of engine failure shortly after taking off from Cincin-
nati's Lunken Airport. The engine failure was caused by mis-
fueling with jet fuel by a FBO operating as a fuel dealer for
65 Id. at 476-77.
66 Id. at 477.
667 Id. (citations omitted).
668 19 F.3d at 478.
669 Id.
670 Id. at 479.
671 627 N.E.2d 986 (Ohio 1994).
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Standard Oil of Ohio. At the close of the trial, the jury returned
a general verdict in Standard's favor but also responded affirma-
tively to a special verdict interrogatory asking whether the fuel
dealer was an "apparent agent" of Standard.
After the jury returned its general and special verdicts, the
trial court had noted the irreconcilability of the findings con-
cerning Standard but determined that the general verdict
should conform to the special interrogatory. Accordingly, the
trial court had entered judgment against Standard for the entire
amount of plaintiff's damages. The Ohio Court of Appeals,
however, discredited the interrogatory response by relying on
the "common knowledge" rule typically invoked in automotive
service station cases, in which the courts take judicial notice of
the general public knowledge that service stations are independ-
ent operations. Extending this rule to the aviation context, the
court held that the plaintiff could not have reasonably believed
that the FBO was an agent of Standard. The court of appeals,
therefore, reinstated the general verdict for Standard.
Before the Ohio Supreme Court, the first issue addressed was
whether the appellate court erred in ruling on the "apparent
agency" issue as a matter of law. The Ohio Supreme Court re-
jected the appellate court's extension of the "common knowl-
edge" rule to cover FBOs, and questioned whether, even in
automobile cases, the general public knows that service stations
are independent dealers.Y
The second issue addressed was whether it was proper for the
trial court to conform the general verdict to the special verdict
against Standard. The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the jury
was likely confused by plaintiff's direct and vicarious liability
theories at trial.673 While acknowledging that the relief was ex-
traordinary, the supreme court remitted the matter under an
order giving plaintiff the option of retrying the apparent agency
theory against Standard or accepting a fifty percent reduction of
the judgment.6 74
F. COSTS
In Holmes v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,675 appellant challenged various
aspects of a costs award granted to Cessna Aircraft Co. by the
672 Id. at 988-89.
673 Id. at 989-90.
674 Id. at 991.
675 11 F.3d 63 (5th Cir. 1994).
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United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
With respect to the trial court's taxation of witness travel costs,
the Fifth Circuit reversed based on its view that the costs were
necessary.676 The court ruled that the expert witness fees and
photocopying costs were excessive and remanded for a
recalculation.
VIII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg,6 7 an important decision
safeguarding judicial review of punitive damages awards, the
United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 1910
amendment to the Oregon constitution barring such review.
The Oregon amendment prevented judicial reductions of puni-
tive damages awards by limiting review of jury findings to cases
where "the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to
support the verdict."678 Therefore, in cases where there was evi-
dence to support a punitive damages award, the courts were
powerless to reduce awards inflated by passion or prejudice.
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the seven-member
majority stressed the importance of the procedural component
of the Due Process Clause and the long English and American
common law history authorizing judicial review of excessive
damages awards. 679 The Court noted that, among United States
jurisdictions, only Oregon flatly prevented review of the size of
punitive damages awards, no Oregon court in the past half-cen-
tury had ever inferred passion or prejudice from the size of an
award, and, in the past ten years, no Oregon court had even
"hinted" that it might have the power to do so. 6 0 Consequently,
the Court found that the Oregon amendment unconstitution-
ally removed one of the "few procedural safeguards which the
common law provided"6 1 against the "acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property""' that the Due Process Clause was in-
tended to prevent. The majority rejected the respondent's argu-
ments that Oregon's existing procedural safeguards (limitation
of punitive awards to amounts pleaded; use of the clear-and-con-
vincing evidence standard; a never-used, pre-verdict court proce-
676 Id. at 64.
677 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
678 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
679 114 S. Ct. at 2335-38.
680 Id. at 2339.
681 Id. at 2341.
682 Id. at 2340.
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dure setting the maximum punitive damages awardable; and
detailed jury instruction) were adequate substitutes for the lack
of review of excessive awards.683
The underlying personal injury action arose from an overturn
accident involving an all-terrain vehicle (ATV). The jury
awarded $919,390.39 in compensatory damages, reduced by
twenty percent for contributory negligence, and $5,000,000 in
punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the action to
the Oregon Supreme Court for further proceedings.6
IX. INSURANCE COVERAGE
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Dawn Aeronautics, Inc., 68 5
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware held
that a fatal air crash was covered by a policy of aviation liability
insurance (AV Policy) and not covered by an airport compre-
hensive general liability insurance policy (AP Policy).
The decedent had rented an aircraft from the insured's flight
school so that he could continue training for his private pilot's
license examination. The airplane crashed, resulting in dece-
dent's death. The decedent's estate gave notice of a claim to the
insured and the insurer. The insured filed a declaratory relief
action.
The insurer conceded that the AV Policy for bodily injury ap-
plied to this claim. The court held that the medical expense
coverage of $1000 per person was also applicable.686 But the
court held that the AP Policy did not apply because of the exclu-
sion for bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
or use of the airplane.687 The court rejected the insured's argu-
me.nt that "bodily injury" did not include death, which would
have rendered the exclusion inapplicable, on the basis that the
policy did not specifically define bodily injury as including
death.61" The court called the insured's interpretation "both il-
logical and contrary to a plain reading of the insurance
contract."689
683 Id. at 2341.
68" 114 S. Ct. at 2341.
M No. 93-65-JF (D. Del. Dec. 10, 1993) (text available in AVIATION LITiG. REP.,
Jan. 11, 1994, at 19501).
w6 Id. at 19507.
687 Id. at 19508.
68 Id. at 19510-11.
68" Id. at 19511.
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In National Union Fire Insurance v. Care Right Ambulance,69 ° in-
terpreting Texas law, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no
insurance coverage pursuant to a breach of warranty endorse-
ment of the insurance policy where the insured had converted
the aircraft.69' The subsequent confiscation of the aircraft,
which might have been covered under the war risk endorsement
had the aircraft not been converted, was irrelevant to
coverage.692
Under a lease agreement for use of an airplane, the lessee was
prohibited from subleasing the aircraft and was required to pro-
vide insurance. The lessee breached the lease by subleasing the
aircraft, which subsequently was seized by the Columbian gov-
ernment for an airspace violation. The lessor's insurer paid for
the loss of the aircraft and later filed a subrogation action
against the lessee's insurer.
First, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the unauthorized sublease, resulting in confiscation of the
aircraft, was a conversion as a matter of law.693 Next, the court
held that the breach of warranty endorsement, which excluded
losses resulting from conversion, among other things, barred
coverage for the loss in this case.694 The court rejected the ap-
pellant's argument that the war risk endorsement of the policy,
which covered losses resulting from confiscation and other risks,
superseded the exclusion for loss resulting from conversion.6 95
Coverage terminated upon the conversion of the aircraft and
was not resurrected following the confiscation.6 96
In Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,6 97 a long-running insurance
coverage dispute over Hughes Aircraft's claims for indemnifica-
tion for its settlement of thousands of personal injury claims by
Tucson residents arising from alleged groundwater contamina-
tion from Hughes Aircraft's activities near the Tucson airport,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in certain insurers' favor. The coverage dispute fo-
cused on the applicability of the pollution exclusions contained
in the insurance policies issued to Hughes from 1956 through
690 18 F.3d 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 293 (1994).
691 Id. at 329.
692 Id.
693 Id. at 325-28.
64 Id. at 329.
695 18 F.3d at 329.
696 Id.
697 22 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1993).
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1985 to injury claims arising from Hughes' improper disposal of
the solvent trichloroethylene (TCE) into unlined ponds.
Hughes had settled the personal injury claims in 1991.
The 1971-1985 insurance policies contained the standard avia-
tion form AVN 46A pollution exclusion which Hughes argued
applied only to "aviation" risks and not to hazardous waste dis-
posal. The Ninth Circuit, finding the exclusion ambiguous, re-
versed the summary judgment against Hughes.69 8 The pollution
exclusion in the 1974-1985 policies also was limited to "sudden
and accidental" discharges. The Ninth Circuit held that, under
both Arizona and California law, "sudden" connotes temporal
brevity, and, therefore, pollution caused by long-term hazardous
waste disposal practices was not subject to the exclusion.69
Hughes also argued that the pollution exclusion should not
apply because TCE was not a known contaminant at the time of
discharge. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the policy lan-
guage did not require contemporary knowledge that a dis-
charged substance was a contaminant or pollutant, but only that
the discharge be of "toxic chemicals, liquids . . . or other
irritants."1 7 0 0
The district court had granted summary'judgment to the in-
surers who issued policies from 1956 through 1971 on the basis
that the harm caused by the pollution was "expected" by
Hughes. The Ninth Circuit ruled that, for Hughes to have "ex-
pected" the harm to occur, it must actually have known or be-
lieved that the harm was "substantially certain" or "highly likely"
to result 70 1 As Hughes' subjective knowledge was a question of
fact, summary judgment was reversed 0 2 The court also re-
versed summary judgment for these insurers on the basis that a
question of fact existed as to whether any of the claimants were
injured prior to 1971.7°3
In Coleman v. Charlesworth,7 °4 the Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed judgment in favor of an insurer in a declaratory relief
action to establish that there was no coverage for injuries and
deaths resulting from a hot air balloon accident.
698 Id. at 1436.
6" Id. at 1437.
700 Id at 1438.
70, Id. at 1439.
702 22 F.3d at 1440.
703 Id.
704 623 N.E.2d 1366 (I. 1993).
1995]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
The insured offered commercial sightseeing flights in hot air
balloons. The insured purchased a policy providing aviation
premises and products liability insurance; however, the policy
was never received because the insured failed to obtain a coun-
tersignature. A cover note issued by the brokers identified the
type of insurance, which allowed the court to refer to the insur-
ance policy to determine coverage.
The aviation premises provision of the policy provided cover-
age for bodily injury or property damage "in or about the prem-
ises." The court found that there was no coverage because the
injuries occurred fifteen minutes after the hot air balloon had
left the balloon port when it struck electrical power lines.70 '
The policy also covered bodily injury or property damage "else-
where" in the course of any work or the performance of any
duties carried out by the insured, but it excluded injuries or
damage caused by aircraft owned, used, or operated by the in-
sured.706 The court held that the exclusion applied.70 7 The
court also held that the products liability provision of the policy
did not apply because it covered only bodily injury or property
damage arising from a good or product, whereas the offering of
a balloon ride was a service.7 °8
X. FAA ENFORCEMENT/LOCAL REGULATION
A. CERTIFICATE ACTIONS
1. Pilot Certificates
In the appeal of Robinson v. NTSB,7 °9 the petitioner helicopter
pilot obtained a reversal of the NTSB's order affirming the
FAA's emergency revocation of his airline transport pilot certifi-
cate (ATP), which occurred after the pilot allegedly executed a
takeoff in a twin-engine helicopter while only one engine was
operating. The District of Columbia Circuit remanded the mat-
ter to the NTSB, holding that the emergency revocation could
not rest solely on circumstantial evidence in the face of contrary
direct evidence.710
The FAA's revocation order was based on the testimony of a
senior airport operations agent that the pilot had advised that
705 Id. at 1368.
706 Id.
707 Id.
708 Id. at 1369.
709 28 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
710 Id. at 216.
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he was having trouble with one engine. Subsequently, the agent
observed the helicopter "skid" around the heliport, which he
characterized as an attempt to make a single-engine takeoff.
One of the pilot's passengers, however, testified that both en-
gines were operating. Another witness, the director of mainte-
nance where the pilot landed after the alleged single-engine
flight, testified that the pilot, after landing, described having
trouble with one engine, which the maintenance director found
was too warm to handle. The maintenance director also testi-
fied that a non-operating engine does not generate heat and
that firewalls prevent heat transfer between the engines. The
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the NTSB's affirmance
was arbitrary and capricious, as the Board failed to adequately
explain why it discounted this evidence, given the lack of contra-
dictory evidence, and remanded the matter for a further
explanation."'
In Booher v. United States Department of Transportation,'1 peti-
tioner sought review of an NTSB order suspending his pilot's
license. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the suspension.
On July 10, 1989, petitioner, a commercial pilot, made a non-
incident emergency landing on South Carolina Highway 11 and
parked his plane on the side of the road. Later, he and the
airplane were discovered by a Highway Patrol trooper, who saw
petitioner pouring gasoline in the airplane fuel tanks. Peti-
tioner explained he had been forced to land on Highway 11
because he had received contaminated fuel and had purchased
the new gas from a nearby Texaco station. Petitioner then took
off and completed his flight to Asheville, North Carolina.
After the incident, petitioner filed a report of his emergency
landing with the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program
(ASRP). The FAA doubted that the landing was necessitated by
contaminated fuel and held an evidentiary hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
The ALJ found that fuel starvation caused the emergency
landing, petitioner initiated his flight with insufficient fuel,'1 3
and fueled his airplane with automobile gasoline." 4 Both viola-
tions warranted suspension, the former violation was waived be-
711 Id.
712 28 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994).
713 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.22(a) (1992).
714 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.31(a) (1992).
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cause it was not deliberate. Petitioner finally argued that both
violations should be waived because he voluntarily filed the
ASRP report. FAA Advisory Circular No. 00-46C limits the FAA
in two respects if it seeks disciplinary action against a pilot who
voluntarily files an ASRP report. First, the report cannot be
used as evidence in the hearing. Second, violations that are "in-
advertent and not deliberate" must be waived. Here, the report
was not used at the evidentiary hearing and petitioner's fuel vio-
lation was found to be deliberate. Thus, the ALJ's suspension of
petitioner's license was affirmed.
In Henderson v. FAA,715 petitioner, a helicopter pilot, chal-
lenged a sixty-day certificate suspension imposed for his alleg-
edly unsafe operation of a helicopter carrying television
journalists on a photography flight over Corvallis, Oregon. The
suspension resulted from the FAA's findings that petitioner had
operated the helicopter at altitudes and airspeeds too low to al-
low a safe emergency landing in the event of mechanical failure
and had violated the 300-foot minimum altitude for helicopter
flights over congested areas. After the suspension was upheld by
an ALJ and the full NTSB, petitioner appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the suspension based on the find-
ing that petitioner had flown the helicopter at too low an alti-
tude and airspeed to allow a safe emergency landing, but
reversed the finding that petitioner had violated the 300-foot
rule on the basis that the rule exemption for photography
flights clearly applied. 716 The Ninth Circuit also rejected peti-
tioner's argument that his due process rights had been violated
by the ALJ, who, petitioner alleged, had "stifled," "interrupted,"
and "intimidated" him.717
In Howard v. FAA,718 the FAA suspended a commercial pilot's
license for forty days after he landed a VFR flight at an airport
that was operating under IFR. The FAA, and later the NTSB,
found that ground visibility was less than three miles and that
the ceiling was under 1000 feet when the pilot landed. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the pilot's defense that the poor visibility
was not "reported" because it had not been communicated to
him and ruled that the fact that the report had been available to
715 7 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1993).
716 Id. at 878-79.
717 Id. at 879.
718 17 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1994).
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the pilot was sufficient.719 The court of appeals affirmed the sus-
pension on the basis that substantial evidence supported the
agency's factual findings.
In Meili v. NTSB,72° petitioner appealed the NTSB's affirm-
ance of his thirty day license suspension, which arose from his
alleged unauthorized flight into the San Diego, California, TCA.
The ALJ cut in half petitioner's original sixty day suspension.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that peti-
tioner had violated the TCA as being supported by substantial
evidence. 72 1 The court of appeals rejected petitioner's argu-
ment that he had been prejudiced by the FAA's failure to retain
a copy of the air traffic control tape, finding the evidence "over-
whelming" that petitioner's version of events was "incredible."
722
In Nehez v. NTSB,72s petitioner, a commercial airline pilot,
sought review of the NTSB's affirmance of the FAA's finding
that he had operated an aircraft carelessly or recklessly. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision and rejected petitioner's
contention that the NTSB, in reviewing the FAA's decision, had
applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence.
The certificate action arose from a takeoff from -Des Moines,
Iowa, in which petitioner performed as second-in-command of a
commercial flight. Petitioner allegedly took off with a runway
visual range of only 800 feet, half the 1600 feet required mini-
mum. On appeal from the FAA certificate action, petitioner ar-
gued that the NTSB was required to show either that the
likelihood of potential harm from his acts was unacceptably
high or that his judgment was clearly deficient. The court re-
jected these contentions, noting that the standard urged by peti-
tioner applied to helicopters but not fixed-wing aircraft.724
Instead, the court noted that the appropriate standard was
whether petitioner's actions could have endangered life or
property.725 Accordingly, the court rejected petitioner's conten-
tion that the NTSB decision was unsupported by the evidence,
719 Id. at 1216-17.
720 8 F.3d 28 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion available at 1993 WL
384573 at *1 (Sept. 28, 1993)).
721 Id. at *3.
72 Id. at *4.
723 30 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 1994).
74 Id. at 1167.
7235 Id.
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as petitioner had executed a takeoff with only half of the re-
quired visibility. 7 6
In Sue v. NTSB,727 the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed an
order of the NTSB revoking petitioner's commercial pilot and
medical certificates.
On December 22, 1989, the FAA revoked petitioner's license
and medical certificate based on two offenses: (1) Sue made
false statements on his 1987, 1988, and 1989 medical certificate
applications; and (2) petitioner operated a seaplane below the
required altitude and without possession of the required pilot,
medical, and registration certificates.
Petitioner appealed the revocation before an ALJ who modi-
fied the penalty to an eleven month suspension. Both parties
appealed to the NTSB, which reinstated the revocation.
On his 1987, 1988, and 1989 medical certificate applications,
petitioner answered "no" to questions concerning past traffic vi-
olations, even though he had three convictions for driving
under the influence. The court found the alcohol related con-
victions to be material because they were relevant to the FAA's
decision to grant a license.72 8 It was also clear from the record
that petitioner had actual knowledge of the falsity of the
statements.72
9
Petitioner also contended that the medical application form
was confusing and ambiguous and to penalize him for his false
statements, therefore, would violate due process. Previous
courts had accepted this argument in the context of criminal
prosecutions due to the additional due process protections and
higher burdens of proof applicable in criminal cases. But, this
court declined to apply the greater protections associated with a
criminal proceeding to a civil administrative proceeding.
Petitioner was also charged with failing to adhere to altitude
restrictions when he flew under a bridge. Petitioner admitted
flying under the bridge but stated it was necessary because the
surrounding terrain was rough and wooded. The court did not
disturb the ALJ's factual finding that the under-bridge flight was
unnecessary and posed an unnecessarily high risk of danger to
petitioner's passenger and to the bridge itself.730
726 Id.
727 8 F.3d 30 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion available at 1993 WL
366559, at *1 (Sept. 20, 1993)).
728 Id. at *2.
729 Id.
7s0 Id. at *3.
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Finally, petitioner admitted he was not in possession of his
medical and pilot certificates on the day of the flight. The court
also upheld the ALJ's finding that the airplane's registration cer-
tificate was not on board during the flight in question.731
In Tur v. FAA,732 the Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's request
for review of an FAA order revoking his commercial pilot certifi-
cate, which found that petitioner lacked the qualifications re-
quired of a helicopter pilot. Petitioner appealed the
administrator's emergency order and an expedited hearing was
set before an ALJ. Petitioner had the option of proceeding with
the expedited hearing or waiving the emergency procedure to
allow him more time to prepare his defense. Petitioner chose to
proceed with the expedited hearing, which was held twenty days
after he was sent notice.
The FAA alleged that, on May 27, 1988, petitioner operated
his helicopter within 100 feet of a fire on a Redondo Beach,
California, pier, causing smoke and heat to blow on fire fighters,
temporarily blinding them. Noise from the helicopter also in-
terfered with the fire fighters' communications.
The FAA also alleged that on another occasion, petitioner ille-
gally flew in formation with a Los Angeles Fire Department heli-
copter rescue flight that was transporting a gunshot victim to
Cedar-Sinai Medical Center. This unauthorized formation
flight forced the fire department helicopter to alter its course
and bypass the landing site in order to avoid a collision with his
aircraft,
The ALJ found these. incidents were established by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence and indicated that petitioner
lacked the qualifications necessary to hold an airman's certifi-
cate. The ALJ sustained the revocation order. Petitioner then
appealed to the NTSB, which sustained the revocation.
In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, petitioner complained of
procedural defects in the prior hearing. First, he complained
that his offenses were more than six months old and did not
warrant the emergency procedures followed by the Administra-
tor. The "Stale Complaint Rule" disallows introduction of evi-
dence of offenses that are more than six months old, unless the
offenses address the airman's qualification.733 The ALJ made it
clear that the old allegations were not barred because the Ad-
731 Id. at *4.
732 4 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1993).
7w 14 at 768-69.
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ministrator's order and the evidence presented directly related
to the issue of lack of qualification.
.Petitioner also claimed that he was denied due process by be-
ing forced to respond to the charges within the expedited-time
frame of the emergency proceedings. Since petitioner himself
possessed the power to expand the time frame, the court held
this argument had no merit.734
Petitioner further argued that the NTSB did not serve the fi-
nal ruling within the sixty day period mandated by 49 U.S.C.
appendix section 1429(a). The Administrator's order to revoke
was effective October 1, 1991. The Administrator notified the
NTSB by letter dated October 17, 1991, and received on Octo-
ber 22, 1991. Notice of the final NTSB ruling was served on
December 16, 1991. The court held that the sixty day limit ran
from the date the NTSB was advised of the order. Therefore,
notice of the final disposition was timely.735
In Hernandez v. NTSB,7 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a rein-
statement of a full b6ard of the NTSB of the FAA's revocation of
-a commercial pilot's certificate for several convictions for drug-
related. offenses, none of which were involved with the pilot's
use of his certificate privileges. In, the initial appeal from the
FAA's certificate order, the ALJ had overturned the revocation
and ordered a twelve month suspension. The FAA then ap-
pealed to the full Board, which reinstated the revocation. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the revocation order after finding that
the board had not supplanted the ALJ's factual findings and
that the policy. of ordering revocation for non-certificate-related
drug offenses was not a new policy, thereby negating any ex post
facto concerns. 737
2. Medical Certicates
The matter of Woznick v. Richards7 38 came before the Sixth Cir-
cuit on a petition for review of the NTSB's order affirming sus-
pension of the petitioner's airman's medical certificate for
failure to produce requested medical records.
734 Id. at 770.
75 Id. at 771.
736 15 F.3d 157 (10th Cir. 1994).
737 Id. at 158-59.
73% 16 F.3d 1224 (6th Cir.) (unpublished opinion available at 1994 WL 33970,
at *1 (Feb. 7, 1994)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994).
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In September 1990, petitioner received his airman's medical
certificate. On the application form, he answered affirmatively
to questions concerning whether he had ever been hospitalized
or had traffic or criminal convictions. Concerning hospitaliza-
tions, petitioner stated that in 1990 he had undergone penile
implant surgery. Petitioner also revealed that he had one DUI
conviction and one other experience involving driving while
under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, the FAA Aero-
medical Certification Division notified petitioner that his medi-
cal certification was under review and requested submission of
records relating to the implant surgery and the DUI incidents.
After petitioner failed to respond, the FAA notified petitioner
that he was no longer deemed qualified to hold a medical certif-
icate and requested voluntary relinquishment of the certificate.
Eventually, petitioner produced a letter from his doctor,
which gave a brief account of petitioner's dysfunction leading to
the implant surgery. The letter stated that the doctor and a psy-
chological consultant believed that petitioner's problem was or-
ganic, not psychological. The FAA sent two more letters to
petitioner demanding that he submit the requested records and
surrender his medical certificate. Petitioner responded with an
affidavit stating that he could not relinquish the certificate be-
cause he had lost it. The FAA then issued an emergency order
suspending petitioner's medical certificate. Thereafter, the pe-
titioner sought and obtained a hearing before an ALJ.
Petitioner testified before the ALJ that he used alcohol infre-
quently and had never been treated for alcohol or drug abuse.
In addition, he testified that he had been convicted in 1981 for
setting false alarms, in 1988 for disorderly conduct, and, in 1972
for-assault and battery. The ALJ ruled that petitioner had failed
to comply with the FAA's request for medical records regarding
the implant surgery, held that the FAA had been justified in re-
questing those records, and upheld the emergency order of
suspension.
Petitioner next appealed to the NTSB, which concluded that
the FAA had reasonable grounds for seeking information re-
garding the penile implant surgery and that the petitioner's his-
tory of arrests suggested that a review of his medical and
psychological records was appropriate.
The Sixth Circuit noted that the NTSB findings would be up-
held, unless they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or that the
Board's factual findings were not supported by substantial evi-
1995]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
dence."73 9 In addition, the court ruled that the FAA was author-
ized to suspend an airman's medical certificate for failure to
comply with reasonable information requests. 740 After reviewing
the record, the court of appeals found that substantial evidence
supported the NTSB decision and upheld the suspension.74
Bullwinkel v. FAA 742 concerned a petition for review of an
NTSB order affirming the FAA's refusal to renew appellant's
third-class airman's medical certificate under the FAA's "no lith-
ium" rule. The airman had been taking lithium to control his
manic depressive mood disorder. The FAA, relying on 16 C.F.R.
sections 60.17(d) (1) (II) and (f) (2), had held that appellant's
history of mood swings, attention deficit disorder, and use of
medications justified disqualifying the pilot for medical reasons.
Bullwinkel challenged the NTSB's adoption of the "no lith-
ium" rule as being in excess of its jurisdiction and as an unrea-
sonable interpretation of the federal regulations. Appellant also
argued that the denial of his medical certificate was discrimina-
tory based on his handicap and, therefore, violated the Rehabili-
tation Act.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the first challenge, holding that
an agency adjudication provides an appropriate forum for deter-
mining the scope of regulations and articulating agency pol-
icy. 745 The court, however, rejected the "no lithium" rule as
being an unreasonable interpretation of 14 C.F.R. section
67.17(f), governing eligibility for medical certificates, ruling that
"even a cursory glance at section 67.17 makes it clear that this
regulation is aimed at underlying medical conditions, not medi-
cations"7 44 and that lithium did not fall within any of the prohib-
ited categories included in the regulations. 745 The court of
appeals also rejected the Rehabilitation Act claim.74
Based on its ruling that the "no lithium" rule could not rea-
sonably be derived from the regulations at issue, the Seventh
Circuit vacated the NTSB's affirmance of the FAA order denying
739 Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
740 Id. at *3.
741 Id.
742 23 F.3d 167 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15779 (1994).
743 Id. at 171.
744 Id. at 172.
745 Id. at 173-74.
746 Id. at 174.
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appellant's medical certificate renewal and remanded the mat-
ter for consistent proceedings.747
Hinson v. Hoovei 48 involved R.A. (Bob) Hoover, one of the
best-known pilots of the modem era. This year, the FAA re-
voked Hoover's medical certificate under an emergency order
because Mr. Hoover allegedly suffers from a "cognitive deficit."
In this NTSB order on the FAA's appeal from an ALJ's ruling
restoring Mr. Hoover's medical certificate, the NTSB ruled that
Mr. Hoover had failed to rebut the evidence of cognitive deficit
and reinstated the revocation of his medical certificate.
In June 1992, two FAA inspectors questioned Mr. Hoover's
fitness based on their observation of his performance at an air
show in Oklahoma City. Based on the FAA inspectors' reports,
the Federal Air Surgeon asked Mr. Hoover to submit to neuro-
logical, psychological, and psychiatric evaluations. After the first
tests results were unfavorable, Mr. Hoover requested and re-
ceived retesting.
The FAA's initial examiner, a psychiatrist, found that Mr.
Hoover suffered from a few abnormalities relating to short-term
memory and ability to recite numbers in declining order (e.g.,
counting backwards by seven units at a time). The psychiatrist
referred Mr. Hoover to a neuropsychologist for testing, based
on his opinion that the aggregate testing showed some form of
nonspecific aging pathology. A referral was then made to a neu-
rologist, whose examination was normal except for a SPECT
scan of the brain (a test in which blood-born radiation tracer is
imaged) showing a borderline possibility of areas of low blood
flow in Mr. Hoover's brain.
When Mr. Hoover was reexamined, a neuropsychologist
found that his range of cognitive responses ran from Impaired
to High Average. Another SPECT scan showed low blood flow
and an initial report explained the findings as suggestive of mul-
tiple strokes or degenerative changes. This reference was later
changed to read "normal variance?" because the neuropsycholo-
gist opined that Mr. Hoover's examination revealed some se-
lected risk signs that could be viewed as accelerated aging or
subclinical disease. At the hearing before the ALJ, FAA wit-
nesses testified that the retesting in 1993 actually showed a pro-
gressive deficit when compared to the 1992 test findings.
747 23 F.3d at 174.
748 1994 WL 57006, at *1 (Feb. 18, 1994) (NTSB Order No. EA-4094).
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Mr. Hoover's defense was first that the two reporting FAA in-
vestigators conspired to have him grounded. The board glossed
over this argument in its opinion. The board seemed to believe
it unnecessary to consider any Fourth Amendment problems in
the FAA's acts that caused Mr. Hoover to be examined, although
Mr. Hoover argued that he was told that the original neurop-
sychological testing would not affect his medical certification,
that the testing conditions were unexpected, and that the tests
were conducted in a hostile environment.
Mr. Hoover also introduced testimony from an examining
flight surgeon that he was fit to fly and that his neurological
examination was average for a seventy-one year old male. He
also had another neuropsychologist testify that Hoover had only
a mild impairment when the results were corrected for age.
Finally, Mr. Hoover introduced testimony from Dr. Antoinette
Appel, the first degreed neuropsychologist in the United States,
who testified that his performance at flying was the, best indica-
tion of his cognitive abilities and who criticized several of the
tests as inappropriate and raising false alarms.
The board, however, found that Mr. Hoover had failed to re-
but the results of his examinations showing evidence of cogni-
tive deficit and had merely suggested other explanations for the
poor test results. 74 9 The NTSB held that the initial testing by the'
first neuropsychologist, which showed cognitive defect, was
never refuted. The NTSB seemed to find that the SPECT scan,
specifically the analysis that perhaps showed a worsening from
1992 to 1993, was particularly persuasive in reversing the ALJ
and revoking Mr. Hoover's medical certificate. The NTSB also
criticized the ALJ's evaluation of medical expert testimony, find-
ing that, in excluding evidence proffered by the FAA, the ALJ
did not follow the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and, in-
stead, apparently applied the Federal Rules of Evidence.75 °
3. Other Certificates
In Greenwood v. FAA, T5 petitioner claimed many violations in
the FAA's suspension and non-renewal of his designation as a
pilot examiner. The Ninth Circuit only entertained the due
process arguments, found no violation, and affirmed the FAA
order.
749 Id. at *9.
750 Id. at *9-*10.
751 28 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1994).
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For fourteen years, petitioner had been an FAA designated
pilot examiner (PED) with authority to test pilots and issue pilot
certificates. The PED is a one-year designation terminable or
non-renewable under internal guidelines established by and
under the discretion of the FAA. 5
During a test, petitioner had required a student to perform an
optional maneuver, which resulted in a hard landing. This inci-
dent caused a temporary suspension of his PED, which was lifted
upon recommendation of a FAA inspector, less than a week af-
ter it was imposed. However, the inspector recommended that
petitioner's PED not be renewed upon expiration.
Despite the inspector's adverse recommendation, petitioner
submitted his application for renewal only four days prior to the
expiration date of his PED, instead of the required sixty days.
Nonetheless, he was given a flight check for renewal and failed.
After communicating with the FAA, petitioner was offered the
opportunity to reapply and to be retested for reinstatement. He
declined to accept and, instead, appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the FAA's decision to sus-
pend and not renew his PED was arbitrary and capricious. The
court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider this question be-
cause there is no judicially manageable standard by which it
could review the administrator's decision.753 Petitioner next ar-
gued that his procedural due process rights were violated when
the FAA suspended and non-renewed his PED. The suspension
of petitioner's PED was temporary and taken after an incident
which resulted in concern for safety. Petitioner was given an
opportunity to respond, which he did, and the suspension was
lifted. Petitioner, therefore, received adequate due process re-
garding the suspension.
Regarding the non-renewal of petitioner's PED, the court
held that he did not have a liberty or property interest in the
renewal because the decision to renew was within the FAA's dis-
cretion. Because he had no legitimate claim of entitlement to
renewal, petitioner was not entitled to procedural due
process.755
Petitioner also attacked the constitutionality of section 314 of
the Federal Aviation Act. However, the court held that he
752 See FAA Order 8700.1, § 9 (1989).
753 28 F.3d at 974-75.
754 Id. at 975.
755 Id. at 977.
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waived this challenge for failure to present a specific, cogent ar-
gument for consideration.756 Petitioner further asserted that
the FAA's internal procedure governing suspensions and renew-
als of PEDs was in violation of the APA, which should govern his
license, but the court rejected the claim due to his failure to
raise the issue below.757
Finally, petitioner argued that the agency's decision violated
his Fifth Amendment equal protection rights because in that the
decision not to renew was based on his age. The jurisdiction of
the court to review agency orders "depends on the adequacy of
the administrative record."758 The record before the Ninth cir-
cuit was inadequate to address this issue in that "the only infor-
mation in the record [was petitioner's] own assertions in letters
to the FAA that he believes the agency's motivation was his
age." 7
59
In Mace v. Skinner,760 a certified aircraft mechanic appealed
the dismissal with prejudice of his constitutional challenge to
the FAA's certificate revocation procedures. The dismissal was
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The action arose from the FAA's issuance of an emergency
order revoking the mechanic's certificate on the basis of alleged
violations of safety regulations stemming from his improper in-
spection and repair work. The mechanic challenged the revoca-
tion, which an NTSB ALJ affirmed. His appeal to the full board
was dismissed because he failed to file his appellate brief on
time. The mechanic then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
While this appeal was pending, the mechanic filed a separate
action in the United States District Court for the District of Ari-
zona, challenging, on numerous constitutional grounds, the
FAA's procedures for issuing emergency orders. The district
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling that jurisdiction to review NTSB deci-
sions was exclusively vested in the circuit courts of appeal. The
mechanic prevailed in his appeal from this dismissal on the basis
that the statute vesting exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in
the appellate courts did not apply to actions challenging the
FAA's revocations procedures in general, as opposed to the mer-
75 Id. at 975.
757 Id.
758 28 F.3d at 978 (citing Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers Ass'n v. FAA, 881
F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1989)).
759 28 F.3d at 978.
760 34 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1994).
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its of a particular revocation order.761 The court also noted that
the mechanic sought money damages in the district court ac-
tion, a remedy that was not available in the review from the cer-
tificate dismissal.762
Olsen v. NTSB763 involved a review of the NTSB's affirmance of
the FAA's revocation of an airframe and powerplant mechanic's
certificate for intentionally falsifying an aircraft logbook entry.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the NTSB ruling on the basis that
substantial evidence supported the charge against the
mechanic. The falsification involved false entries of aircraft en-
gine time at the point of sale to a third party, which were caused
by the mechanic's knowing failure to update entries in the log-
book for the aircraft, which he owned, and for misrepresenting
the date he last conducted an annual inspection.
The mechanic last performed an annual inspection of the air-
plane in November, 1990, at which time he entered a tachome-
ter reading of 2402:00 in the aircraft logbook. After this entry
was made, the mechanic knew the airplane had made two flights
of approximately thirty to thirty-five minutes each. In August
1991, the mechanic sold the airplane, representing to the buyer
that he had conducted the annual inspection one week before.
The mechanic then entered the tachometer reading "2402" in
the logbook and dated the annual inspection sign-off as August
9, 1991. After 2.83 operating hours, the purchaser took the air-
plane to his own mechanic, who determined that there were sev-
eral discrepancies in the aircraft that rendered it unairworthy.
The buyer then notified the FAA, which commenced an investi-
gation uncovering the mechanic's wrongdoing.
XI. DEBTOR-CREDITOR
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. United States Department of Transporta-
tion764 focused on a federal law under which an air route may
not be transferred between air carriers without the transferring
carrier's initial consent.765 At issue in this case was whether the
Department of Transportation (DOT) was authorized to trans-
fer a route over the bankrupt's formal withdrawal of its transfer
application prior to final approval.
761 Id. at 859-60.
762 Id. at 858.
763 14 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 1994).
764 15 F.3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
765 49 U.S.C. app. § 1371 (h) (1)(1988).
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Finding that the DOT's actions, in effect, protected the effi-
cient operation of the marketplace by ensuring that the route
was transferred to a carrier able to use it, the court approved the
action as within the DOT's discretion. 766 The court further held
that to allow withdrawal of a transfer application in the final
stages would hamper the public interest and administrative effi-
ciency.767 Given that the transfer ultimately would be subject to
the bankruptcy court's approval, the court held that the bank-
rupt's contractual rights were adequately protected.7 S
In In re Midway Airlines, Inc., 6° in response to efforts by a cred-
itor, an engine service facility, to enforce statutory artisan's liens
on an engine in debtor Midway Airlines' possession, the bank-
ruptcy trustee moved for summary judgment contending that
the creditor lacked a secured interest in the parts. The court
denied the motion, holding that undetermined factual issues ex-
isted that would determine the creditor's lien rights, which
would be enforceable despite the bankruptcy stay if it were
shown that Midway had no remaining equity in the parts.
The creditor had performed repair and testing services on the
debtor's engine parts beginning in the mid-1980s on an unwrit-
ten credit basis. In 1990, after the debtor established a pattern
of delinquency, the creditor advised that it would no longer ex-
tend credit and that the debtor's parts would not be released
until the debtor's balances were paid, plus a $100,000 advance
against future fees. The debtor made no payments and sent no
parts to the creditor for servicing.
The debtor had originally filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11. After that proceeding was voluntarily converted to Chapter
7, the creditor moved to have the automatic stay modified to
allow enforcement of its liens. The creditor claimed it had en-
forceable liens under New York, Texas, and Florida law, where
the engine parts were stored. The creditor also claimed a lien
interest on the parts for sums the debtor owed for services to
parts that had been returned to the debtor, by arguing that its
extensions of credit for future services had been calculated with
reference both to the anticipated fees for those services and to
766 15 F.3d at 1119.
767 Id. at 1119-20.
768 Id. at 1118.
769 167 B.R. 880 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
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the debtor's outstanding balance for services rendered.77 ° The
court accepted this argument and held that the creditor had a
colorable claim against the parts held for repair, which would be
determined by the resolution of the factual issues concerning
the parties' business relationship. 77' Noting that under 11
U.S.C. section 362(d) (2) the court may lift the automatic stay as
to collateral in which a debtor has no equity, the court denied
the summary judgment motion."2
XII. PENAL ACTIONS AGAINST PILOTS
AND PASSENGERS
In United States v. Compton,773 the Ninth Circuit affirmed de-
fendant's conviction for attempted air piracy but vacated entry
of judgment and sentence on his conviction for interference
with a flight crew member on the basis that the interference
charge was a lesser included offense of the attempted air piracy
conviction.
On February 10, 1991, defendant boarded a Houston-bound
Southwest Airlines flight in Oakland, California. Approximately
forty-five minutes after departure, he handed the senior flight
attendant a note stating he had nitro glycerin on his person and
a bomb in his luggage. This note demanded that the flight di-
vert to New York and that defendant be given $13 million in
ransom money before proceeding to Cuba.
The captain notified air traffic control of the problem and
descended from 26,000 feet to 10,000 feet to avert the loss of
cabin pressure in the event of an explosion. Defendant was
then informed that the flight did not have enough fuel to fly to
New York and would have to stop in San Diego. At that point,
defendant announced, "I'm not serious."
The plane landed in San Diego and defendant was arrested.
Defendant confessed he had attempted to hijack the flight be-
cause he needed money, but "after I got into it I decided it
wasn't going to work." Defendant was indicted, convicted, and
sentenced to thirty years for piracy and twenty years on the inter-
ference charge, the sentences to run concurrently.
770 Id. at 885,. The court noted that ordinarily an artisan's lien is relinquished
when the property is returned to the debtor, as it can no longer be said the
artisan was relying on the property to satisfy his fee. Id.
771 Id.
772 Id.
77-1 5 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1993).
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the piracy conviction on the basis
that delivery of the note alone was more than sufficient to com-
prise attempted air piracy, as it-constituted "the use of a threat
to seize the aircraft." 774 However, the court vacated judgment
on the interference charge, which was based on defendant's in-
terference with the captain's and flight attendants' duties, be-
cause it was a lesser included offense necessarily committed in
the act of attempted air piracy.775
In United States v. Oesterblad,776 defendants appealed the denial
of their motions to dismiss their indictments for fraudulent con-
spiracy and for mail and wire fraud. The indictment arose from
defendant's alleged fraud in a scheme of bonus mile acquisi-
tions that defendants redeemed for travel credits.
Defendants contended on appeal that their conduct did not
comprise a "scheme" or "artifice" designed to defraud the car-
rier of its "property." The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that "dishonest methods or schemes designed 'to
wrong( ] one in his property rights' or 'the deprivation of some-
thing of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching' will ful-
fill the scheme to defraud element,"77 7 and that the bonus mile
credits that defendants obtained satisfied the "property" ele-
ment of the fraud offense.778 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed
the trial court's finding that the bonus miles were "things of
value," and, hence, were "property" for purposes of the federal
mail and wire fraud statutes.779
In United States v. Ross,78 0 the United States appealed the dis-
trict court's suppression of two packages of cocaine that were
discovered in defendant's carry-on luggage by security employ-
ees of an air carrier on which defendant had been ticketed. The
incident occurred at the beginning of defendant's one-way
flight from Los Angeles to Chicago and on to Washington D.C.,
for which defendant paid cash, stating that shewas not carrying
any personal identification. Because of these facts, the air car-
rier required that her luggage be X-rayed at the ticket counter,
although defendant was not so advised.
774 5 F.3d at 360.
775 Id.
776 12 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion available at 1993 WL
478420, at *1 (Mar. 9, 1993)).
777 Id. at *1.
778 Id.
779 Id.
780 32 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The X-ray of defendant's luggage revealed the presence of
two unidentifiable items. An air carrier employee removed and
opened the first such item, a Rolex watch box that contained
cocaine. 'The employee advised the Los Angeles International
Interagency Narcotics Task Force, which dispatched an officer
who told defendant to open the- second unidentifiable item,
which also turned out to be. a container of cocaine. It was undis-
puted that the baggage searches were conducted in conformity
with FAA regulations which are directed at preventing sabotage,
hijackings, or terrorist acts.
The trial court suppressed the evidence of both packages on
the basis that the searches constituted state conduct and were
conducted without search warrants. With respect to the second
package, the court ruled that the air carrier's employee had
opened the package directly at the request of the narcotics of-
ficer, and, therefore, was acting as the government's agent in
conducting a warrantless search. The Ninth Circuit agreed that
the first search fell squarely within the state action rule, notwith-
standing the fact that it was conducted by the air carrier's em-
ployees, because "the search was part of the overall, nationwide
anti-hijacking effort." 781
In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Jenny,782 defendant
appealed his convictions on two counts arising from his intimi-
dation of flight crew members and one count arising from abu-
sive sexual contact, arguing that the district court had erred in
enhancing his sentence under federal sentencing guidelines on
the basis that he had recklessly endangered the safety of the air-
craft and passengers. Defendant had been sentenced to fifty-
one months imprisonment for each of the intimidation counts
and six months for the abusive sexual contact count, the
sentences to be served concurrently.
The convictions were based on the following facts: on July 29,
1992, the defendant boarded United Airlines Flight 475 from
Denver, Colorado, to Ontario, California, in order to serve his
sentence for a drunk driving offense. Upon boarding the air-
craft, the defendant was abusive to a flight attendant, and, dur-
ing the flight, repeatedly used vulgar expletives when addressing
the cabin crew, sexually molested a cabin attendant, and gener-
ally harassed the passengers. The flight was ultimately required
781 Id. at 1413-14.
782 7 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1993).
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to make an unscheduled landing in Grand Junction, Colorado,
where defendant was arrested and removed from the airplane.
In defense to premeditation charges at trial, defendant had
relied on expert witness testimony that he had a fear of flying
and suffered from severe alcohol dependency and that his ac-
tions were spontaneously caused by these factors, as aggravated
by dread induced by his forthcoming incarceration and from
leaving his girlfriend. On appeal, he argued that the district
court's application of the guidelines enhancing his sentence was
in error, basing his challenge on the argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support the finding that he had the req-
uisite "foreknowledge" to support a determination of reckless-
ness, an argument the Court of Appeals swiftly rejected.783
In State v. Omar T8 the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed de-
fendant's conviction for forgery of merchandise receipts he sub-
mitted to an air carrier for the purpose of avoiding Warsaw
Convention liability limitations for lost baggage.
Upon arriving in Istanbul, Turkey, on a flight from Cleveland,
Ohio, defendant discovered that his luggage had been torn
open and its contents stolen. Defendant claimed to have lost
$4450 in property. The air carrier agreed to pay defendant the
$640 mandated by the Warsaw Convention and promised to re-
imburse him completely if he could supply receipts for the miss-
ing items. Defendant then submitted altered receipts, and the
air carrier contacted the police.
Defendant appealed his conviction for forgery on the basis
that he did not have the requisite intent to defraud because he
was only attempting to regain the value of his lost property. The
appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed defendant's
conviction, ruling that, as the air carrier was only obligated to
pay defendant $640, his forgery was an attempt to fraudulently
obtain the $3800 difference.78 5
The appeal of State v. Waga, 8 6 arose from appellant's convic-
tion for "misconduct at an emergency," in violation of section
2917.13(A) of the Ohio Revised Code.
In attempting to land his "light weight fabric" airplane at
Freedom Field in Medina County, appellant crashed and the air-
plane came to rest upside down on the runway. Officers of the
783 Id. at 957.
784 No. 16562, 1994 WL 263234, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 1994).
785 Id.
786 632 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio CL App. 1993).
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Ohio State Highway Patrol assisted at the scene, including one
who instructed the appellant not to move the airplane from the
runway. Despite these instructions, appellant tied a rope to the
airplane and was again instructed not to move it. In response to
appellant's statement that he was going to move the airplane
anyway, the officer repeated her instruction, whereupon appel-
lant finally ceased his efforts. The officer then continued her
investigation and allegedly touched or pointed at the airplane
with her clipboard. The appellant requested that the officer not
touch the airplane because she might damage the fabric, where-
upon she arrested appellant for misconduct at an emergency.
Appellant argued to the Ohio Court of Appeals that the trial
court incorrectly overruled his motion for acquittal, that his
conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and
that the trial court incorrectly ruled that the Ohio statute was
not preempted by federal regulations requiring preservation of
wreckage at the scene of the accident. Appellant's first two
assignments of error were overruled by the court of appeals on
the basis that the evidence supporting his conviction was
sufficient. 787
The court rejected appellant's preemption argument ruling
that preemption was inapplicable where, as here, the court per-
ceived no conflict between the federal regulation and the Ohio
statute, as both were directed at preserving evidence at accident
scenes. 78 The court commented that its ruling was based on
the fact that the Ohio statute buttressed the federal provision
and stated that, in its view, appellant had violated the federal
regulation by attempting to remove the airplane from the
runway. 789
787 Id. at 547-48.
78 Id. at 548-49.
789 I& at 549.
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